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i 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis develops a participatory modelling process to study improvement in the 
management of irrigation efficiency, including physical and social dimensions in the 
context of arid and semi-arid regions of Iran. This study develops an interdisciplinary and 
participatory method to understand and strengthen collective decision-making in local 
Iranian farming systems. Specific attention is given to groundwater irrigated agricultural 
practices under the Iranian governance system to provide wider context. Kashan City, in 
central Iran is selected as a case study area for specific reasons, such as historical water use, 
the farmers’ rich indigenous knowledge, and successful agricultural practices under 
conditions of water scarcity. The accessibility and willingness of local farmers to engage in 
a participatory modelling process are considered. The thesis suggests the first use of role-
play simulation for irrigation management practices in Iran, is an effective and insightful 
method of achieving adaptive management solutions. The application of an innovative 
participatory simulation modelling with farmers revealed their main incentives for 
collective irrigation practices, their capabilities to learn and evaluate the system. It is 
argued that management decisions have major impacts on farmers’ livelihoods and 
therefore it is essential to integrate farmers’ perspectives in local governance to sustain 
agricultural productivity.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to this research and gives an overview of current global 
challenges in the management and governance of water resources. It then reviews the 
important role of groundwater irrigated agriculture, different approaches to groundwater 
management and the need for interdisciplinary water management as a new tool for the 
allocation of common-pool resources. The main aims, objectives and research questions 
addressed by the work, as well as the outline of the thesis structure and chapter by chapter 
elaboration of the research are presented in the final section. 
 
1.1. Global Water Resources: Challenges and Management 
Water is life; it is both ‘indispensable and incompatible in its form as drinking water’ (UN, 
2006), which reflects its vital role both for human society and for the environment.  
Water covers approximately three quarters of the Earth’s surface, and is almost ubiquitous 
beneath the surface. The total water resource on the planet is estimated at 1.38 billion cubic 
metres (109 m3), of which only 2.5 percent or 35 million cubic metres (106 m3), is freshwater 
and potable (Almasvandi, 2010). Over the past 100 years since 1900, while the global 
population has doubled, water consumption has increased by over six-fold (UNESCO, 2004). 
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Freshwater resources are essential components of nature, however, they are directly 
threatened by human interests and will be affected greatly by ‘anthropogenic climate change’ 
(Meybeck, 1998; UNESCO, 2006; Vörösmarty et al., 2000; Karl, et al., 2009). For example, 
half of the world’s wetlands have been destroyed since 1900, and to prevent the remaining 
wetlands from degradation, there is a need to address the threats and improve management of 
freshwater resources (Zedler and Kercher, 2005).  
Water systems and their management have been transformed globally through extensive land 
use change, the expansion of urban and industrial activities, massive engineering projects 
such as dams, reservoirs and irrigation infrastructure or water transfer schemes, which have 
sought to maximise human access to available water resources (Shiklomanov, 1999; 
Meybeck, 2003; Farming Committee of the Global Water System Project, 2004). Anticipated 
population growth, changing population distributions and uneven distribution of precipitation 
together lead to a reduction in per capita water availability. At the same time, increasing 
dependence on desalination, and increased water demand, will reduce the availability of 
potable water resources and, consequently new approaches for sustainable water management 
are essential.  
In developed world, extensive investment has almost ensured security of water supply for an 
estimated 190 million people; however nearly 80% of the world population (1,800 million) in 
low-income countries currently experience high levels of water insecurity (Water for Growth 
and Development, 2006). One of the main principles of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) was to halve the population around the world who lack access to clean water by 
2015, and provide safe drinking water; however this major challenge has yet to be resolved.  
Around 780 million people globally lack access to clean potable water, 2.5 billion do not have 
sanitation facilities, and 2-5 million people (over 5000 every day), mainly children, lose their 
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life every year because of water-related diseases (Gleick, 2003; UN, 2003; WHO and 
UNICEF, 2012; Gleick, 2014. p.1). Around 13 percent (over 800 million) people are living 
under conditions of poverty and food insecurity (UNESCO, 2004). Thus one of the greatest 
challenges of this century is providing sufficient water to produce enough food and balance it 
with other water demands and interests (UN, 2006; MDGs-United Nations, 2011).  
Within individual countries, the concentration of welfare and facilities in large cities in 
developing nations has attracted an increasing population and exerted more pressure on water 
supply resources and increasing competition between urban and rural areas. The ever 
increasing water conflicts in Middle Eastern countries on the competing use of water for 
energy development projects has become problematic (Siddiqi and Anadon, 2011). As 
agriculture and energy are the major users of water, these resources are closely interrelated 
and their sustainable consumption and management requires integrated approaches (Gleick, 
2014, p.5). The concept of the ‘water-energy-food nexus’ has been considerably neglected by 
policy decision-makers (Gleick, 2014). This concept was developed in response to the need 
for integrated sectoral policies to reduce the cost of water management and to add benefits to 
both human and nature for the future sustainable development plans (Ringler et al., 2013). 
Global assessment of water resources requires a systematic approach. Currently this 
assessment is based on fragmented data at a country level (Gleick, 2014) and when water 
demand reaches (or exceeds) water supply availability, water scarcity results. According to a 
standard hydrological index of water scarcity, (which defines it as “the number of hundreds of 
people who has to share one million cubic metres annually available renewable water”) by 
2025 around one third of the global population will live in water scarce countries, mainly in 
developing regions (Ohlsson, 1999). Scarcity of water essentially means that there is 
insufficient water to satisfy the requirements of agriculture, domestic and industrial water 
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uses, this is traditionally known as ‘first order water scarcity’. The associated problems of 
water scarcity are more than just a lack of water; they also affect many other social aspects of 
life, or known as ‘second-order water scarcity’, which requires successful adaptation of 
people to the first-order water scarcity (Ohlsson, 1999).  Successful water and groundwater 
management for irrigation under conditions of severe water scarcity and drought primarily 
depends on acquiring collective action and sharing knowledge by different resource users, 
which will be discussed in this study in Chapter 2. 
To a certain extent, agricultural intensification and adoption of modern irrigation technologies 
such as drilled wells and micro-irrigation systems, has reduced water and labour use and 
provided sufficient food to satisfy global demand through a market oriented approach (see 
Chapter 2). While this provides short-term economic revenue, there are disadvantages 
including the spread of pollution and over-exploitation of natural resources. Moreover, 
limitations in access to food, water, land and technology in lower-income regions has led to 
an unequal distribution of food (UNESCO, 2004). Technological solutions might act as a 
short-term alternative to improve efficiency or economic development; however given the 
lack of consideration to the social-economic aspects of local users, the long-term 
consequences are usually not taken into account (Gleick, 2003; Turral et al., 2010; Gleick, 
2014) (see Chapter 6). Within the past 60 years challenges in managing water resources have 
been addressed in many different ways. Early efforts mainly focused on the establishment of 
large-scale physical structures for water supply, e.g. dams to improve water availability. Later 
it was recognised that technology in itself is not sufficient to address water management 
issues. The concept of water governance emerged in the early 1990s, in recognition of the 
need for more integrated approaches to effective water management, and that the technology 
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alone is inadequate to address the continual water management concerns (UN 2003) (see 
Chapter 2).   
The United Nations consistently emphasised in the first World Water Development Report 
that: the “Water crisis is essentially a crisis of governance and societies are facing a number 
of social and political challenges on how to govern water more effectively” (UN, 2003, p. 
370). 
It is commonly stated that problems of water shortage mainly arise through mismanagement 
rather than for solely physical reasons (see Chapter 2). Water shortages may also reflect a lack 
of suitable institutions, corruption, bureaucratic phenomena and absence of sufficient 
investment in both human competency and physical infrastructure (UN, 2003).  
One of the indications of water scarcity is a decline in groundwater levels. Although within 
the last 20 years well-drilling technologies have reduced the cost of groundwater exploitation, 
the withdrawal rate has tripled during the last 50 years, and rates of groundwater extraction 
exceed recharge in many countries (UN, 2011) (see Chapter 2). Agricultural technologies and 
modern irrigation infrastructures have constantly led to increased food production and rural 
welfare; however this has only benefited a limited portion of the farming community 
population around the world (UNESCO, 2004). 
The water crisis and increased water demand represent social and political challenges for the 
future. According to UNESCO: 
“This can be addressed by modifying water demand and usage through increased 
awareness, education and water policy reforms. The water crisis is thus increasingly 
about how we govern access to and control over water resources and benefits” 
(UNESCO, 2006). 
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This suggests a need to develop more effective management practices for scarce groundwater 
resources, which particularly emphasise water demand management. Implementation of more 
efficient irrigation systems that are locally adapted by farmers is one of the main strategies in 
reducing agricultural water demand, improving efficiency and hence the sustainable 
management of groundwater resources that will be discussed further in this thesis. This 
statement also highlights the key role of education, raising awareness and stakeholders’ 
interaction and collective action in managing scarce water resources.  
In the next section the important role of groundwater resources particularly in irrigation 
management practices will be explored. 
 
1.2. The Role of Groundwater Resources in Irrigation Practices: Origins and 
Importance 
Irrigation represents an historical human adaptation to climate conditions and climate change 
specifically in the context of rainfall variability and resulting water shortages. Given the lack 
of adequate rainfall (which makes rain-fed agricultural practices difficult or unprofitable), 
irrigation has played a crucial role in providing an adequate and reliable source of water. 
Irrigation has formed and centralized social relations and human settlement; it has facilitated 
agricultural production and thus human wellbeing. Agriculture is currently the world’s highest 
water consuming sector (Lopez-Gunn and Llamas, 2008). Agriculture constitutes the earliest 
economic sector to formalize cultural and ethical values of land and water through human 
settlements (UNESCO, 2004). Today around 17 percent of the world’s cultivated land areas 
produce over one third or 40 percent of the world’s food demand (Siebert et al., 2005; Fereres 
and Soriano, 2007; Hanjra and Qureshi, 2010). The future climate change will impact on 
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water resources will be threatened by a reduction in available water resources (Falloon and 
Betts, 2010) which will increase demand for irrigated agriculture (Knox, 2012).  
Degradation of available water quality because of salinization is another threat for the 
sustainability of water and land resources. Ghassemi et al. (1995) estimates that of 230 
million hectares of irrigated land areas globally, nearly 45 million hectares are deteriorating 
due to ‘irrigation-induced’ salinization (Gowing et al., 2009). Sustainable agricultural 
practices are therefore required to meet the needs of both society and environment. Improving 
water management particularly irrigation efficiency is one of the main functions of 
agricultural practices which provides various benefits not only production of food (Knox et 
al., 2010) (see Chapter 6). The irrigation efficiency is an indicator to express the level of 
irrigation system performances, which for example in developing countries is around 38 
percent (FAO, 2002). Improving irrigation efficiency is crucial in water scarce countries, to 
sustain food production, groundwater sustainability and local farmers’ livelihood; which this 
study investigates further (see Chapter 6).  
During the twentieth century, irrigated agriculture played a crucial role in food provision and 
in rural development in many arid and semi-arid countries around the world (Amichi et al., 
2012). Globally, the estimated area of irrigated lands by 2030 will be 310 million ha, of which 
developed countries account for approximately a quarter of the total, while around 75 per cent 
is located in developing countries. China and India account for almost 56 per cent of the 
irrigated land (Bruinsma, 2009). Rain-fed areas covering an estimated 1,250 million hectares 
(5 times larger than cultivated lands), produce the remaining 2/3 of the world’s food 
production (UNESCO, 2004). Irrigation has a significant role in improving agricultural 
production for a growing population under conditions of a changing climate (see Chapter 6). 
Irrigation is also acknowledged for its role in ensuring food security and enabling 
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improvements in living standards, particularly for poor local farmers (Rijsberman, 2006; 
Turral et al., 2010). However agricultural development has various social and ecological 
consequences, including drainage problems and expansion of soil salinity (see Chapter 2). 
Farmers have developed different ways of using and crafting rules and agreements to manage 
irrigation systems in different parts of the world (Molle, 2003; Ostrom, 1994) (see Chapter 2, 
6). However, there is a need to emphasize the substantial role of groundwater resources in arid 
regions of the world, in irrigation. This is due to the adaptable abstraction of groundwater, 
which has enabled farmers to diversify and expand cultivation to secure food provision and 
overcome rural poverty (World Bank, 2006; Narayanamoorthy, 2007) (see Chapter 2).  
Currently annual groundwater abstraction rates are estimated at two hundred times more than 
oil in terms of volume. The concept of ‘groundwater footprint’ was introduced by Gleeson et 
al., (2012) to define the area needed to sustain groundwater use and groundwater-related 
ecosystem services. Their study of groundwater balances around the world showed that 
humans are overexploiting groundwater resources at unsustainable rates, and in aquifers 
which are essential for agriculture, particularly in Asia and North America (Gleeson et al., 
2012). Groundwater is used in many countries often as the main source of drinking water, and 
supplies potable water for half the global population. It also plays a significant role in 
irrigation and agricultural economy in dry regions of the world (Figure 1 and 2) (Turral et al., 
2010; Margat and van der Gun, 2013). For example data for India show that economic yield 
for land irrigated by groundwater is 5 to 10 times higher in comparison with surface 
irrigation. By increasing abstraction costs the crop value must increase, but in many cases 
poor farmers are unable to cultivate cash crops (Llamas and Martinez-Cortina, 2009). 
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             Source: Margat and van der Gun, 2013, p. 145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
                        Source: Margat and van der Gun, 2013, p. 141 
 
 
Since the early 1980s, there has been increasing investment in groundwater exploitation. This 
trend has been classified by Shah (2007) as a ‘groundwater economy’ which is particularly 
important in south-east Asian where it provides annual water flow offering higher flexibility 
in using groundwater in conjunctive use with surface-water resources (Barker and Molle, 
Source: IGRAC in WWDR2 (2004)   
Figure 1 Groundwater Abstraction Proportions based on Water 
user Sectors 
Figure 2 Groundwater Irrigated Areas by Countries 
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2004).  Shah and Raju (1988) analysed the informal groundwater market in regional economic 
scale in India, and later focused on intensive agricultural groundwater use in South Asia. 
These studies revealed the critical role of groundwater resources in South Asian’s rural areas 
and also the increasing water scarcity for economic development in that region (Shah et al., 
2003) (see Chapter 2).  
 
The increase in groundwater irrigation has largely arisen as a result of moderate levels of 
abstraction by millions of farmers in many arid countries in a quest for the major short-term 
benefits that groundwater development can generate. This occurred due to abundant, 
uncoordinated, and unplanned individual exploitation of groundwater resources, which is 
placing increasing stress on regional aquifers in many parts of the world (Llamas and 
Martinez-Santos, 2005; Margat and van der Gun, 2013). Many states have invested in 
building major dams, reservoirs and huge irrigation infrastructures (Gleick, 2003). In many 
developing countries, particularly in arid regions, numerous state-oriented large-scale 
irrigation schemes have been implemented, aiming for agricultural intensification to generate 
major economic benefit (Molle et al., 2008; Kuper, 2012).  
The green revolution that occurred as a consequence of increased irrigation led to a global 
increase of food production lands, from 140 million to 240 million hectares from the 1960s to 
the 1980s (UNESCO, 2004). However, this trend has led to unsustainable increased rates of 
groundwater abstraction (Siebert et al., 2005) and the bilateral impacts of increased water 
demand, drought and mismanagement in irrigation development schemes, has put 
groundwater resources at the risk of overexploitation. This development has mainly occurred 
in arid developing countries, where pumped-well technology had played a major role in 
irrigation practices for example in Southern Asia in areas with little government control. This 
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has subsequently resulted in significant groundwater depletion (Llamas and Martinez-Santos, 
2005; 2008). Besides the green revolution that occurred around the world, another silent but 
major transformation occurred mainly in dry regions. The spread of fairly cheap pump 
technology made revolutionary changes in access to both groundwater and surface water 
resources for irrigation. This moderate but global movement of farmers around the world to 
exploit groundwater resources through private pumped-well technology is described by 
Llamas and Martinez-Santos (2005) as ‘silent revolution’. A silent revolution has been 
reported by Wang et al. (2007) to extend over many arid regions in USA, South Asia, China 
and has been also observed in North Africa (Hammani et al., 2009). Llamas and Martinez-
Santos (2005) suggest that an important advantage of the silent revolution was its positive 
impact on many farmers’ socio-economic status, which enabled them to provide education for 
their children. In many developing countries the rural economy is largely dependent on 
groundwater irrigation to increase farmers’ income and employment (Smith, 2004; Turral et 
al., 2010) (see Chapter 2). Groundwater development has also significantly changed the 
labour force in many countries as a consequence of development in technological 
infrastructures (Llamas and Martinez-Santos, 2005) (see Chapter 3).   
 
During the silent revolution, many government agricultural agencies supported farmers by 
providing loans and energy subsidies, while the main focus of water management agencies 
was on planning, operation and maintenance of surface water irrigation systems. Thus 
groundwater development received much less attention from most policy makers (Llamas and 
Martinez-Santos, 2005; Margat and van der Gun, 2013). Some studies indicate that in regions 
where groundwater is a major source of water for irrigation, it is very challenging to control 
aquifer over-exploitation by water users, especially in areas where farmers’ livelihood 
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depends on agriculture (Llamas and Martinez-Santos, 2005). Thus, in this study groundwater 
irrigation practices at a local community level are used to explore and understand the 
management mechanism and governance structure through a participatory management study 
in case study area in Iran.  
In many developing countries, the high number of farmers involved in irrigation practices and 
the lack of accurate recording devices to monitor their abstraction rates, make it more difficult 
to control over-exploitation of groundwater (Berahmani et al., 2012). This is coupled with a 
lack of suitable institutions and financial investments on controlling or monitoring systems for 
groundwater resources (Berahmani et al., 2012). Regulating adaptable and community-based 
rules (and infrastructures) for resource use is particularly needed in countries where the 
government has always played a main role within authoritative and top-down management 
decisions for natural resources (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2001; Mukherji and Shah, 2005). 
This top-down policy, for example in Iran, has usually neglected locally adaptable 
management strategies and in most cases has not introduced suitable infrastructures and 
technologies for resource management.    
The amplified importance of groundwater resources for irrigation practices has increased the 
number of studies of groundwater governance using various analytical approaches within the 
last 50 years. In studies on groundwater governance three main schools of thought have been 
recognised (Faysse and Petit, 2013) including: Ostrom (1990) who consider groundwater 
governance as a collective action for common-pool resource management (Chapter 2). The 
common-pool resource approach is also adopted in this thesis as it addresses the local 
challenges in managing groundwater irrigation at local level and the role of collective action, 
which I will discuss further in this chapter and discussion chapters. The second main school 
of thought is Shah’s (2007) evaluation of ‘informal groundwater economies'. Shah concluded 
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in his thesis that groundwater governance in South Asia is not appropriate for an Integrated 
Water Resources Management (IWRM) approach (see Chapter 2), and the water policy 
regulation and administration are not applicable and are not practical (Shah, 2009). He argued 
that, as the main principles of the global water management frameworks (such as IWRM) are 
not practicable at regional scale, policy-makers are required to consider more realistic and 
practical approaches and identify mechanisms that justify the informality of groundwater 
economies. Shah suggested that there is a need to develop management strategies based on the 
particular characteristic of an aquifer (Shah, 2012). For example while a groundwater 
recharge project is more practicable in hard rock aquifers, alluvial aquifers require more 
indirect demand management strategies because of their particular context. Shah and Raju 
(1988) analysed the informal groundwater market at a regional economic scale in India. A 
well-known example is a project in Gujarat, in which adoption of the scheme on installation 
of electric power water supply for controlling groundwater abstraction by farmers was 
successful, as it had no negative effect on the groundwater economy (Shah et al., 2008).  Shah 
expanded his study to areas in Mexico (Scott and Shah, 2004), China and Spain (Mukherji 
and Shah, 2005). He developed a conceptual and methodological approach that resulted in a 
typology of the groundwater economy as the outcome of his worldwide evaluation of 
groundwater governance and use.  
 
The ‘political ecology’ dimension of groundwater management forms the third school of 
thought (Faysse and Petit, 2013). Political ecology emerged in 1970s to address ecological 
concerns within the human organisation or global economic systems (Paulson et al., 2003). 
The main concept in this field is that politics are important to understand the interactions 
between human and environmental degradation. This also concerns the power relations, and 
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specifically how environmental effects facilitate the control of powerful actors such as stat on 
people. This particularly concerns the challenges in access to natural resources, and the way is 
shaped by existing power relations among different stakeholders (Mukherji, 2006). 
The studies by Prakash (2005), Mukherji (2006) and Birkenholtz (2009) focused on intensive 
groundwater use for agriculture in villages and the states of India, and the socio-political 
challenges regarding groundwater abstraction. The main issues regarding the political ecology 
of groundwater resources that have been undertaken emphasise that how different access to 
groundwater resources (caused by water availability, abstraction regulations or governance) 
lead to unequal distribution of water among farmers. In this study, based on social research 
understanding, I will reflect on the issues of inequity in water allocation in groundwater 
irrigation management in Kashan (Iran) in Chapter 6; however, the political ecology of 
groundwater resources is not the main subject of this thesis. 
 
Prakash (2005) studied groundwater over-abstraction for irrigation in a village in Gujarat with 
the aim of assessing the impacts of declined water availability on increased differentiation 
between farmers. He suggested that because richer farmers who owned the wells refused to 
sell excess water to poorer farmers, agreements between rich and poor farmers to introduce a 
lower electricity tariff for water abstraction could reduce the risk on inequity in accessing to 
water for poorer farmers. Mukherji (2006) argued that confusion over groundwater 
governance structures in West Bengal and Gujarat, where there was no groundwater 
regulation, has led to overexploitation of aquifer. Birkenholtz (2009) analysed groundwater 
reform in Rajistan that was encouraged by the World Bank and which introduced more strict 
regulations on private property rights. Farmers agreed with the regulations of the reform as 
their assumption was that they can influence authorities. However in contrast their restrictions 
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have increased and they could not influence authorities’ decisions in governing groundwater 
resources (Faysse and Petit, 2012).  
 
In this thesis, the concept of groundwater and irrigation system management as a common-
pool resource is the main focus of analysis in the context of dry regions. Ostrom’s (1990) 
analytical approach is particularly selected for this study, to explore the potential in local 
irrigators within the state-led governance system of Iran. Also this approach can shed light on 
the related concepts such as community-based irrigation management; collective action and 
the use of simulation games to improve social learning processes at local level, which will be 
investigated in this thesis (see Chapter 6 and 7). Different governance systems have made 
these three approaches distinctive to achieve sustainable management, particularly from the 
aspect of engaging water users in governance, implementation and users' benefits (Faysse and 
Petit, 2012). Although these approaches share many similarities in their methods, each 
approach seeks a different focus for academic analysis. While the grounded ‘social dilemmas’ 
(or tragedy of common-groundwater resource) (Ostrom, 2007) in using groundwater resources 
are similar in all three measures, the institutional context, governance and implementation, 
informal rules and social norms vary between different places in different countries and 
cultural contexts. Schlager (2007) stated that groundwater case studies demonstrate the 
capability of local users in crafting solutions to their own local common-pool dilemmas. This 
is consistent with Ostrom’s (1990) viewpoint, which suggests that successful management of 
common-pool resources is more likely when users participate in the design, management and 
implementation of rules for water use, rather than when there is state management or 
privatization (see Chapter 6, 7).  
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In this section, I classify the main groundwater irrigation management concerns into broad 
themes, which help to analyse different aspects in a more structured way throughout the 
thesis. One general theme is a. local indigenous knowledge, which I will elaborate in the 
following section and will analyse further in Chapter 6, the other themes such as b. 
governance, c. adaptive management and participatory modelling will form the next broad 
themes to be discussed. 
 
1.3. Human-Related Water Scarcity: The Role of Local Indigenous Knowledge 
Groundwater scarcity is a social as well as a technological problem and as mentioned 
previously, solutions are difficult to find (Chapter 2) (Rosegrany et al., 2009; Cominelli and 
Tonelli, 2010). Regarding groundwater irrigation, generally farmers have been the 
stakeholders most affected in conditions of water crisis while “throughout the entire period… 
farmers have had very little say in the design and management of public irrigation systems” 
(Molle and Floch, 2008, p. 112).  Due to the fact that farmers are the main stakeholders of 
water usage around the world, if socially crafted norms and beliefs deteriorate as a result of 
unsuitable management practices, there is the potential for negative human impacts on water 
resources and destruction of formal rules (Dietz et al., 2003).  
Article 14 of the European Water Framework Directive (WFD), emphasises the need for 
stakeholder participation and the use of experts’ knowledge in the water management 
decision-making process (European Union, 2000). This active involvement of different 
interested parties to generate mutual respect will promote transparency and trust among 
various stakeholders. Also provision of accessibility to information and representativeness are 
some of the factors required for effective decision-making processes. Equitable water 
allocation and distribution represents the main foundation for managing scarce water 
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resources, while multiple organisational conflicts and disagreements in equitable distribution 
of water is the main cause of water scarcity (FAO, 2012) (see Chapter 2).  
 
In this thesis I will argue that participation of farmers in groundwater irrigation management 
and sharing knowledge is essential. This is important because of the crucial impact that each 
individual action and decision has on the pattern of water use particularly in the common-pool 
irrigation system (Lankford and Watson, 2007). The fundamental role of participation in 
water management under harsh and water scarce conditions is evidence as the competition, 
and probable conflict, for water is very common for sustaining livelihood. Groundwater 
management for irrigation where there is a severe water scarcity and prolonged drought 
chiefly depends on acquiring collective action and sharing knowledge by irrigators. Thus, this 
thesis emphasises the importance of creating a dialogue and discussion amongst local 
stakeholders, aimed for improving social learning process and local capacity building for 
groundwater irrigation management (see Chapter 6, 7). 
 
1.4. Groundwater Governance and the Role of Local Farmers’ Communities 
There has been little success in designing effective and successful groundwater management 
strategies. This is because of the complex nature of groundwater as an invisible resource and a 
common-pool resource property. Its governance also involves multiple users with different 
interests and stakes (Bouarfa and Kuper, 2012). Mukherji and Shah (2005) propose that 
successful groundwater management requires a shift from technical, legal or economic 
management towards a more integrated and holistic governance approach. 
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According to Mollinga (2008), water management is an inherently political process as it is 
based on water control in which ‘any human intervention in the hydrologic cycle that 
intentionally affects the temporal and/or spatial characteristics of water availability and/or its 
qualities, is a form of water control’ (Mollinga, 2008). Based on Mollinga’s viewpoint the 
technical/physical control, organisation/managerial controls and socio-economic and 
regulatory controls, must be carefully monitored to ensure effective water management.  
According to Mollinga (2008, P. 11-12) water allocation quotas and water rights comprise a 
crucial part of “everyday politics of water resources management”, and form part of the 
routine daily practices of water use and management among farmers.  In this regard, and 
particularly in irrigation practices in which water rights and allocation rules are practiced 
daily by farmers, the social associations and power relations need to be clearly addressed 
(Semmahasak, 2013). According to Azkia and Hooglund (2011) many of the problems 
associated with water abstraction and use, are related to pressures imposed by managers and 
local political powers. The role of local institutions and non-governmental organisations in 
empowering individuals and local communities’ capabilities has been generally neglected (see 
Chapter 6 and 7).  
Water management has been mainly controlled and regulated within the discipline of the 
natural sciences and engineering hydrology and through formal institutions for economic 
development purposes (Molle et al., 2008; Lankford and Hepworth, 2010; Pahl-Wostl and 
Kranz, 2010). Solutions that identify human need and address institutional arrangements are 
essential in confronting future irrigated agricultural practices in developing countries (Ostrom 
and Gardner, 1994; Lopez-Gunn and Llamas, 2008; Turral et al, 2010). This holistic approach 
is one of the main principles of the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
framework which seeks efficient and impartial sustainable water resources development and 
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management (Rahaman and Varis, 2005; Hooper 2006; UN-Water, 2007; Leidel et al., 2012; 
Semmahasak, 2013).  
 
1.5. Interdisciplinary Participatory Modelling Approach for Adaptive Groundwater 
Management 
Effective water resources management requires an integrative approach which includes both 
physical and social dimensions and their inter-linkages. Furthermore, interdisciplinary 
approaches to complex groundwater systems which address both socio-economic and 
environmental interests are critical. This thesis aims to develop an interdisciplinary and 
participatory modelling effort that engages participants in planning, designing and running a 
simulation exercise for their actual local irrigation practice. The study has partly contributed 
to the research effort by integrating a social simulation with a physical hydrologic model to 
achieve collective decision-making and foster dialogue (see Chapter 4, 7). Using an 
interdisciplinary method in a participatory and bottom-up approach can enable local farmers 
to contribute in government policy management and planning. This requires a participatory 
management approach using innovative methods for engaging various interests and 
viewpoints of stakeholders which this study has attempted (see Chapter 4, 6 and 7).  
The concept of ‘adaptive management’ played a key role in governing groundwater resources 
which was in the centre of Shah’s (2009) analyses. Shah (2009) considered users’ 
participation in water demand management strategies as essential for good water governance. 
The adaptive management was identified by Blomquist (1992) as one of the indicators of 
performance and it is an essential element in analyses of institutions (Blomquist and Ostrom, 
2008) (see Chapter 2). The adaptive management approach, by considering uncertainties and 
20 
 
complexities of water resource systems, provides a systematic basis for improving 
management-decisions. The adaptive management approach implements different 
management strategies by actively involving stakeholders in the management process. The 
stakeholders learn from the consequences of applied strategies. Within an iterative and 
adaptive process of developing, implementing and monitoring of water resources 
management, the best management solutions can be formulated. This thesis aims to develop 
an innovative and participatory irrigation management process, which would lead to more 
effective adaptive management strategies (see Chapter 7). 
Adaptive management is the most effective method in complex water resources management 
because this approach to water management allows stakeholders to learn from past 
experiences and adopt more appropriate solutions. Adaptive management is substantially 
different from traditional methods of resource management, which were based on command 
and control. The approach is based on discussion, mutual dialogues, scenario planning and 
quantification of risks to reach an acceptable solution. Within this approach, centralised 
governance is replaced by polycentric governance, following shared responsibilities and a 
participatory resource management approach. Adaptive water management also integrates 
technical, social and ecological problem solving approaches. 
It is important to develop new approaches for water re-allocation which utilise natural and 
technological mechanisms, in combination with social and cultural considerations that are 
responsive to uncertainty and complexity of water management decision-making process 
(Poff et al., 2003; Qadir et al., 2003; Forouzani and Karami, 2010). Therefore, this study takes 
into consideration the local social and physical circumstances of farmers in an 
interdisciplinary effort, in order to provide a more integrated approach that also adds more 
complexity into a management process. As adaptive management approach is a learning-
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based process, participation of stakeholders is essential. Adaptive participatory process can 
empower local farmers in their decision-making and social learning process (see Chapter 7).  
Some of the major water policy agendas, for example the European Water Framework 
Directive (EWFD, 2000) have emphasised the importance of stakeholder engagements 
through participation. In article 14 of the Water Framework Directive (WFD), a participatory 
approach to engage stakeholders’ perspective is promoted.  Implementation of the WFD 
presents water managers with considerable challenges. Water systems are complex and the 
majority of expert knowledge is represented in computer models with many and varied 
uncertainties (Walters, 1997). The Rio Conference and Agenda 21 (1992), and the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) and Johannesburg Plan of Implementation in 2002, emphasized the importance of 
access to knowledge and public participation of stakeholders in decision-making to achieve 
justice in environmental management. Because water management is closely linked with 
many different human activities that potentially have conflicting interests over water, water 
policies must consider competing values, interests and the perspectives of various 
stakeholders during the decision-making process (Blomquist and Schlager, 2005; Blackmore 
et al. 2007). Socio-economic aspects of water related issues are embodied in different expert 
disciplines and different actors, who have specific interests in water resources. As a result, 
both physical and socioeconomic knowledge are frequently challenged by stakeholders 
(Fischer, 2003). 
In this thesis a physical hydrological model is integrated with a social simulation exercise in 
an innovative and community-based manner. While there are different modelling approaches 
in the field of natural resources management to engage stakeholders in adaptive management 
process, here a participatory modelling process was developed with stakeholder participation. 
22 
 
The integration of stakeholder perspectives in the decision-making process is considered the 
most effective method for resource management and allocation (Mitchell et al., 2012). It is 
suggested that the combination of a participatory modelling process within adaptive 
management will lead to more deliberative and legitimate outcomes that take into account the 
different perspectives and viewpoints of users. Considering the crucial role of groundwater 
users’ perspectives in management decisions, the participatory modelling approach was 
selected to deliver well-informed and adaptable management solutions in the specific context 
of Kashan, Iran.  
The modelling process in this study develops a simulation role-play game which was designed 
by local farmers (see Chapter 4). An interdisciplinary modelling study was also undertaken by 
incorporating some of the local factors (e.g. scenarios) in a hydrological model and then 
discussing the outcomes with farmers to generate further dialogue. Using simulation models 
to manage complex natural resources such as groundwater or irrigation systems have been 
found to be effective social methods to elicit knowledge from stakeholders (e.g. Ostrom et al., 
1994). 
The modelling process, in contrast with common social research methods, are effective in 
visualizing the real system (i.e. invisible groundwater resources) for participants, which forms 
an ideal basis for investigating farmers’ behavioural approaches, motives or conflicts for 
collective action regarding common-pool resources (Burton, 1989; Hagmann and Chuma, 
2002) (see Chapter 4, 7). The participatory simulation model developed for groundwater 
irrigation management in this study also aimed to foster discussion and dialogue amongst 
participants so as to achieve collectively agreed management solutions which could be locally 
adaptable by farmers in Kashan. 
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The use of models in decision-making process is not a recent development as they have been 
applied in many studies from 1961 onwards (Rouwette et al., 2002). Different modelling 
approaches include group modelling or cooperative modelling (Tidwell et al. 2004), shared 
vision mapping (Palmer, 1999), and collaborative decision making (Kreamer and King, 1988). 
They all have a common aim which is to engage stakeholders in the process of 
conceptualizing and analysing knowledge and viewpoints into illustrative output (i.e. a model) 
to tackle a complex problem (Van den Belt, 2004). Participatory modelling creates group 
thinking and a dialogue exchange which can lead to group learning or social learning (Van 
den Belt, 2004).   
Hydrological models can only represent specific and limited features of the physical 
environment. However, they create a ‘black box’ in which both stakeholders and policy 
decision makers may be unable to verify the legitimacy and validity of their outcomes and to 
what extent their predictions are realistic (as examined in Chapter 4). These models are 
heavily dependent on the modeller’s expertise to produce a more reliable picture of the future 
which can be trusted to influence the policy-making process (Shackley 1997). The use of 
existing models might eventually be challenged by stakeholders, and when there is a lack of 
trust in the model results, it can ruin the process. In this study, the use of a hydrologic model 
is developed within a participatory modelling process (see Chapter 4). The main inputs and 
the final outcomes of the model are discussed and validated based on local farmers’ 
knowledge. This has eventually increased the level of their trust to the model outcomes, thus 
the use of model was not entirely challenged or rejected by stakeholders (see Chapter 7).  
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1.6. Thesis Aims, Objectives and Scope 
This thesis investigates the potential role of participatory role-play games for irrigation 
management, within an adaptive management approach in the Kashan area of central Iran.  
The combination of disintegrated water management practices in Iran, inappropriate water 
allocation, low efficiency of irrigation distribution system and unsustainable water 
developments has failed to provide sufficient water for social, agricultural and environmental 
demand. Usually government policies depend upon technology or imported management 
strategies from abroad to address water management problems. Under this situation there is 
insufficient room to develop democratic approaches for participatory or community-based 
local resource management. This has led to a lack of capacity to improve the effectiveness of 
management decisions for the main stakeholders and to empower local institutions to adopt 
locally suitable technologies or management solutions. Understanding local stakeholders’ 
behaviour can improve local water use efficiency. Thus this study contributes to the limited 
literature on social dimensions of farmers’ ‘deep’ knowledge, their behaviour in decision-
making and how they cope with water scarcity at a local level. Moreover, this research 
develops an innovative and participatory method to engage local farmers in in-depth 
discussions of the local management process. The study included the development of a 
simulation role play exercise within an interdisciplinary study effort for the first time, which 
engages local stakeholders from the beginning throughout the modelling process and also 
incorporates their viewpoints into a more technical hydrological model and its outcomes. The 
aim is to empower farmers’ decision-making capacity within an adaptive water management 
process. The research examines the potential value of utilising innovative social simulation 
methods such as role-play game for achieving collective decision-making, to elicit more in-
depth and valuable knowledge and improve communication among local farmers. In this 
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study, a novel Irrigation Management Game (IMG) was used as a participatory modelling tool 
to provide detailed analysis on how to achieve agreement and collective decisions on 
irrigation systems in a way which is sensitive to the local situation (see Chapter 4, 7). This 
participatory management process should ultimately lead to a more transparent, self-organized 
and educational procedure for farmers to select better irrigation management options in the 
particular social-cultural and political system of Iran. 
The Kashan case study area is located in central Iran: a region of arid climate with a low 
annual precipitation (140 mm/year) and high temperatures. The area is characterised by two 
separate mountain and plain regions. This study investigates groundwater irrigation practices 
in the arid plain region of this case study. Groundwater is the main source of water and 
farmlands are mainly cultivated with wheat, barley, maize, pistachio and pomegranate by 
small-scale farmers (see Chapter 4). 
The aim of this study, to understand the effective role of role-play games in participatory 
adaptive irrigation management is addressed by the following objectives:  
1. To evaluate the local capacities of farmers to participate in irrigation management game 
processes in the arid and semi-arid context of Iran; 
2. To investigate farmers’ perspectives and knowledge on different irrigation regimes, water 
use efficiency, contemporary water management challenges and the future difficulties for 
groundwater sustainability through social research method; 
3. To examine the local motives and obstacles for shifting towards more self-managed and 
effective irrigation performance through participatory adaptive management and investigate 
how the occurrence of social learning could be facilitated and improved;  
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4. To develop an innovative participatory simulation modelling process with farmers to 
facilitate more collaboration and mediating between governmental authorities and farmers 
towards organization of a successful adaptive management approach.  
1.6.1. Thesis Structure and Outlines 
This chapter has reviewed the main challenges regarding global water management and 
governance and produced an overview of the main problems. It sets out the research questions 
and the main aims and objectives of the research. 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of this study. It is presented in two parts; the first 
giving an overview of the global water management problems particularly the current water 
crisis in arid regions of the world such as in the Middle East, the importance of groundwater 
resources for irrigation practices and existing governance problems in dry countries. The 
second part discusses the implementation of the participatory adaptive management approach 
in successful groundwater irrigation management around the world. This emphasises the 
crucial role of stakeholders’ engagement in the development of participatory modelling for 
improving resource management decisions. 
Chapter 3 consists of two main parts; Part I reviews the traditional water management and 
irrigation practices in Iran in three sections. First, it summarizes the geographical and climatic 
characteristics of Iran to provide background of the country; and second section describes the 
traditional irrigation water exploitation systems (i.e. Qanat). The third section provides a 
chronology of the water governance and management system of Iran including current 
challenges. Part II reviews the current water and irrigation management problems under the 
Iran’s governance system, also the recent changes in management approaches towards 
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participatory management. Finally the existing barriers for resource users to participate in the 
government management-decisions are reviewed.  
Chapter 4 introduces the methods and describes the socio-economic as well as the biophysical 
characteristics of the Kashan case study area in arid central Iran. The methodology is divided 
into three parts: it first describes the social research methods that were used, including 
interviews and a role-play simulation. Second, it describes the development of the companion 
modelling process in a participatory simulation exercise and the use of a hydrological model 
of Water Evaluation and planning system (WEAP) for testing the scenarios obtained from the 
Role-play Game (RPG) simulation. Third, it describes the process of resource mapping, 
selection of participants and the development of the Role-play game for irrigation 
management study with Iranian farmers.  
Chapter 5 describes the WEAP hydrological model and reviews its implementation in various 
case studies. A justification of choosing this model and its capability to incorporate socio-
economic aspects of water management is provided. The results of the scenario evaluation are 
given in the final section. 
Chapter 6 first reflects on the empirical findings of existing challenges regarding groundwater 
irrigation governance and management in Kashan, using interviews and group discussions 
with local farmers. The chapter then considers the empirical findings on the most influential 
factors affecting farmers’ participation and behavioral approaches in joining governmental 
irrigation management schemes in the region. 
Chapter 7 reflects on the outcomes of the participatory role-play game exercises as well as 
farmers’ discussions and perspectives regarding the hydrologic modelling outcomes. The 
chapter then argues for the need to enhanced capacity building through local institutions for 
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local farmers, and the need for a transition towards more adaptive and participatory irrigation 
management in Iran. 
A review of the main research contributions and findings is provided in Chapter 8. Further 
recommendations, research gaps and potential for development of future participatory 
simulation exercises, particularly in a similar climate and management context are presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Flowchart of Thesis Methodological Structure 
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1.7. Conclusion 
In summary this chapter has provided a general review of the existing global water-related 
challenges. It highlights the crucial role of groundwater resources as the main water supplier 
for social and economic development in arid regions of the world. Different concepts such as 
adaptive management, integrated and participatory modelling, local knowledge and farmers’ 
engagement into management processes have been the main emphasis for developing the 
main objectives of this research study.  The following chapter reviews the concepts regarding 
groundwater irrigation governance and the recent management approaches that provide 
further rationale for the methodological approach adopted for this study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
Conceptualising Participatory Water Management; Reinforcing Collective 
Action Using Simulation Games 
 
Introduction 
This chapter develops the theoretical context of this study, expanding on the topics introduced 
in chapter 1, and elaborates on the research approach and the methods. The literature review 
provides broader perspectives on water and irrigation management, within certain biophysical 
and socio-cultural contexts. In particular, participatory adaptive groundwater/irrigation 
management is used as a foundation concept of this review to analyse and support research 
arguments and justify the research methods.   
In this chapter, the context is divided into three parts: Part I. reviews global water 
management and governance systems. In this section, the analysis of the water crisis focuses 
on arid and semi-arid regions specifically in water scarce countries. The causes for conflicts, 
governance and the challenges for irrigation management are reviewed.  Part II. reviews 
farmers’ decision-making. The literature review focuses on areas where water users 
(irrigators) are effectively engaged in the management and decision-making process to create 
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their own water governance system. Part III. reviews participatory adaptive water 
management at local/regional level, and particularly outlines empirical literature on the use of 
simulation games within participatory water/irrigation management to improve decision-
making process and irrigation efficiency. This strand of the literature is utilised to shape the 
methodology design (Chapter 4), in which I test and examine an innovative methodological 
approach to engage stakeholders in the management-decision process to reinforce collective 
action by local irrigators, within social learning process. 
 
PART I: Global Water Management 
2.1. Water Crisis in Arid and Semi-arid Regions:  ‘A wicked’ Problem 
Water scarcity emerges from a lack of available freshwater resource. This is partly a drought-
related phenomena but it also reflects policy failures leading to inefficient water delivery and 
distribution of water within the public or private sectors in addition to water overuse. These 
are mainly social and governance factors and result in water crisis over a long time (Loftus, 
2009). The World Water Development Report (WWDR) (2006) and Human Development 
Report (HDR) (2006) have indicated that water scarcity is a consequence of inefficient 
governance and failed policies and management plans rather than the particular environmental 
characteristics of a region (Loftus, 2009). 
A ‘water crisis’ is a familiar situation that has frequently occurred in arid and semi-arid parts 
of the world. This has caused ongoing historical water conflicts within and between nations in 
arid regions (Hatami and Gleick, 1993; Kamash, 2007). Water related disputes, particularly in 
the Middle East, go back to ancient eras (e.g. Tigris and Euphrates River basin is a symbolic 
example of water-related conflict~5000 years ago). Several recent reports (Ehrlich, 1972; 
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Gleick, 2000; Allan, 2002; Amery, 2002; Wessels, 2009) on water conflicts in this region, 
indicate that these problems continue today. The nature of existing  arguments vary from 
conflicts over management of water supply, to issues of water accessibility and allocation at a 
national or international level (i.e. when water delivery systems are targeted to be attacked 
during modern wars) (Hatami and Gleick, 1993). Some statements emphasise the severity of 
water conflict, for example Hans van Ginkel (1999) indicated that 'Conflicts over water, both 
international and civil wars, threaten to become a key part of the 21st Century landscape' 
(Financial Times, 15 March 1999, p. 4).  Also Butler (1995: 35) stated that 'nowhere is the 
potential for a water war greater than in the Middle East' (e.g. Starr, 1993; Lonergan, 1997). 
 
Alongside these pessimistic perspectives on the potential for future water disputes in the 
Middle-East, there are some optimistic viewpoints that ‘water wars’ will not occur in this 
region. One of the earliest suggestions in this regard was made by Deudney (1991:26) who 
argued that the precious characteristics of water will make war less likely (Elhance, 1997; and 
Wolf, 1995, 1999). Alam (1998) argued that there is increasing evidence of collaboration 
around the world, to support international cooperation for freshwater management between 
nations. Alam’s ‘water rationality’ concept is particularly expected from cooperation between 
India and Pakistan for good management of their shared water resource (Indus waters). It is 
proven that water war does not result in any long term security for the two nations (Alam, 
2002). This concept suggests that countries will eventually act in ways to encourage security 
of their freshwater supplies through cooperation and negotiations. 
Dolatyar and Gray (2007) have denied the potential for water war in the Middle East region, 
mainly due to the fact that water is very essential substance of human resources and it will 
cause greater damage to put water at the risk of war. Some scholars argue that water disputes 
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can contribute to tensions around available water-supply resources; however the scarcity of 
water resources will generate greater collaboration between stakeholders for more equitable 
decision-making and innovative technologies for more negotiations among politicians to 
resolve water management problems (Dolatyar and Gray, 2007; Wolf, 1999; Hatami and 
Gleick, 1993).  
Currently global water planning and management is challenged by diverse complexities, 
uncertainties and disagreements, and hence they are called ‘messes’ (Ackoff, 1979) or 
alternatively ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973). The ‘ill-defined’ (wicked) nature 
of water management problems reflects uncertainty, a limited understanding of water system, 
and the associated risks in decision-making and different viewpoints that describe the social 
value of water resources (Rittle and Webber, 1973; Reed and Kasprzyk, 2009).  
Rittel and Webber (1973) described water management and planning as a class of wicked 
social value problem, as the problem was characterised by the following:  
1. a lack conclusive formulations;  
2. problems can be true or false; 
3. they are unique; 
4. they incorporate decisions that are usually irreversible, and  
5. the consequences of planning and management decisions are uncertain or even unknown. 
 
Only a fraction of the water resource management literature addresses the particular ‘wicked’ 
nature of water management problems through combining social, technical and scientific 
measures (Reed and Kasprzyk, 2009).  Yet, finding management solutions for water resources 
requires further consideration of the variety of knowledge, perspectives and values in the 
decision-making process for sustainable water management. As a consequence, there is a need 
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for different innovative methods of collaboration, to help improve water management and 
planning (e.g. HarmoniCOP, 2005; Mostert et al., 2007). This thesis addresses this gap by 
developing an interdisciplinary and innovative participatory method with stakeholders for 
local groundwater irrigation management (see Chapter 5). 
Effective water resource management requires an integrated approach, which considers both 
physical and social aspects and their interactions for local or regional water management (See 
Part II). Under a condition of high uncertainty relating to the future sustainability of water 
systems, there is a need for more adaptive management solutions, which this study has 
investigated through its participatory modelling, using simulation role-play game (see Chapter 
4). Water management has been perceived for a long-time as a political issue which must be 
controlled and managed under top-down governmental regimes, particularly in authoritative 
and arid countries of the world including Iran. However, modern management approaches 
seek more democratic and collaborative practices for the future sustainable management of 
available water resources (see Chapter 1). According to Ostroms’ (1990; 1992)  worldwide 
experiences, more effective and successful water management, particularly of smaller scales, 
is certainly possible through collaborative effort and a bottom-up approach, which involves 
water users in management decisions.  Thus, in this study the development of a democratic 
and participatory approach for adaptive irrigation management with Iranian local farmers is 
designed and developed. This is undertaken within a particular farming community setting, in 
the arid Kashan region of the country. It is argued that in developing countries, specifically in 
the Middle-East, finding alternative solutions to the water crisis is even more problematic, 
because deterministic governmental policies are heavily dependent on technology to 
overcome water management conflicts (see Chapter 3).  
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Under this situation, there is usually a lack of capacity to improve water supply sources or the 
water transmission infrastructure as well as a lack of capacity and budget to empower 
institutions to make effective decisions. Consequently there has been little consideration and 
effort to develop democratic approaches to water management. There is a need for more 
investment in collaborative and integrated decision-making process in order to encourage 
participatory management at a lower level. This study addresses these shortcomings and 
management failures within Iran’s authoritative governance system in terms of the problems 
this poses for water and irrigation management practices. To address this problem, I have 
reviewed existing approaches for successful irrigation management globally, presented in the 
third part of this chapter. I will emphasise the advantages of using participatory water 
management approaches, the characteristics of a successful participatory irrigation 
management and the way it should be applied in an interconnected social-ecological irrigation 
system. I will also address this question of whether this approach can lead to transition to a 
more transparent, democratic and sustainable water management within the particular socio-
cultural and political system of Iran (see Part III of this Chapter and Chapter 7). 
 
Before moving on to the participatory water management concept, this chapter reviews some 
of the most fundamental and recent management frameworks and perspectives. This will be 
the basis to develop my approach to more adaptable and sustainable water management for 
future groundwater resources management. 
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2.2. Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) Framework: Principles and 
Shortcomings 
Traditional water resource management approaches have been mainly sectoral (domestic, 
agriculture, industry, environmental conservation, etc.) and lack effective coordination 
between different sectors. This has made this approach inadequate for addressing 
global/national water challenges. Due to the fact that water is flowing in nature and 
crisscrosses boundaries, particularly in river streams, the previous perspectives for 
development have resulted in various socio-economic and environmental disadvantages. Top-
down centralized governance system in most Middle-East regions is mainly focused on 
supply-side management, and lacks a holistic vision for effective and integrated water 
management and development plans. This has led to insufficient and unsustainable water 
development plans in many developing countries (Xie, 2006). This trend has been observed in 
nations under fast development path, for example in Iran the supply-side water management 
efforts after the revolution (and during 1960s) have been concentrated on engineering and 
technical solutions such as establishments of hydro-power dams (see Chapter 3). The 
centralised governance and management approach has not led to integrated and successful 
water management strategies in Iran and over only a few decades has provoked a water crisis 
in the country.   
Hence, as discussed the water crisis in both Iran and in other arid regions is currently regarded 
as a consequence of governance rather than physical scarcity. The inadequate water 
allocation, pollution, low efficiency of water supply or distribution services under 
disintegrated management approaches, fail to equally provide water for public and private, as 
well as social and environmental water demands (Xie, 2006). These limitations have led 
global regulatory bodies to create the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
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approach to address traditional water management practices. This has opened a new paradigm 
for future sustainable water management (Figure 4).  In 1992, the Dublin Principles were 
merged into the Agenda 21 of the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED). These have greatly influenced the expansion of the IWRM and its widespread 
application around the world.  IWRM can potentially put the Dublin principles into practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              Source: www.newater.info, Accessed 2015 
 
The Global Water Partnership (GWP, 2000) (an international organisation to promote 
sustainable water resources management), has defined IWRM as: (emphases are added in 
bold) 
“a process that promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and 
related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an 
equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.” 
Figure 4 Integrated and Adaptive Water Management 
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This definition emphasises the coordinated nature of the framework in terms of its holistic 
view which considers social and economic equality in management decisions as well as the 
sustainability of the water resources.  
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) definition of this 
framework is: 
“IWRM is a participatory planning and implementation process, based on sound science, 
which brings together stakeholders to determine how to meet society’s long-term needs for 
water and coastal resources while maintaining essential ecological services and economic 
benefits.” 
 
From these two definitions it can be concluded that IWRM is a coordinated approach which 
considers water and land resources in conjunction, for sustainable management and equitable 
social and economic welfare. It utilises a participatory process that is based on scientific 
understanding and adopts a democratic approach for the long-term ecological and economic 
beneficiaries.  The participatory aspect that is embedded in this framework definition is the 
key factor that links this framework to the adaptive management approach. The integrative 
aspect in terms of engaging various stakeholders, scientific vision and sustainability in 
ecological and economic features of water bodies in the future is another feature of this 
framework. This framework is a process and a tool in which different development projects 
can be evaluated. It does not provide direct prescriptions for water resources problems, but 
offers broad guidelines, principles and tools in an integrated mode which should be tailored to 
the particular context of any country or region (Xie, 2006). 
In this framework the main conceptual approaches are: ‘Integration, Decentralization, 
Participation, and Economic Sustainability’ (Xie, 2006). This integrated approach aims to 
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address the shortcomings of sectoral approaches in traditional water management by including 
economic, social and environmental development in all horizontal sectors influencing water 
management. 
In addition to horizontal integration, vertical integration synchronises local, regional, national 
and international water users and organisations (Figure 5). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                          
                             Source: Gurunathan, 2013, P. 4 
 
Although IWRM provides some fundamental principles for a comprehensive and integrated 
framework for global water management, many criticisms and weaknesses have been 
suggested as the framework has been widely implemented in different countries. For example, 
the framework has not considered different socio-economic and physical variations in 
environmental conditions when rapid changes make the water management practices more 
complex and challenging (Biswas, 2008). According to Biswas (2008), this framework does 
not have any practical quality or value for recent and future water management, and has not 
Figure 5 IWRM: Vertical integration structure 
Figure 5 IWRM: Vertical integration structure 
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improved water management at a macro or medium level (in South-east Asia and Latin 
America) (Biswas et al., 2004).  
 
Three indications are believed to be the main downfalls of the IWRM framework (Biswas, 
2008). First there is no clear definition of this concept or not any usable and implementable 
definition exists, which has reduced the application of this framework. Second, it is argued 
that many institutions around the world are still just continuing traditional management 
policies whilst attracting more funds and global acceptance without sufficient results. The 
third criticism outlined by Biswas (2008) is that a single paradigm of IWRM framework 
cannot simply be applied to diverse countries because the systems of governance, legislation, 
collaborative decision-making process and type of institutions are different from one country 
to another. More importantly, different social norms, cultures, physical and economic 
attributes, financial and institutional capacities and organisations (e.g. around groundwater 
abstraction) differ in different regions and countries. His conclusion is that fully integrated 
water management cannot be done and is not achievable in the real world. Although this 
framework provides comprehensive guidelines for policy makers the implementation of this 
approach is not applicable particularly in many developing countries.  
 
The IWRM framework gives a holistic view to management approaches which are more 
legitimate in comparison with traditional top-down management system. However, 
inapplicability of the IWRM framework to the governance structure, legislation and 
collaborative decision-making process of Iran as well as the lack of institutional capacity to 
empower resource users’ communities are the main reasons that this was not selected as a 
chief framework for this study. To implement this framework, it is important to translate the 
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IWRM guides into measurable criteria at a level that provides feasible integration of water 
resources in specific contexts. Furthermore, this framework does not adequately consider 
groundwater management decisions under conditions of high uncertainty. Moreover, this 
framework does not address the distinctive context of local irrigation management and does 
not provide practical solutions which can be achievable in short period of time. That is not to 
say that none of the principles of IWRM are applicable. Indeed in my study, I emphasise 
stakeholders’ involvement in management processes and participatory actions. Water use 
efficiency is one of the main management instruments in IWRM that plays a crucial role in 
water demand management which is undertaken for this study. The main focus is to undertake 
a community-based management approach and to develop a participatory management 
process to achieve adaptive and locally relevant solutions, which are integral to some of the 
main principles of this worldwide framework.  
 
My research focuses on groundwater resources. Here, the distinctive factor is that existing 
management approaches are very different from surface water resources. The conventional 
approach for groundwater resource management and governance is to balance water 
abstraction by the level that does not exceed recharge rate in a long-term within a particular 
aquifer; this is also known as the ‘sustainable yield’. It has been argued that the IWRM 
framework would not be the best option for dealing with the groundwater over-abstraction 
phenomenon in developing countries (Moench, 2007).  Moench (2007) argues that the lack 
progress in implementing conventional management framework (such as IWRM) to 
groundwater resources is a combination of social, technical, behavioural and organizational 
limitations that exist in different countries. This is why the adaptive solutions that can address 
the inherent limitations in different management context as well as the social aspects of 
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groundwater resources are more effective than global water management frameworks. He 
argues that regarding groundwater resources, because the scale and boundaries of aquifers are 
unrecognisable and very difficult to identify, there is a mismatch between the scale and 
boundaries of human institutions and water management plans to develop any watershed 
institutions or management within the IWRM approach (Moench, 2007).  
 
The adaptive management paradigm has emerged to address the impacts of climate change 
and high uncertainty and complexity that exist in managing groundwater resources. The 
adaptive management approach has been selected for this study over the IWRM framework 
because it can better account for the experimental participatory irrigation management 
practices in Kashan and their impacts on groundwater resource sustainability; flexibility in 
management approaches; self-organization by local users, high uncertainty of future 
groundwater resources under climate change. Adaptive management can also promote more 
deliberative methods of water management, and is more sensitive to the local conditions. 
 
The adaptive management process provides useful community-based research and 
participatory tools (Mitchell et al., 2012). However, such approaches to groundwater resource 
management have not been widespread and the literature is not extensive. Ostrom’s (1990) 
work on the role of social capital in managing common-pool resources by local communities 
has been a notable exception.  
Recently the importance of farmers’ decision-making behaviours for groundwater 
management has been noted (Mitchel et al., 2012). This is directly influenced by the level of 
farmers’ engagement and collaborations for management (see Chapter 6 and Part II of this 
Chapter). There is still a lack of integrated management approaches which link physical and 
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social aspects of groundwater management and which involve the participation of different 
stakeholders.  
 
2.3. The Contemporary Challenges to Groundwater Irrigated Governance  
The management of groundwater resources has faced different historical trends, and shows 
different features and problems in its development. Within the second half of the 20th Century, 
groundwater was considered as a threat to irrigation systems. This threat was due to the fact 
that irrigated systems were leading to a rise in the groundwater table leading to common 
problems of soil salinization and water logging or the so-called ‘twin-menace’ for many 
farming systems around the world (Bouarfa and Kuper, 2012). Large-scale irrigation and 
drainage schemes were applied around the world, for example in Pakistan 8000 public tube-
wells were dug in following drainage programs and government provided subsidized diesel-
powered pumps for numerous private tube-wells (Johnson, 1989). Drainage was increasingly 
considered as a supplementary water source given the lack of available surface-water supplies 
in large-scale agricultural schemes (Beltran, 1999). 
Studies in Australia on the Murray Darling Basin emphasized improving drainage systems to 
remove excess salt from soil and lowering the groundwater table to avoid water logging 
problems (Beltran, 1999). Bouarfa and Kuper (2012) argued that the biggest challenge to the 
twin-menace problems occurred when the groundwater table dropped as a consequence of 
high number of private tube-wells. Water logging problems disappeared, but groundwater 
depletion has created a secondary reason for salinization due to poor groundwater quality 
(Kijne, 1995). Improving drainage systems in arid zones is necessary as without this, most 
systems are unsustainable (Bouarfa and Kuper, 2012), however, by using appropriate 
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agricultural practices, soil salinity can be elevated as illustrated in North Africa by Bouarfa et 
al., (2009) and Ghazouani et al. (2009).  
The main challenges regarding groundwater irrigation practices still remain problematic in 
arid and semi-arid regions. Shah et al. (2000) has identified a coherent framework of the three 
main problems that may occur for groundwater resources: 1. Depletion of aquifer due to over-
exploitation; 2.Water logging and salinization due to inappropriate drainage and 3.Pollution of 
groundwater caused by agricultural, industrial and/or by domestic inputs. These three major 
problems are common in most arid regions that are dependent on groundwater resources for 
irrigation including the Kashan case study area in Iran. The main governance issues around 
groundwater resources are established based on controlling mechanisms, using economic 
tools and incentives such as increased water tariffs, removal of subsidies, penalties for over 
exploitation (see Chapter 6). However, this study looks at different innovative management 
approaches that encourage irrigators to collective decisions which are community-based and 
adaptive (see Chapter 4, 7). 
By increasing demand for agricultural products, technological investments for exploiting 
more of groundwater resources have increased. According to literatures (e.g. Molle et al., 
2003), changes in the governance structures from community-based to a state-led  in 
developing countries have caused significant increases in levels of groundwater development 
and exploitation. Due to the increased number of individual investments in groundwater 
abstraction and numbers of technical and managerial problems, public tube-well schemes 
have declined. Many challenges have resulted when some countries have attempted to transfer 
public schemes to the individual farmers (Bouarfa and Kuper, 2012). Private tube wells have 
rapidly expanded in countries such as China, India and Pakistan since the 1990s (Chaudhry, 
1990), which has affected the expansion of irrigated areas as well as agricultural productivity. 
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This trend has been observed in Iran as a result of introducing private pump technology to the 
traditional gravity irrigation systems and resulted in significant challenges for local farmers 
(see Chapter 4, 6). Currently, of an estimated 300 million ha of irrigated areas globally, 111 
million are dependent on groundwater abstraction which represents 25% of the total irrigated 
water requirement (Siebert et al., 2005). 
Over the last 50 years, the increased importance of groundwater resources for irrigation has 
increased the number of studies of groundwater governance in various analytical approaches.  
Numerous studies have been conducted with the aim of improving governance and 
institutional performance of groundwater resources around the world. The importance of 
localising irrigation studies and context-specific nature of groundwater irrigation systems for 
developing management options has been emphasised by Lankford (2006). The top-down 
governance tools have not been effective in arid developing countries. The bottom-up 
approach for designing or improving existing institutions requires reforms to not only make 
substantial changes in groundwater organization but also make reasonable and adaptable 
changes to adjust the system functions to local need (see Chapter 6). It is important to 
establish a powerful local institution, as many empirical studies illustrate, these local 
institutions are usually informal, fragmented and not efficient (Shah et al., 2004; Errahj et al., 
2009) (see Chapter 7). This problem particularly exists in developing countries, because water 
resources are a substantial factor in their social and economic development, as the next 
section will explore.  
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PART II: Farmers’ Decision Making 
2.4. Characteristics of Groundwater Resources: Governance, Management Approaches 
and Farmers’ Decision-making 
Despite government responsibility for water scarcity in Iran at present, groundwater 
abstraction is unregulated and there has been considerable depletion of groundwater levels. 
This has caused land subsidence and increasing costs to farmers for abstracting further 
groundwater (Molle et al., 2003). In this context, government interventions have sought to 
ensure sustainable groundwater use, but have failed to consider either the socio-economic 
implications of the policy or the adaptability of local farmers (Molle and Mamanpoush, 2012) 
(see Chapter 4 and 6). 
Local irrigation institutions play a major role in effective irrigation management practices, 
however in Iran key policies were designed by policy makers and engineers who, whilst they 
might have technical competence, generally lacked awareness of the local social, cultural and 
biophysical context (see Chapter 6). Many developing regions have seen a historical transition 
from community-based management to top-down governmental management, conflicts 
between these two management structures still exist, and their effectiveness is varied. In 
authoritative governance regimes it is important to understand the driving forces for 
improving management performances and empowering local capacity for better cooperation. 
Joshi et al. (2000) states that under farmer-managed system when institutional arrangements 
such as social sanctions, local monitoring, trust and farmers respect towards rules are 
stronger, the irrigation performance is higher.  
Groundwater, as well as irrigation systems are regarded as common-pool resources and have 
been managed by a variety of governance structures which differ from each other (see next 
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section). The main challenge in groundwater management is that it is seemingly an invisible 
source and its linkage to surface water resources (physically and ecologically) is so complex 
that it has not been well studied and understood. Thus the impact of human behaviour on 
groundwater resources is difficult to identify, observe and control (Mitchell et al., 2012). 
Studies on common pool resources have identified two traditional approaches: a Pigovian 
approach (Pigou, 1932), and property rights. The first approach states that external 
governance, with centrally imposed regulations, can overcome over-exploitation of natural 
resources that might occur within the ‘commons’ (in this approach taxation is one of the most 
effective examples of an incentive for changing resource users’ behaviour). Many policy 
analyses suggest that local communities are unable to establish their own norms, rules and 
property-rights to manage their common pool resources and to reduce the externalities 
(external costs) (Agrawal, 1998; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995).  Based on this 
assumption, policy makers suggest external agents, such as central government agencies, 
should interfere in managing the resource to reduce the externalities for common users and to 
improve efficiency. The other most well-known suggestion was to establish property rights; 
specifically private property, as an effective way to manage common pool resources. In this 
regard, Coase (1960), Demsetz (1964-1967), Anderson and Hill (2002) focussed their studies 
on this approach which eliminates common access to limited public resources. 
Although there were strong approaches towards governmental management and 
nationalization of resources, rich literatures emerged around common-pool resource 
management in the 1980s. This was followed by comprehensive field studies by Ostrom 
(1990, 1992), which emphasized the effectiveness and capabilities of local communities to 
self-organize their shared resources. Ostrom (1990, 2000) brought new insights on common-
pool resources. She examined empirical case studies from communities around the world who 
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successfully developed local-based institutions to collectively manage their shared resources, 
and had achieved higher management efficiency (Ostrom, 1990). It is evidenced by Ostrom 
that in the majority of examples, community-based management of natural resources were 
more successful and effective than conventional top-down governmental interventions. Her 
studies revealed that in most communities farmers were able to manage and organize 
themselves by overcoming collective action problems. Schlager (2007) suggested that the 
groundwater case studies demonstrate the capability of local users to craft a solution for their 
own local common-pool dilemmas. Weschler’s (1968) study on groundwater management in 
California, at the same time as Ostrom, but in a different groundwater basin, indicates that the 
solutions that resource users craft are similar in comparable climatic and organizational 
settings. 
Despite the limited number of recent studies in this field, the importance of social research on 
groundwater management has become increasingly recognized. Natural resource management 
is influenced by human activities, thus changing human practices and behaviour is important 
in improving the management of groundwater resources (Mitchell et al., 2012). There are 
some examples of how social researchers suggested different practical approaches to engage 
and improve human interactions with groundwater management. For instance as mentioned, 
the work by Ostrom (1965), on social norms in natural resources governance as her PhD 
thesis on groundwater management (Ostrom, 1965, 1990) or Syme et al. (1999)’s study of 
groundwater allocation reforms and justice in Australia. A comprehensive literature review on 
the social dimension on groundwater management has been conducted by Mitchell et al. 
(2012), who indicate that the importance and number of studies in this field is increasing. In 
their study, they emphasised the key role of trust and social norms in improving groundwater 
use behaviours (Mitchell et al., 2012). My study contributes to this existing research by 
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investigating the role of social norms and equity in effective management of scarce 
groundwater resources by local farmers. I have also explored the role of participatory 
simulation exercises in achieving better management-decisions regarding irrigation practices 
by farmers (see Part III of this Chapter). In the Kashan case study the rules surrounding water 
use have been established through the historical evolution of traditional norms and fair water 
allocation (see Chapter 6, 7).  Lam (1999) considered that there was “the need for efforts to 
help farmers enhance their capability to work together and to avoid a dependence mentality 
rather than imposing rules on farmers” (Lam, 1999, pp 192–193). Lam also emphasised that 
officials should not be involved in water allocation mechanisms as they lack the knowledge 
and understanding of ‘socio-institutional aspects’ of irrigation systems (Lam, 1999, P. 200).  
Finally, Bouarfa and Kuper (2012) used case studies to analyse farmers’ decision-making 
behaviours. They studied the impact of local institutions on groundwater sustainability and 
farming systems, fair access to groundwater and agricultural productivity. In their review they 
analysed the historical evolution of groundwater management to create a holistic analytical 
framework for the different case studies and to improve adaptive capacities of local 
groundwater users (Bouarfa and Kuper, 2012). Engaging farmers into the resource 
management process will reveal their main perspectives and attitudes as well as decision-
making behaviours. Farmers as the main landholders play a crucial role in groundwater and 
irrigation management activities, they are entitled to resources, thus any changes to the 
resource is as a consequence of their practices and decisions (Mitchel et al., 2011).  Mitchel’s 
review of social groundwater management studies has revealed that there are very few papers 
done on farmers’ decision-making in groundwater management, and among existing research 
the focus has been mainly on resources rather than actors (i.e. farmers and landholders). Some 
of the factors that affect landholders’ behaviour have been explored by Bekkar et al. (2009) 
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and earlier work by Albrecht (1990; 1995) considers the connections between landholders’ 
behaviour and their impacts on organisations. Bekkar et al. (2009) expanded their 
investigation to three different case study areas in Morocco, to understand the management, 
ownership, the attitudes toward aquifer recharge and the underlying reasons of groundwater 
overexploitation from the perspectives of local stakeholders. Farmers’ behaviour towards 
groundwater use is classified as either offensive if they install private tube-wells, cultivate 
intensive water-use and high valued crops, adopt modern irrigation facilities such as drip 
irrigation or defensive strategies, when they decide to maintain their current water use that 
they are entitled by using the same tube-wells, cultivating less water consumptive crops, and 
reduce their land sizes (Mitchel et al., 2011; Kuper, et al. 2012). These two types of farmers’ 
behavioural approaches exist in the Kashan case study area, as the offensive strategies are 
adopted by large-scale farmers and defensive strategies exist amongst small-scale farmer 
communities (see Chapter 6). These different strategies are believed to relate to the attributes 
of ownership status and accessibility to groundwater (e.g. individual/private vs. collective 
access), in which farmers with private tube-wells adopt offensive strategies while collective 
tube-well owners use defensive strategies (Mitchel et al., 2011; Bekkar, et al., 2009). Another 
pattern in the farmers’ decision-making behaviour relates to the land size and farmers’ access 
to water resources. In Albrecht’s (1990) investigation on Ogallala aquifer in Texas, he 
revealed that farmers with large land holdings and better access to water resources were in a 
better financial status to invest in adopting more expensive irrigation equipment such as 
centre-pivots irrigation system. Also regarding groundwater governance and farmers’ 
attitudes towards water scarcity condition, Albrecht (1995), compared the viewpoints of 
farmers and non-farmers on Edwards Aquifer in the Texas of United States (U.S.). In that 
study non-farmers had stronger beliefs that water issue in this particular aquifer was critically 
51 
 
scarce. Farmers put more emphasis on the interfering role of government in worsening 
groundwater management practices and decisions.   
However, as there is not any definite structured social theory on landholders’ decision-making 
behaviours on groundwater resources, this is a significant gap in literatures (Mitchel et al., 
2011). Relevant studies have been done on surface water resources, yet the nature of 
groundwater is different (as it is a hidden source, the boundaries are not clearly defined and it 
is recognised as a common-pool resource) and requires its own evaluation on decision-making 
indicators (Pannell et al., 2006). There are also very few research efforts pursuing an 
integrated approach, linking social and biophysical dynamics of groundwater resources 
management (Hammani et al., 2009). Some of the suggested trends for exploration are: the 
attributes of governmental interventions which affect farmers’ decision-making behaviours; 
the attributes of global production prices; establishment of norms and social capital within 
local institutions (Mitchel et al., 2011; Ajzen, 1991). I will reflect on these factors in my 
analysis of local farmers’ behaviour in my case study area in Chapter 6 and 7. 
My research addresses the shortcomings of the existing Iranian literature on integrated 
participatory modelling approaches to link social and physical attributes (i.e. climate 
variables) for groundwater irrigation management. The research methodology introduces and 
develops an innovative participatory management approach to establish adaptive decision-
making processes within an integrated approach, therefore addressing one of the main 
principles of IWRM framework. I have conducted a social simulation method in order to 
identify some of the main reasons behind local farmers’ decision-making behaviours, 
regarding groundwater irrigation in arid context. Some of the social factors such as collective 
action and social capital revealed more insights on farmers’ main incentives or obstacles for 
participation in local irrigation management practices as they directly engaged with this 
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research study (see Chapter 3).  In the next section, I discuss some of these influential factors 
on farmers’ behavioural approaches in irrigation management. These factors improve the 
development of my participatory simulation game for this study (see Chapters 6, 7). 
 
2.5. The Factors Influencing Farmers’ Participation in Groundwater Irrigation 
Management 
Considerable research has been completed by Ostrom and others (1990, 1992) on the 
effectiveness of community-based irrigation management, rather than governmental 
authorship. The most well-known comparison between different governance structure of 
Farmer-managed and Agency-managed irrigation systems was undertaken by Ostrom et al. 
(1994) in Nepal.  This study explored how two different governance regimes can affect the 
incentives faced by governmental officials and farmers in one irrigation system. In this 
section, the incentives for farmer’s participation in community based irrigation systems will 
be explored. It can be concluded from existing empirical studies that individual farmer 
communities can have different motives for cooperation in collective action. These motives 
may be generally classified into economic, social, institutional, technological and moral 
incentives as well as complex reasons. I will review the main incentives for collective action 
in community-based irrigation management system, in order to put my research findings into 
context. 
According to Ostrom’s (1994) research, that suggests several social factors as forming 
incentive structures in self-governance and farmer-managed irrigation system, the study by 
Wang (2009), uses this theoretical framework to analyse the governance of natural resources 
management in China and the factors which have crucial role in creating strong incentives for 
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collective actions. Although the similar conceptual framework is not adopted for this thesis, 
however I review some of these features below, including: a. adaptive rules, b. effective 
institutions and social capital, c. structure of irrigators (irrigation land size; homogenous or 
heterogeneous farmer communities), d. property rights, and e. economic factors. Some of 
these factors proved to have crucial roles in creating behavioural decisions among farmers in 
my case study area. My empirical research revealed additional motivational factors which I 
discuss in Chapter 6. 
 
2.5.1. Adaptive Rules (or rules-in-use) 
Users of common-pool resources (or appropriators) are more likely to contribute to collective 
activity if they observe a set of trustworthy rules that help them to resolve the problems of 
collective action that may occur in their system. Any irrigation system requires valid and 
understandable rules to formulate relations between farmers and to assure them that their 
contribution will succeed and be of benefit to them. Farmers need to see the links between 
their self-interests and the results of collective action in irrigation system operation and 
maintenance (Williamson, 1985, 1990; North, 1990). The adaptive rules or ‘rules-in-use’ in 
each community are the product of years of social interaction and working together in 
resolving problems that farmers collectively face. These rules are unique and represent a set 
of shared social knowledge and experiences belonging to that community. Based on the 
empirical studies of Ostrom (1990), the written governmental rules, in the form of 
frameworks, have been proved to lack effectiveness and do not enforce resource management 
sufficiently. These rules can never “provide” common rules that have been established by 
years of experiences in each community (Ostrom, 1990). One of the most crucial features in 
self-governed irrigation systems is that farmers are able to make new rules to apply in their 
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daily activities and re-structure the rules from time to time to match their everyday situations. 
There is a need to rationally establish and maintain rules that also provide positive incentives 
for farmers to cooperate. Since farmers are closely interconnected and deal with the existing 
problems, they will understand and perceive problems best (Freeman, 1989).  
The similarity in understanding rules by farmers provides a higher level of effectiveness of 
rules and ultimately more effective irrigation (Pant and Lohani, 1983). These rules can be 
better understood by farmers which will reduce the cost of interpreting and monitoring the 
rules and deal with conflicts in local communities. Many researchers argue that farmer-
organised irrigation systems in developing countries have proved to be effective, provoke 
fewer conflicts and contain a higher degree of collective action. These systems use a diversity 
of rules that are a result of long-term bargaining and power relations among farmers (e.g. 
Coward, 1980; Hunt, 1989; Ostrom, 1992; Ostrom and Gardner, 1994). 
Within the community, collective problems could be resolved by the rules that distribute cost 
and benefits among farmers equally. Although not in every case the bargaining to set effective 
rules could enhance the efficiency of irrigation systems and reduce conflicts, the mutual 
reliance amongst farmers and the expected reciprocity created during long-term has helped to 
develop capacities among farmers to craft rules and overcome the majority of their collective 
problems. The rules are adopted and implemented within bargaining powers among farmers 
and changing any of these established rules would not be easy (Ostrom, 1990). These rules are 
more effective and collaborative, thus improving their independence from external agencies, 
rather than the enforcing rules imposed by governmental managed systems (Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom and Gardner, 1994).  
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The locally created rules are based on social capital and norms are representing the main 
values of that particular community, where they have agreed which decisions were correct 
and which were mistakes (Ostrom, 1992). Subsequently farmers are more likely to follow 
these types of rules and agreements. Within these agreements and collective activities farmers 
will be able to solve their collective action problems, and create norms and social capital 
which enable them to enhance their productivity and irrigation efficiency (Ostrom et al., 
1994). 
 
2.5.2. Effective Local Institutions and Social Capital  
The capacity of communities’ institutions to establish cooperation differs because of factors 
such as any history of cooperation, leadership, the level of social capital, and strong 
monitoring and sanctioning systems (Ostrom et al., 1994). Effective institutions are the 
foundation for establishing social capital and collective action. Through locally adopted 
institutions and rules, farmers will practice self-dependency, reciprocity and problem solving 
in their irrigation management.  In the case studies reviewed by Ostrom (1994) it is observed 
that the chief (local leader) in irrigation systems is usually chosen and hired by farmers of the 
same community. In most cases the staffs are farmers themselves, who know the systems well 
and also have sufficient motivation to work and satisfy other farmers in keeping their job. The 
chief can work closely and in conjunction with other farmers to operate and maintain the 
system and reduce the cost of monitoring.  
The importance of existing social capital for managing common-pool resources is due to 
recognition of the crucial role of human actions and behaviour in shaping and improving 
management of natural resources. The concept of social capital is chiefly about the effects of 
human interactions and individual relations within a social structure.  Social capital in relation 
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to natural resource management is defined by Coleman (1966, p.98) as a phenomena that is 
created by individuals who act collectively by spending time and energy with other 
individuals to seek  better options to achieve particular ends. 
The concept of social capital is an essential pre-condition for the participation of local people 
in decision making, and active adaptation. The notion of social capital is based on social 
relationships and the main factors included in this concept are norms of reciprocity, networks, 
social engagement and trust. Social capital can be defined as collective benefit in the form of 
shared values, beliefs, norms, trust and social networks and institutions that facilitate 
collective action for all individuals (Bhandari and Yasunobu, 2009). Participatory social 
research can build and strengthen human capital and social capital in terms of trust, social 
networks, norms and rules between users to engage stakeholders more effectively in collective 
actions and provide collaborative governance of water resources management (such as water 
governance or Co-management) (Lockwood et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2012).   Social capital 
in relation to groundwater irrigation management emphasises the role of social norms, 
existing rules, water allocation mechanism, equity and other human dimensions such as trust 
and collaboration for improving the governance structure of groundwater resources (Ostrom, 
1990) (see Chapter 6 and 7).  
Social capital can improve environmental outcomes through decreasing transaction costs. It 
can also increase cooperation, information flows, monitoring and enforcement opportunities 
(Anderson et al., 2002). There has been much literature on the potential impact of social 
capital on collective action and the forging of sustainable institutions (Walters, 2002; Pretty 
and Ward, 2001) which has identified that where social capital is well-developed, local groups 
with locally developed rules and sanctions are able to make more of existing resources than 
individuals working alone or in competition. Adler and Kwon (2002) argued that social 
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capital transforms individuals from self-centred agents and benefit-chasers to members of a 
community with shared interests, a common identity, and commitment to the common pool 
resources. Different ways of distinguishing between types of social capital include bonding, 
bridging and linking (Bhandari and Yasunobu, 2009; Pretty, 2003). It is stated that all three 
dimensions of social capital are associated and related to and can affect local natural resources 
governance (Pretty, 2003).   
The definition of social capital for this thesis also includes the element of physical capital that 
Ostrom offered in her definition (1990, 1992), in which “social capital is the arrangement of 
human resources to improve flows of future income” (Ostrom, 1994, p.527). The physical 
capital includes a set of rules that are used to allocate the benefits from the physical 
source/facility and to sharing the costs of that facility by individual users, who invested in 
social capital (Ostrom, 1990, 1992). Other forms of social capital in terms of network, norms 
and social beliefs also exist (Putnam, 1993a). According to Ostrom the social capital is 
created when individuals have repeatedly operated the physical capital successfully over a 
long period of time (such as managing irrigation infrastructures by creating collective rules) 
(see Chapter 6).  
It is stated that communities equipped with high levels of social capital are more likely to 
develop their own self-help organizations and establish and enforce locally-adopted 
institutions regarding collective goals (Putnam, 1993). It is stated that various types of 
collective action will be successful under balanced physical capital and social capital (Ostrom 
1992; Uphoff, 1986) and these two should not be considered as isolated from each other. My 
research assesses the different social aspects of farmers in Kashan, in order to investigate the 
existing social interactions and farmers’ behavioural approaches regarding groundwater and 
irrigation management choices. 
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There is a powerful social capital in terms of reciprocity in receiving water rights and fair 
allocation of scarce water among farmers in Kashan village community, which encourages 
them to mutually respect each other and respect the irrigation rules and norms (Chapter 6). 
My empirical findings show that farmers in Kashan, collectively cooperate in regulating water 
distribution in which each farmer receives his exact water right on time and in equitable 
manner. My study also shows that local farmers (including elder members) avoid isolation in 
society thus, farmers collectively respect irrigation rules and are interested to be involved in 
collective action projects (see Chapter 6, 7); this is also to obtain moral standing with other 
society members. Also the other influential factors on motives for collective actions are 
physical capital, which I have investigated in terms of farm land size, and adoption of modern 
irrigation infrastructures as follows.  
 
2.5.3. Engineering Infrastructure and Size of Irrigation System 
Apart from institutions and governance structures, different socio-economic elements affect 
individual motives for collective action. One of the main physical attributes that impacts the 
level of cooperation in communities is the size of irrigation system (Meinzen-Dick, et al., 
2004). Barker (1984) argues that in large irrigation systems especially in developing countries 
only powerful governmental agencies will be able to successfully manage irrigation systems 
(Barker et al., 1984). This is particularly observed in the Kashan case study area, where large-
scale farmers receive technical supports and financial aids from the government to produce 
for the national food market. As Olson (1965) stated in ‘the logic of collective action’, he 
believes that in larger groups the effort for collective action is less expected than in a small 
group.  Based on Olson’s argument, Hardin (1982) argued the main reasons why larger 
groups failed to achieve collective action, as by increasing the number of users the individual 
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gain relative to the cost of a good reduces, thus free-riding behaviour increase in larger groups 
and inevitably individual’s contribution and collective action diminish (Hardin, 1982). 
Although these findings conflict with Ostrom’s (1990) empirical findings which indicate that 
large irrigation systems in Nepal were successfully managed by local farmers under the 
support of rich farmers who paid for the infrastructure.  However, despite different studies, 
there is not any consensus among scholars to indicate the effect of size on the level of 
collective action (Poteet and Ostrom, 2004).  
Numerous studies on the impacts of engineering infrastructures on the operation and 
maintenance of irrigation systems have concluded that ‘technological fixes’ are not solely 
suitable methods for improving irrigation performances (Ostrom and Gardner, 1994; Ostrom, 
1994; Lee, 1994). Much of the literature emphasises the importance of technology in 
enhancing irrigation performance and productivity. Ostrom questioned whether appropriate 
modern technology can enhance irrigation efficiency of many farmer-led systems, however 
the technological interventions are mainly designed by outsiders, and neglect the existing 
reciprocities and mutual dependencies among farmers which may cause disruption and reduce 
performance. This forms the main argument by Ostrom and Gardner (1994) that self-
organising common pool resources have proven local farmers’ abilities to perform a very high 
efficiency and equity in managing their resources. As stated by Ostrom, to construct any 
engineering infrastructure there is a need to consider two factors to achieve successful 
management: 1) the engineering design of a new irrigation system infrastructure must be 
suited within a larger physical and socio-technical setting in irrigation system; 2) individual 
farmers play a major role in operation and maintenance of the system. In many irrigation 
systems such as in Nepal, construction of costly sophisticated irrigation infrastructure as a 
main policy to improve irrigation performance, has failed. The difficulties posed by modern 
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irrigation technologies can discourage farmers to adopt new irrigation systems (see Chapter 
7). 
 
2.5.4. Property rights as an incentive 
Because common-pool resources are large in size, it is very costly to identify particular users 
and exclude other beneficiaries from the resource. The concept and definition of common 
pool resource is similar to common-properties as well as open access resources. It is the 
opposite of private properties held by individuals. The property rights that are defined for 
common-pools and for common-property resources, are those rights which are held by 
communities of individuals, including official agencies as well as local users. Their use can be 
regulated by different institutions and in various ways (Common and Stagl, 2005). However, 
Ostrom (1990, 1992) argues that common-pool resources somehow differ from common-
properties by having two main different features. In common-pool resources excluding 
beneficiaries from accessing the resource is difficult, and the resource is subtractable, which 
means that each individual usage of the resources, subtracts benefits of other users. Common-
pool resources becoming open-access resources has been problematic in the past, because no 
one owned the resources or had control over them. Users did not therefore have any 
incentives to reduce their abstraction, and as a result, the resource was exploited, leading to 
the famous tragedy of commons (Ostrom, 1990). To avoid overexploitation of the resource, 
common-pool resources have been regulated in different ways. As stated, in common-pool 
resources such as fisheries, groundwater, forests, irrigation systems and pastures the 
privatized property rights are not possible, and different governance regimes should co-exist 
cover different property rights characteristics of the resource. For common pool resources the 
institutions might be the norms created by users, or religious, or formal written law that has 
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been created by the main users during historical time, such as groundwater management and 
allocation mechanism for irrigation practices.  
Therefore for successful management of common-pool resources and to avoid potential 
conflicts amongst different users, a strong governance regime is important. The establishment 
of an appropriate relationship between government and the main stakeholders is also 
necessary. 
 
2.5.5. Economic Factors and livelihoods 
Economic driving forces are the key determining motives for initiating locally-based 
collective action. Economic factors in terms of financial constraints can also act as a barrier 
for farmers’ adoption of a particular irrigation system. Local farmers evaluate the cost and 
benefits of collective action based on economic, social or cultural issues.  It is observed that 
farmers make rational decisions based on their economic estimates (Ostrom, 1990). Under 
water scarcity and reduced farmers’ income (Forouzani and Karami, 2010), if a new irrigation 
system could improve farmers’ production level by increasing their water availability, it is an 
advantage that enhances their agricultural revenue. Also farmers are more persuaded to 
participate in collective action when they economically benefit and when they can increase 
their irrigation efficiency through more appropriate water allocation systems. It is common for 
individuals to calculate the specific costs and benefits of participation related to their 
responsibilities, rights and commitments, and to compare these against the cost and benefits of 
all other members of union (Johnson and Libecap, 1982). Farmers gain more benefits when 
they collectively share the lands and tube-wells. This is to break the costs and responsibilities 
of repair and maintenance of the irrigation system infrastructures and bills (see Chapter 6). 
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Therefore this study investigates the important role of economic factors in farmers’ 
behavioural approaches and decision-makings.  
Farmers are faced with economic uncertainty in their agricultural production because the state 
does not provide sufficient support for capital investment, thus this motivates them for self-
dependence strategies and collective management of their systems. The influence of the 
capitalist market economy is often indicated as one of the latest and strongest forces for 
changing usual collective action and local institutional arrangements (Barham and Chitemi, 
2008).   
 
PART III: Participatory Approaches to Water Management 
2.6. Participatory Adaptive Management: Definition and Application Experiences 
Adaptive management is a process of finding management problems, defining our knowledge 
of the system to define management alternatives or redesigning a particular policy. This 
process includes the development of dynamic models, created based on identified 
assumptions and future scenarios for the particular system, this process will continue while 
our learning of the system is improving (Hollings, 1986). Adaptive management is also 
defined as a “systematic process for improving management policies and practices by learning 
from the outcomes of implemented management strategies” (Walters, 1986; Lee, 1993; 1999). 
The practical application of an adaptive irrigation management will improve the social 
learning and collective decision-making processes among farmers.  
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Adaptive management approaches have been applied for several decades, the first expression 
of adaptive management in the literature refers to Beverton and Holt (1957) in fisheries 
management (reviewed in Williams 2011). Later the conceptual framework of adaptive 
management was formally introduced by Holling (1978) and followed by the concept of 
resilience (Holling, 1986). Adaptive management incorporates uncertainty and complexity in 
order to face future challenges and changes in the system (Allen et al., 2010; Berkes and 
Folke, 1998). As Williams described: “adaptive decision making involving the articulation of 
objectives, identification of management alternatives, predictions of management 
consequences recognition of key uncertainties, and monitoring” (National Research Council, 
2004). Therefore adaptive management is a structured decision-making process (Williams, 
2011) rather than a simple trial and error.  
Many studies have applied the adaptive management concept as their main strategy and 
analysis, for example the adaptive management framework was developed for the Great 
Ruaha Catchment in Tanzania by Lankford et al. (2007), aimed at implementing of effective 
and practical strategies for river basin management. Adaptive management has the flexibility 
to adjust to different changes that occur in system management (Gunderson and Holling, 
2001). When uncertainty is high and controllability is low (e.g. under climate change impacts) 
the adaptive management approach can still be useful to eliminate some of the effects, and 
under high uncertainty and low controllability developing and analysing possible future 
scenarios are appropriate options.  
Participation is the main concept that is considered in the adaptive management approach in 
natural resources management (Gunderson and Holling, 2001) as well as in adaptive water 
governance (Huitema et al., 2009). Several researchers have linked participatory resource 
management processes with a more sustainable resource management (e.g. Ostrom, 1990; 
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Enserink et al., 2007; Newig and Fritsch, 2009) and a transition to a more sustainable socio-
ecological and political system. Once this transition is made, it plays a key role in improving 
the management process (Von Korff et al., 2010). Some have associated improved 
management process with development of adaptive capacity within system management 
(Pahl-Wostl, 2007). Users’ participation in the management process has been also assumed as 
a precondition of good governance (Enserink et al., 2007). In the literature the concept of 
‘participatory environmental governance’ has been suggested as an alternative option to the 
authoritative governance regimes around the world toward natural resources management 
(Huang et al., 2009).   
 
Adaptive management does not only produce iterative learning outcomes from different 
applied management strategies for participants, but it also broadens the range of management 
options available to policy makers. These alternative management solutions are flexible, 
meaning they can capture and integrate various interests and perspectives from stakeholders 
(Stringer et al., 2006; Von Korff et al., 2010). The concept of adaptive management is related 
to the social learning process in which cooperation and sharing responsibilities to cope with 
uncertainties, and collaborative decision making is possible (Fiorino, 1990; Von Korff et al., 
2010). 
In the literatures, a more comprehensive explanation of adaptive management exists to 
account for wider socio-political dimensions (Walters, 1986; Lee 1993). However, in all 
cases, this process will eventually lead to (1) Better understanding of the system and (2) 
Enhanced management decisions according to improved understanding (Williams, 2011).  
Particularly regarding water resources management, the increasing scarcity and vulnerability 
of water has resulted in more practical and integrated approaches around the world (e.g. 
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Walker and Salt 2006; Rijsberman, 2006; UNDP, 2006).  According to Von Korff et al. 
(2012), the participation of different actors as well as expertise, and their integration into the 
discussion, can lead to a higher quality decisions. Engaging stakeholders, who are affected by 
decision-making, ensures wider agreement and greater support for successful 
implementations. Participation can also improve social capital, when intensive 
communication can potentially create new networks among participants. The development of 
social capital can assist in conflict resolution and create better problem solving alternatives 
(Von Korff et al., 2012).  
 
2.6.1. Decentralisation and Emergence of Participatory Irrigation Management 
In the international framework for Millennium Development goals, decentralization is one of 
the key aims. This involves transferring some governmental authority and administrative 
responsibility to the local communities. The local bodies then provide communities with the 
services and utilities (MDGs, p. 234).  One of the main strategies to meet the water scarcity 
problem is to transfer management responsibility to water users. This provides a solution for 
optimizing the use of water resources and improving the productivity of land and water. 
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) is a scheme in which irrigation management 
responsibility and authority is transferred from government to local communities. In Iran as 
one of the most water scarce countries the changes in policies and devolution of 
responsibilities to water user associations has recently been piloted. The main goals of the 
IMT are that: operation and maintenance of irrigation systems will improve; the losses will 
reduce and the sustainability of irrigation infrastructures will be enhanced (UI Hassan et al., 
2007).   
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Within the past two decades there was a substantial trend towards transferring centralized 
governance to local users in Asia, Africa and America. This decentralization process has 
particularly occurred in water (irrigation management) but also in other common pool 
resources (Barker et al., 1984; Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999). The different titles associated 
with decentralisation or transfer schemes have different meanings such as community-based 
or participatory management and co-management. Community-based management is when 
the government has almost completely withdrawn from its role in managing natural resources 
and management is almost entirely transferred to local users. Co-management, or joint 
management, is when government continues with the majority of its roles in conjunction with 
local users and has transferred some management responsibilities. In participatory irrigation 
management local users are encouraged to increase their engagement in the management 
process and to complement the role of government (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999).  
 
Considerable attention was paid to the role of local institutions and the importance of 
collective action to take over resource management from the state. Irrigation Management 
Transfer (IMT) is one of the strategies to improve the operation and maintenance of irrigation 
systems and to enhance the sustainability of the irrigation infrastructure, however in many 
cases particularly in developing countries, due to high costs of sharing expenses and financial 
difficulties of local farmers’ institutions, these programmes have not achieved the main goals 
of this scheme (Hamada and Samad, 2011). The IMT scheme has faced some financial 
difficulties in its implementation particularly in developing nations, and involves some 
organizational shortcomings to create sufficient collaborations between government and local 
users; if the implementation process was not conducted properly it cannot meet the main 
objectives of sustainable resource management. One key factor for successful IMT process is 
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the importance of transfer early irrigation management to farmer communities (e.g. in Sri 
Lanka and Philippines). This assists local communities in forming organizations, selecting 
leaders, creating rules and responsibilities (Barker et al., 1984). A lack of success in each 
particular phase of this transformation, and in its implementation, will result in unsuccessful 
management experiences. In successful IMT process these organisations were not dictated to 
farmers but were used to supplement governmental intervention policies.  
Although in theory, in most developed nations the advantages of devolution to local users 
have been proved (e.g. Turral, 1995); the outcomes of this policy in achieving equitable and 
sustainable resource management in developing countries have not been completely achieved.  
In some cases that lacked appropriate management transfer to local users and did not identify 
allocation rules, the resources were depleted, or could not be equally distributed, which has 
demonstrated the need for strong local management in the form of local institutions to act as 
an intermediates in transmitting the roles and responsibilities from states to the local 
institutions. This is another important factor for successful implementation of the IMT scheme 
to local communities. Apart from the role and capabilities of local institutions in successful 
decentralization process, other important factors such as collective action and clear property 
rights must be considered (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999). Clear property rights provide 
further incentives for resource users to regulate sufficient rules and if necessary sanctions to 
manage resources equitably and to reduce conflicts. 
In order to create a strong local institution, there is a need for innovative methods which 
emerge from local norms and rules and are developed by user communities within the bottom-
up approach. There are numerous methods of such innovative and participatory approaches 
regarding natural resources management in the literature, which aim to step towards more 
decentralised and democratic management practices. One practical approach within 
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participatory resource management is the adaptive management concept, in which stakeholder 
participation can increase understanding of the system and learning for both researchers and 
participants (Hirsch et al., 2010). In an authoritative governance regime particularly, the more 
innovative methodological approaches may be required, for example the study by 
Moellenkamp et al. (2010) in Spain focuses on formal and informal process within 
participatory management effort and includes: 1. integrating informal process of resource 
users’ participation into highly structured governance systems 2. a ‘co-design’ participatory 
approach between researcher and participants for the study, and 3. outcomes in terms of social 
learning process, which may include educational outcomes for participants, governmental 
bodies and the researcher. It is crucial that each participation process be designed and adapted 
developed to individual circumstances in order to deliver successful outcomes (Stern and 
Fineberg, 1996; Carpini et al., 2004; Irvin and Stabsbury, 2004).   
 
Although there have been numerous achievements in the field of participatory management, 
the main question to be addressed is ‘which participatory approach to choose in which 
particular setting or context’ (Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001; Rowe et al., 2004). In this 
regard, there are numerous guides for participatory practices and various case studies expand 
on this concept (e.g. Arnstein, 1969; Pateman, 1970; Webler and Renn, 1995; Mostert, 2003).  
A review of progress in the theory, exercise and evaluation of implemented participatory 
water management by Von Korff et al. (2012), utilising case studies from around the world, 
addresses these questions of what are the beneficiaries of participatory management and how 
should these approaches be implemented in different socio-ecologic and cultural complexities. 
Part of the literature also focuses on the criteria for effective or successful participatory 
process (e.g. Rowe and Frewer 2000, Beierle and Cayford 2002, Dietz and Stern 2008). 
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Successful participatory management is indicated when it results in improvements in the 
quality of participants’ relationships, their social skills, their ability to reach common 
agreements through debates and negotiation (Von Korff et al., 2012). One of the challenges of 
this research study was how to ensure participants that the participatory irrigation 
management within adaptive management approach would be mostly beneficial for them and 
how it should be developed and implemented in complex natural systems (Von Korff et al., 
2010). This challenge will be addressed within the development of methodology (see Chapter 
4).   
In light of the previously identified shortcomings of IWRM, my research investigates the 
possibility and usefulness of participatory process for farmers at local-level in Iran. It 
examines the capabilities of locals to bring their knowledge and experiences into the 
management process, as well as how to fit the process with this specific social context to 
improve its effectiveness. 
Potential challenges to implementing a local participatory water management research 
approach are the conflicts that might be raised by different stakeholders’ interests and 
perspectives that are involved in the discussions. However, not all their perspectives are 
involved in the policy making procedure, and thus there is a danger of increasing participant’s 
expectations (Hirsch et al., 2010). This may increase demands for further and immediate 
improvement in participants’ circumstances which the research cannot achieve. For example, 
in a participatory research study in Uzbekistan there were limitations in transferring local 
interests to a higher political level to improve system management (Hirsch et al., 2010).  
The advantages of participation include improving legitimacy of decisions, increasing 
opportunities for more democratic management procedures (e.g. Fiorino, 1990; Larid, 1993; 
Sabatier et al., 2005) and developing social learning.  Case studies around the world which 
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have implemented participatory approaches have been successful in stakeholders’ engagement 
and in achieving social learning (e.g. Bousquet et al., 1996; Barreteau, 2003; Hirsch et al., 
2010; Van den Belt, 2004). When local stakeholders effectively participate in the system 
management there is better access to a more in depth and diverse source of knowledge which 
can be later incorporated into policies and regulations (Monroe et al., 2013). 
 
Research on participatory methods of local irrigators or water resources users in hydrological 
modelling is not widespread. It is therefore necessary to provide a brief review of existing 
studies on the interactions between human and computerised models and to comment on the 
importance of engaging farmers’ experiences and social variables into hydrological models. 
 
2.7. Socio-hydrological Modelling Platform: Human interactions with hydrological 
modelling within a participatory approach  
Some scholars believe that computer models could be ineffective tools, because they do not 
specifically involve stakeholders in the process of decision-making (e.g. Barreteau et al., 
2001; D'Aquino et al., 2003). However, in capturing the complexity of natural resources, 
particularly water systems, there is a need for integrated models which are capable of 
incorporating different hydrological and socio-economic phenomena/variables. This physical 
and social integration enables a more effective decision-making process, as it provides 
multiple perspectives on particular water management problems that illustrate system 
complexity than is possible when physical models or social simulation are used alone 
(Robinson, 1991). These modelling attempts provide various opportunities to design 
participatory projects emphasising the social dimensions of users’ participation and making 
linkages between practical experiences and scientific assumptions (Von Korff et al., 2010). In 
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general participatory approaches can be used to explore the ways in which models can be used 
as a mediation tool to support dialogue and negotiation between stakeholders and formulate 
acceptable solutions (Von Korff et al., 2010). There are several different approaches to 
participatory modelling which I explain here. 
 
2.7.1. Participatory Modelling Methods 
The emergence of a wide range of participatory methods for water modelling, decision-
making and planning aims to achieve more effective and integrated management of complex 
water systems (Bryson and Crosby, 2006).   
Modelling water or other natural resources with stakeholders’ participation has received 
increasing interest from researchers. The problem of how to include stakeholder perspectives 
in the modelling platform to increase system understanding and social ecological interactions 
has been one of the main concerns in this field (Daniell and Ferrand, 2006; Jakeman et al., 
2006; Voinov and Bousquet, 2010). This interest has resulted in an expansion of various 
methodologies for stakeholders’ engagement in participatory modelling processes for water 
management such as the companion modelling approach (Bousquet et al., 1996; Barreteau, 
2003), which is mainly for social learning purposes.  
 
Regarding participatory modelling, several studies have been conducted including models that 
are most adapted to specific contexts (Flood and Jackson, 1991; Mingers, 2010), participatory 
process assessments (Hare et al., 2003; Etienne, 2010) and identifying how to organise, select 
and impact the modelling design (Luna-Reyes et al., 2007). The participatory process has 
been designed under a number of different frameworks. Barrateau et al (2010) designed a 
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framework which not only presents different steps of the process but also designed 
stakeholder’s interactions that could lead to a successful participatory implementation.   
 In participatory modelling, participants can be stakeholders, they may validate a model 
designed by a researcher prior to or within the simulation (Barreteau et al., 2010), or 
participants can be co-constructors of the modelling process. In this process, stakeholders are 
the main designer of the model and the researcher acts as an ‘intervener’ who engages in the 
process and learns lessons from it (Von Korff et al., 2010). Zorilla et al. (2010) studied the 
effectiveness of co-construction of different models to facilitate participatory process and 
social learning. Their case study in Upper Guadiana Basin in Spain focused on over-
exploitation of groundwater resources which has led to the degradation of a wetland and 
conflict between farmers and officials as well as environmentalists. They concluded that co-
constructing models could result in better understanding of the system, different factors and 
their interactions, as well as stakeholders’ anxieties.  
 
Other methods have been developed in order to tackle participant interaction in the 
hydrological modelling. In the study by Bots et al (2011) the researcher created a set of codes 
as informal ‘rules of the game’. In this study it was mainly participants who influenced the 
organisation of the modelling process, and act as co-researchers or ‘co-engineers’ who make 
decisions. In this study, farmers particularly have identified the main influential factors in 
their groundwater irrigation management practice and dynamic. These factors were integrated 
into the hydrological modelling development (see Chapter 5) as specific input criteria and 
generated results for participant farmers (see Chapters 3, 7).  
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2.7.2. Companion Modelling Approach for Irrigation Management 
The Companion Modelling (ComMod) approach is an innovative methodology which uses 
multi-agent systems (MAS) in the form of computer models or human organizations to create 
simulation models as a collective learning platform (Bousquet et al., 2005). ComMod has 
been developed with the aim of including different stakeholders’ perspectives within the 
continuously evolving adaptive management and social learning process (Bousquet et al., 
1999; Barreteau, 2003). This approach suggests that participatory modelling is an effective 
method in which stakeholders can be directly involved into the modelling design, assumptions 
and selection of indicators, as well as in developing and evaluating relevant scenarios 
(Barreteau, 2003). The ComMod approach usually has two main objectives: 1) to capture and 
understand complex biophysical and social situations and 2) to support negotiation and 
collective decision-making processes in managing natural resources (ComMod Group, 2003; 
Bousquet et al., 2005) (Figure 6). In creating the ComMod platform, a combination of tools 
such as multi-agent system (MAS), role playing games or conceptual models can be used to 
involve participants in developing the methodology. Because this thesis develops a Role 
Playing simulation, ComMod is suitable to incorporate the outcomes of the simulation. 
ComMod usually uses different types of simulations to capture complexity in human-
environmental systems. A multi-agent system is employed as a stakeholder-driven model 
integrating various viewpoints from different resource users (Etienne et al., 2003; Becu et al., 
2005).  In this study, the two main objectives of this process have informed the development 
of the companion modelling effort. The methodological framework has been modified to be 
tailored to the case study area, to specific research questions and to Iran’s social-cultural 
circumstances. 
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                Source: Le Page and Abrami  (2013) 
 
The ComMod approach in participatory agent-based modelling utilises the ‘Role Playing 
Game’ to address the model’s shortcomings (Barreteau, 2003). The ‘Role Playing Games’ 
provide basic settings to increase farmers’ understanding of environment and assist them to 
decide in the real-life conditions. Games consist of rules which define every aspect of 
interaction between farmers and between farmers and the environment. They involve defined 
roles that will be played by farmers. RPG provides experimental experiences of decision 
making process and enable farmers to explore areas beyond their defined structured 
framework and modify or change some aspects of the game or the rules (Dionnet et al. 2008) 
(see Chapter 7). The literature on using RPG to develop collective decision-making or within 
the negotiation processes indicates the benefit of using RPG together with computerised 
models to support stakeholders’ engagement in a process (Parent and Gallupe, 2001; 
Figure 6 ComMod Perspective: Schematic representation of Socio-ecological 
relations in natural systems 
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D'Aquino et al., 2003). One of the main advantages of RPG is that computer models lack the 
self-design process capability which might emerge from the personal opinions of participants 
(Gintis, 2000). Computer models are less flexible and may lack capacity to incorporate social 
assumptions that arise from participants’ perspectives. RPGs usually involve some 
behavioural incentives in their construction, while computer models provide wider variability 
using assumptions and simulations, for example the climatic factors such as increased 
temperatures or population growth will affect groundwater resources condition and 
management in the future that computer models can simulate in the form of scenarios. 
 
2.8. Simulation games and their role in fostering social learning 
In the past, simulation games have proven to be an effective social method to investigate and 
elicit knowledge from local users on the management of common-pool resources (Ostrom, 
1990; Ostrom et al., 1994). Simulation games have been widely used to create experiential 
learning for participants and to support negotiation and social learning processes (e.g. Burton, 
1989) where specific agricultural policies and climate change scenarios can be explored, 
analysed and discussed. A critical aspect of participatory irrigation management and 
technological acceptance is the concept of ‘social learning’. This refers to how the 
understanding of a particular natural and social system has changed among participants as a 
result of exchanging information (Von Korff et al., 2012) and this is closely related to the 
social capital concept. These changes also might have changed the quality of participants’ 
relationships, their social skills such as their ability to reach a common agreements, their 
participation in a constrictive debates and negotiation process (Von Korff et al., 2012). This 
study is particularly aimed at providing the tools and conditions for social learning to take 
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place, in order to change participants’ understanding and perceptions of groundwater and 
irrigation management practices. The outcomes are discussed in detail in chapters 6 and 7. 
Social learning occurs during discussion and by interactions between participants. When 
various perspectives or viewpoints emerge, this can improve participants’ understanding of 
each other’s concerns or interests to explore preferences through dialogues (Von Korff et al., 
2012; Muro and Jeffrey, 2012).  
The study of Hoverman et al. (2011) in the developing small-scale state of Solomon Island 
indicated that in the participatory process can facilitate the creation of trust between 
traditional communities, water manager officials and water developers/experts. Under this 
situation participants agree to contribute their knowledge and to overcome cultural constraints 
through interacting in the process which will lead to social learning and collective action 
(Hoverman et al., 2011). Social learning is a concept which has yet to be integrated into the 
water management agenda of many countries. The study by Kuper et al. (2009) on 
participatory irrigation management in Morocco emphasises the development of a social 
learning process in improving local farmers’ capacity to adopt modern irrigation systems. The 
question remains as to what extent this concept can be translated into a practice in natural 
resources management, as this can be culturally and physically difficult in some cases 
(Huitema et al., 2009; Von Korff et al., 2012). 
There are other creative simulation methods to enhance social learning, for example Selman 
et al. (2010) focused on the less explored concept of ‘imaginative engagement’ in 
participatory approach which leads to social learning. This participatory method is ‘art-based’, 
so as to more practically engage participants in identifying and reflecting on their basin 
through conducting a series of creative writing workshops in a previous industrial area in 
Northern England, describing their recovering river basin. Participants found this method a 
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positive experience. The research has explored the effectiveness of this method in raising 
awareness, changing values, knowledge, individual behaviours and actions in use and 
management of the river. Selman et al. (2010) reflected on the potential of this method for 
facilitating social and institutional capacity for sustainable river basin management and 
planning in coal mining area in South Yorkshire (UK). As stated by Von Korff et al (2010), 
participatory research can be flexible and creative in design either following a systematic 
approach or an artistic or imaginary dimension such as role playing game or imaginative 
modelling process. This study utilises a creative design in developing RPG which is simple 
and engaging for farmers in particular local irrigation context of Iran to improve their social 
learning. 
 
This study further explores the role of participatory RPG in achieving successful adaptive 
management process for groundwater resources by engaging local farmers’ knowledge and 
perspectives into management decisions (see Chapter 7). 
The use of games to extract information and explore farmers’ motives for collective action 
and behavioural approaches to water resource management issues has been widely applied in 
different contexts (Burton, 1989; Hagmann and Chuma, 2002).  Collective action is defined as 
an “Action taken by a group (either directly or through an organization) in search of 
members’ perceived shared interests” (Marshall, 1998).  Empirical and theoretical research 
has focused on collective action in common pool resources established since 1965, by the 
studies of Olson and with growing interest in community-based management of resources, 
extended by Axelrod and Hamilton in 1981 and Uphoff in 1986. Olson (1965) believed that 
when the benefits of using a common pool resource is greater than the cost to produce it, or 
when collaboration in using a public good has higher benefit with the lower cost, individuals 
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are keen to continue their collective action and cooperation in managing the common resource 
(Olson, 1965).  Collective action requires investment in the system by members and to 
exclude outsiders from the benefits. Creating persistent collective action in managing natural 
resources depends on rules and decision making, the monitoring, and conflict resolution also 
play an important role (Ostrom, 1992).  
Game theory is one of the most popular theories in explaining the mechanism of collective 
action problem.  Games have been widely used to address the question of whether individuals 
are capable and inspired for cooperation and voluntarily organizing themselves to manage 
resources (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). The main perspective in Game theory is that one 
individual’s benefit might be changed based on how many other participants contribute to a 
particular activity, in rational behaviour, individuals decide based on others’ behaviours in 
contribution to common pool resources (Oakerson, 1992). To enhance the accuracy of game 
theories an artificial rules and setting of the games has been modified by facilitators in Role-
play game simulations, by including norms, values and other social variables into the games. 
This has improved the transparency, understandings and perceptions of games and made them 
more applicable to the real world. However, there are some critical arguments indicating the 
limitations in game setting that fail their usage in reflecting complexity of the nature and the 
various alternative strategies faced by local resource users in the games (Rasmussen and 
Meinzen-Dick, 1995). In this study, this shortcoming of the RPG is addressed by 
incorporating a hydrological model and climate variables within Companion modeling 
process. This is to improve the accuracy of the assumptions and predictions for the local users 
in the case study. 
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2.9. Conclusion 
This chapter first provided broader perspectives on water crisis, management and governance 
in arid developing countries. This has provided arguments on the water crisis conditions as 
mainly a social problem, which is a consequence of long-term governance and management 
failures. Water resource management plays a crucial role in ensuring social and economic 
development, political stability and international security. Thus governments are under 
increasing pressure to satisfy water demand, and develop the most suitable long-term strategy 
for future water development. As discussed in part I of this chapter, although there are 
pessimistic perspectives about the future water disputes particularly in the Middle-East, there 
are some optimistic viewpoints that water wars will not occur in this region. The increasing 
evidence of collaborations around the world is the evidence to support international 
cooperation for freshwater management between nations. 
National governments are also responsible for controlling abstraction of strategic groundwater 
resources, water allocation and accessibility, providing high quality domestic water and 
resolving inter-basin conflicts (Rogers and Hall, 2003). Government responsibilities for these 
issues are of greatest concern in those developing countries where the agricultural sector has 
the main influence on social and economic development and food security (The World Bank, 
2006; Namara et al., 2010). This study particularly focuses on the water management issues 
regarding groundwater sustainability and improving efficiency of irrigated water use at local 
level. There is still a need for innovative methods that encourage collaboration for future 
water and groundwater managements between nations and in the nations for future sustainable 
water developments. This thesis addresses this gap by developing an interdisciplinary and 
innovative participatory method with stakeholders for local groundwater irrigation 
management in the context of an adaptive management approach (see Chapter 4).  
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The effective water resource management requires an integrated management approach, 
which considers both physical and social aspects. Existing water management frameworks are 
not particularly adaptable and applicable in many countries worldwide and there is a need for 
more context specific and adaptive management options through participatory social methods.  
The literature review provided the theoretical context to understand local farmers’ decision-
making and behavioural approaches for participatory irrigation management. This has 
identified some existing gaps in the literature on groundwater resources management as 
common pool resources in Iran, including a lack of empirical studies on the social dimensions 
of groundwater irrigation practices and farmers’ decision-making behaviours. The present 
study addresses this by adopting a participatory simulation method which engages local 
farmers in the water management decision-making process. The study aims to obtain deeper 
understanding and knowledge from local irrigators in Iran and to evaluate different driving 
forces for their collective action behaviours. Different incentives such as adaptive rules, 
strong local institutions, social capital, engineering structure, property rights and economic 
motives provide a possible foundation to creating a successful farmer-managed irrigation 
system. Focusing on groundwater resources, different challenges in managing irrigation 
systems in arid and semi-arid regions in developing countries were explored; under 
authoritative governance regimes the main management strategies are based on controlling 
mechanisms, and there is lack of local-based and adaptable solutions based on resource users’ 
perspectives and needs.  The literature review elaborated on the driving forces for equitable 
resource allocation and management, particularly common-pool resources which require 
collective decision and collective action for its management. The study explores further 
motives for farmers’ collective decision-making behaviours within empirical chapters (see 
Chapter 7).  
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The review then focused on the definition and selection of suitable management and 
methodological approaches to address one of the main objectives of this study which is to 
develop a participatory and adaptive management method for groundwater resources, the 
relevant literature is presented to support the arguments in discussion chapters. The 
importance of local knowledge in understanding the system dynamics and establishment of 
effective local institutions was highlighted. The existing literature provided background on 
implementation of successful adaptive management strategies in local resources users and 
incorporation of integrated and creative methods. I outlined the rationale for developing 
participatory approaches to adaptive groundwater management in semi-arid developing 
country in the third part of this chapter. This study has assessed the feasibilities and potential 
for implementation of community-based management approach in Iran (expanded in Chapter 
6). The Companion modeling for participatory modelling effort was introduced here, to 
foreground the methodological approaches provided in the next chapter. The role of 
participatory simulation role-play game in fostering discussion and collective decision-
making was analysed and its effective use in re-allocation of resources discussed. In the next 
chapter, I will show how these different participatory tools have shaped my methodological 
approach to better understand irrigation system dynamics, foster social learning and to 
improve the integration of local knowledge within integrative and transparent models of water 
management.  
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CHAPTER 3  
Contemporary Water Governance in Iran: historical trends and current managerial 
approaches for groundwater irrigation practices 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I outline Iran’s national water management context particularly on 
participatory irrigation management practices. This chapter emphasises the development of 
groundwater resources and irrigation practices as well as the historical development of 
irrigation rules and collective management of irrigation systems in local communities of Iran. 
This chapter also examines the impact of national regulations and administration on the 
management of collective farming systems at a national and regional scale, and the reasons 
for unsuccessful participatory management in irrigated agricultural. This chapter provides a 
background and review of the governance and management of groundwater irrigation systems 
in Iran (Kashan) prior to method development chapter. 
Data for this chapter are collected from the academic literature, water related institutional 
reports, reviews of national water policies and regulations, and available published documents 
including local bulletins and national newspapers in Farsi and English.   
The first part of this chapter reflects on the traditional water and irrigation management 
practices in Iran, and comprises three sections. The first section of this chapter reviews the 
geography, hydrology and climate of Iran to offer an overview of the particular climatic and 
biophysical characteristics of the region which have shaped past and current water 
management arrangements. The second section of chapter outlines the traditional water 
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management system of Iran (the Qanats) which was developed prior to land reform in the 
1960s, and reflects on the historical water trend, traditional irrigation management and 
institutional arrangements which are currently under practice. This review provides a context 
base for designing a participatory modelling platform as a research method. Therefore, 
understanding the nature of traditional arrangements around irrigation systems (i.e. Qanat) in 
Iran will assist to better reflect on the particular irrigation context and culture of Iran, which I 
will discuss further in later chapters (see Chapters 6 and 7). In the third section, the chapter 
provides a chronology of water management development and governance in Iran, comprising 
four different periods and traces Iran’s history of water and irrigation management and the 
governance structure in each period since 1960.  
The first period is that of traditional water and irrigation management, which was developed 
under the Qanat (is a system of underground canals that in hillsides taking water from the 
aquifers to farmlands) water supply and distribution mechanisms and the existence of the 
landlords. In the second period the chapter summarises nationalisation of water and irrigation 
management practices and organisations which commenced following implementation of land 
reform in the 1960s, particularly the regulations relating to water and land management after 
Iran’s National Revolution in 1979. The third period of this chronology, describes the 
expansion of the pump-well technologies in Iran and the re-structuring the water governance 
and management in Iran will be explained. The fourth period examines current water 
management challenges, national water governance and the role of local institutions (read 
more in Chapter 7).  
The second part of the chapter reflects on the contemporary water management and 
governance of Iran. The combination of a centralized water governance structure in Iran, 
together with the impacts of climate change, increased water demand as well as competition 
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between different water use sectors (across the industrial, domestic and agricultural sectors) 
has created significant challenges for current decision-makers in water management. These 
factors are embedded in the scenarios that formulated by farmers, to reflect the future changes 
in the system (see Chapter 4, 5). Also in this chapter, I reflect on the recent 
changes/modifications in water policy of Iran in considering participatory approaches in 
management practices.  
Iran as an Islamic country takes its constitution from the Islamic principles ‘Shari’a’ or 
“Islamic framework which is unchangeable and unquestionable in terms of religious 
enquiries” (Hashemi, 2012, p. 259), and the government acts and makes management plans 
within this framework. Participation, which is one of the main principles of integrated water 
resources management approach, can be found in the Islamic principle of ‘Shura’ (or 
consultation). This provides a powerful basis for public participation in manging natural 
resources built on ethical values (Hashemi, 2012), although the users participation is not 
sufficiently considered in current management agenda (read more in this Chapter). The review 
of historical water management and engineering in Iran, existence of traditional community-
based management and the established water rights which are practiced until now and the 
strong ethical values for participation from religious perspectives all steer the current and 
future water governance towards more participatory management approach in Iran.  
In the current national Iranian water development policy, the importance of improving water 
use efficiency and cooperation of stakeholders are highlighted, and this could influence the 
sustainable use of groundwater resources. In relation to the recent policy development in 
irrigation management and practices in Iran, I review the factors that influence farmers’ 
participation in irrigation management practices, particularly the existing barriers identified in 
Iranian studies. There has not been any participatory modelling for groundwater irrigation 
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management using simulation games in Iran, which I have undertaken in this study. However, 
I review the previous experiences of implementing different social methods on participatory 
management at national or regional scales to understand the driving forces and barriers for 
farmers’ participation in government projects. In Chapter 6 and 7, I will reflect on these 
factors and expand more incentives of farmers’ collective behaviours and decisions which 
have been achieved from conducting and developing a simulation game. 
In Iran, irrigation rules are established around Qanat system and are still practiced by farmers, 
so there is a need to provide more detailed backgrounds on different physical, social and 
cultural aspects of Qanat prior to the main discussion chapters and methods. The irrigation 
rules for designing a participatory simulation exercise is extracted from the traditional Qanat 
system (see Chapter 4), and this chapter provides sufficient background for understanding. 
There was a significant change from Qanat system water delivery mechanism to the pumped-
well technology. This has put major impacts on sustainability of groundwater resources and 
irrigation management and governance particularly in rural areas in Iran and on local farmers 
(see Chapter 6), which this chapter reviews this governance regime transformation. 
 
PART I: Iran’s Traditional Irrigation Management Practices  
3.1. Geography, Hydrology and Climate Characteristics of Iran  
The particular geography and climate of Iran has greatly affected the formation and 
establishment of water distribution and delivery systems as well as traditional rules and 
management practices. I will outline the main geo-hydrologic characteristics and general 
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farming systems of Iran and then explain the development of a traditional irrigation system of 
Qanat and water right mechanism in the next section.  
Iran is situated between 250 and 400N and 630E, and has a total area of 1,648,195 km2 and 
population of 79 million (Hashemi, 2012). Iran is surrounded by three major water bodies: the 
Caspian Sea to the North, and the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman to the South. The 
neighbouring countries to the East are Afghanistan and Pakistan; to the North, Turkmenistan, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan; to the West Turkey and Iraq and to the south the Arab States of the 
Persian Gulf. The topography is varied: the lowest altitude is found on the southern coast of 
the Caspian Sea (28 m below sea level) while the Mount Damavand is 5,671 m above sea 
level. Approximately 90% of the country comprises a Plateau (or tableland), one-fourth is 
desert and less than one-fourth is arable farmland while the remainder is highland and 
mountainous areas (Madani, 2014). 
Climate variability is high and annual temperatures can vary from -20 to +50 C in different 
parts of the country. Mean annual precipitation is 250 mm equivalent to a total of 413 × 109 
m3 annually (Ardakanian, 2005). However, 75% of precipitation occurs during the winter, 
when there is no need for water to be used for agriculture (Madani, 2014). While 65% of the 
country is arid, 20% is semi-arid and the rest is humid or semi-humid, the annual renewable 
water per capita in Iran is 1,700 compared with the global level of 7000 m3. 
A total of 14 × 106 ha of land is cultivated of which 8 × 106 ha are irrigated while the 
remainder is supported solely by precipitation (Ehsani, 2005; Forouzani and Karimi, 2010). 
Rainfed farming in Iran is mainly practised in the North and West, where river and stream 
flow provides sufficient amount of water, and around 50% of population lives in this area 
which has ~70% of the country’s total water resources (Motiee, 2001). There is, however, an 
87 
 
unequal distribution of water resources across the country. Two mountain chains, the Alborz 
in the North and the Zagros to the West inhibit moisture transport and thus affect regional 
precipitation (Moradi-Jalal et al., 2010). However, surrounding local highlands receive more 
precipitation (rainfall, snow) which has supplied groundwater for Qanat systems for many 
centuries. 
While 78% of farmers practise small-scale farming, farms totalling less than 10 ha extend 
across 37% of cultivation areas but only contribute 10% of total production. However, 
medium sized farmers (10 to 50 ha) cover 50% of cultivated lands and produce 75% of 
agricultural products (Madani, 2014). While cultivated land only covers 15% of Iran, 
agriculture consumes 92% of available water resources (7% is used in domestic and 1% is in 
industrial sector) (Ardakanian, 2005). Cultivation patterns and selection of crops follow 
traditional farming practices and crops which are guaranteed to be purchased by the 
government (such as wheat) are not adapted to the regional climate and water availability 
(Madani, 2014). Iran is prone to flood and drought risks and climate change impacts are 
expected to lead to increased regional temperatures and hence put higher pressure on available 
water resources (Abbaspour et al., 2009; Evans, 2009; Jamali et al., 2012). This will have 
considerable implications for the agricultural sector in Iran (Gohari et al., 2013). 
 
3.2. Qanat Systems and their Role in Irrigation Practices in Central Iran 
The Qanat system has very deep roots in irrigation practices in rural communities. Thus, to 
understand the traditional as well as present irrigation rules and water allocation mechanism, 
it is essential to realise the socio-economic and cultural features of this system. The Qanat 
irrigation system consist of underground water transmission canals which provide an efficient 
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way of moving groundwater from the uplands to the plains, where agricultural farmlands are 
concentrated (Figure 7). Qanat is a well-recognised and sophisticated system of traditional 
irrigation infrastructure which has been described as the world’s oldest water supply system 
(Agarwal, 1999; Goldsmith and Hildyard, 1984; Wulff, 1968). Qanat is called by various 
names and pronunciations in different regions: Qanat (Iran), Karez (Afghanistan and 
Pakistan), Kanerjing (China), qanat romani (Jordan and Syria) Khettara (Morocco), galleria 
(Spain), falaj (UAE), Kahn (Baloch, Iranian ethnicity) and Foggara/fughara (the French 
translation of the Qanat, used in North Africa) (Sankaran Nair, 2004). 
The Persian inspiration for Qanat goes back over 2000 years to when Persepolis was the 
capital of the Achaemenid Empire, when the city’s water supply was provided through Qanats 
(Cressey, 1958). The system has spread around the world as a result of the Silk Road, Arab 
and Roman expansion and Spanish colonisation (Mostafaeipour, 2010). The Qanat system 
was developed in many countries including China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Arabia, Morocco, 
Syria, Jordan and even in some American countries (Mostafaeipour, 2010) and the technique 
is used in South Asia and North Africa as a main supplier of freshwater.  
The number of Qanat chains in Iran is estimated at ~22,000, with a total length of more than 
272,000km. This system has been also the means for more innovative technological 
structures. Irrigated agriculture and expansion of Qanat systems extends throughout central 
and eastern arid regions of Iran. Many parts of Iran are reported to be highly dependent on 
Qanat for both domestic and agricultural purposes (Cressey, 1958). Although almost two-third 
of Iran’s land is arid or semi-arid, this infrastructure has provided a suitable supply of water 
for agriculture for many centuries.  This has enabled production of agricultural products as 
well as industrial crops for export such as pistachio, cotton, dried fruits, oilseeds, etc. 
(Mostafaeipour, 2010).  
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Figure 7 The construction of Qanat (A) 
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McLachlan (1988:93) considers that the use of Qanat for irrigation had an important influence 
on the local Iranian villagers, in terms of the principles governing the rotation of water 
allocations (when water is in turn diverted to the land of different farmers according to their 
water right time-slot), seasonal flow and the use of water in drought or wet years and in 
agricultural activities, which in fact created the “irrigation culture”. Some of the water 
allocation rules of Qanat were used for designing a participatory simulation game exercise, 
which was explained by farmers (see Chapter 4).   
The Qanat water distribution system is based on cycles of specific numbers of days and nights 
(24 hours) (Bonine, 1989: 148-52) this systems of water allocation and distribution is still 
largely practiced by local farmers (see Chapter 6, 7). Traditionally, the water share 
mechanism was based on a rotation of 6 to 22 days (each farmer could receive his water 
delivery turn, either in 6 days or in 22 days), which this is given to each individual farmer 
throughout a year. It has been suggested that the length of cycles might have roots in 
‘cultural-historical development’ (Bonine, 1982). The water cycle is divided into different 
time-slots (water right delivery might receive during night or day), so each farmer can receive 
his own share based on that time.  
McLanchlan (1988: 991) indicates that an understanding of the traditions of Iranian villages is 
impossible without an understanding of the role of Qanat systems. He states that this water 
supply system could provide powerful incentives for collective action, for supplying water, 
and both managing and maintaining the system by farmers (McLanchlan, 1988).  Qanat could 
also sustain the ‘social cohesion’ in each village (Balali, 2009). It is noted that the 
communities which were using Qanats developed a complex system of management and 
distribution (e.g. in Oman Al-Isamily and Probert 1998; Dutton, 1995). These complex social 
and economic interactions developed around Qanat systems could be observed in Kashan case 
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study area, and created a strong bond among farmers particularly for collective water 
allocation behaviours.  
Qanat construction in dry regions has been a major economic investment to provide a water 
supply in water scarce areas. The introduction of new technology into Qanat-based systems 
required extensive amendment as English (1998) describes how this required changes in 
social patterns, law and customs that were developed around Qanat systems (see Chapter 7). 
Over time, a set of rules and norms came into settlements which developed around Qanat 
systems, these Islamic rules (Shari’a) regulated water supply and distribution. The earliest 
book of this codification is the Ketabi Qani (book of Qanats) in the eleventh Century 
(English, 1998).  The main purpose in regulating laws over this system was to support and 
protect the long-term investment of Qanat owners in agriculture. One of the most important 
laws was the Harim (border), which proscribes the distance between two Qanat tunnels. Each 
Qanat has an entrance where the surrounding land is reserved as harim and known as the 
territory around each Qanat and construction of any new mother well which can sink water 
within 1km of the existing mother well is forbidden (English, 1998). This regulation helped in 
areas with a high population density, and supported stable agricultural practices (English, 
1998). Qanats are closely linked with community life in arid regions and the laws are 
regulated to ensure their constant function and fair water distribution. This indicates the 
precise mechanism for fair water delivery and distribution in historic irrigation systems and 
management agenda. These rules which have been passed through to the recent developments 
of tube-wells technologies made the modern development acceptable and successful among 
traditional farmers (see Chapter 6, 7).  
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Land ownership under the Qanat system is fragmented, and water flow is directed through 
each household before it is used for irrigation. Qanat construction is based on the social and 
organizational structure of settlements (Balali, 2009). Although Qanats were built by wealthy 
individuals, the continual necessity for maintenance led to rapid fragmentation in their 
ownership throughout the settlement population. In some cases the number of Qanat owners 
reach over two or three hundreds and some Qanat water is divided over 10,000 time-shares. 
These division rules extend back, in some cases, to only a hundred years ago. This 
fragmentation in land ownership of Qanat systems has currently caused difficulties for 
farmers, as scattered and small land pieces make ineffective use of agricultural machineries, 
also land integration and agreements has become problematic and very hard to achieve (see 
Chapter 7).   
Beaumont (1989) states that although Qanat could provide irrigation water for arid and semi-
arid regions, their future importance is uncertain. Within the past 50 years the number of 
Qanats has started to decline in Iran and elsewhere. This is mainly as a result of increased 
population and thus water demand, increased frequencies of drought and floods and the 
expansion of pumped-well development, that brought higher economic advantages, has all 
negatively affected the sustainability of Qanat systems (Haeri, 2003). Although it is indicated 
that Qanat cannot contribute to the development of modern capitalist agricultural practices, 
some still believe that Qanat can still play a major role in local economic development of 
agricultural settlements and that they should be maintained in future (English, 1998; Madani, 
2014). This issue was discussed further with local farmers in Kashan, however they argued 
that scarcity of groundwater resources and increased demand does not allow for further 
development or maintenance of Qanat in drier regions. 
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The social regulations and norms of Qanat systems for farmers to access water and fair 
distribution of irrigation water are crucial. These rules are also linked with the local social 
capital arrangements among farmers. In my study, these water allocation rules among farmers 
were clearly observed during the social simulation exercise and were used to design the game 
board and the rules (see Chapter 4). Therefore, it is important for the researcher to know these 
social rules. The other key point regarding the Qanat system is that the operation and 
maintenance of the irrigation systems are established based on collective action and 
cooperation among farmers. This could encourage farmers to share the cost and 
responsibilities; this is still the main driving force for farmers to act collectively to maintain 
the operation of the current in-use pumped tube-wells (see Chapter 6). The other important 
point is that although the future sustainability of Qanat systems is unclear, it has nevertheless 
been crucial for local farmers to transfer the traditional norms, rules and social capital to the 
modern system of tube-wells for continuing their successful farming practices. This is 
particularly the case when poorer farmers need to collectively own the water and land in order 
to share the costs of water abstraction and repairs under the water scarcity conditions in the 
region (see Chapter 6).  
 
3.3. A Chronology of Water Management Developments in Iran  
3.3.1. Traditional water management systems before land reform (in 1960s) 
During the 1960s, Iranian farmland was managed under a feudal system by landlords, 
however, the number of Qanat has since started to decline (Ehlers et al., 1989). At this time 
landlords reduced their financial support for annual repairing and cleaning of Qanat systems 
and expressed more interest in investing in motor-pumped devices, although the water law, 
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established in 1943, required the protection of Qanats where necessary (Lambton, 1953).  The 
Buneh system refers to the main social institution in the pre-modern era of water and land 
management in Iran during 1960s. The water allocation rules in Qanat, the land ownership 
status and Buneh system are the main components of traditional irrigation management in 
Iran, explained in the previous section. 
 
3.3.2. Nationalisation of Iranian Water Resources before the Revolution (1960-1979) 
After water resources in Iran were nationalized in 1967, state interventions for centralisation 
of water governance began. The Shah’s modernist ethos assumed that traditional irrigation in 
rural regions was primitive, regressive and inefficient. This came along with his nineteen 
point “White Revolution” scheme (reflecting the fact that the revolution was bloodless) which 
was to be applied across the whole country (McLachlan 1988; Ehlers et al., 1989). In general 
this scheme sought to give the state more control over water and land resources. After the 
Shah’s White Revolution many traditional water rights and customary rules in local irrigation 
systems were destroyed, and major land owners were put under intense pressures to sell their 
lands at lower prices and to divide the land between other farmers, so that share-croppers 
would become landowners (Lambton, 1969; Ghazi, 2003). Regional water agencies started to 
evaluate and control water consumption and the state obtained power over taxation and 
charging private or common water source properties (Lambton, 1969). In the agricultural 
sector, due to a lack of understanding of traditional practices by both foreign and the new 
domestic organisations, as well as the rate of change, the pre-modern (traditional) irrigation 
and governance system considerably changed (Balali, 2009). Traditional irrigation institutions 
(Buneh) were replaced by a system of small holding farming and land-lords replaced by 
95 
 
government agencies which led to many consequences in farming communities (Balali, 2009). 
These consequences were for example deterioration of the social capital and collective action 
among farmers to work together and maintain the irrigation system; also numerous farmers 
left their job (Azkia and Ghafari, 2005). Under the new structure, farmers were no longer able 
to collectively maintain the Qanat irrigation system and associated rural infrastructures and 
therefore they became dependent on the state for the necessary services (Balali, 2009). This is 
a problematic issue until present times, which due to high costs of repair farmers are not able 
to keep maintenance of irrigation systems and motor pumped-wells independently, and need 
financial support from the government (read more in Chapter 6). “The land reform plan 
seriously neglected the socio-economic aspects and the value systems of the rural areas” 
(Balali, 2009, p.167). The government could not include small land holder farmers in a 
modern system of agricultural transformation. After land reform in 1960s, Iran’s water and 
land management systems was driven by technology. This encouraged mechanized agriculture 
and increased the production of large-scale commercial crops for export (Ardakanian, 2005, 
Karbasiuon, 2007, Balali, 2009).   
 
3.3.3. The Development of Wells after the Islamic Revolution until the Implementation 
of Fair Distribution Law of Water (1980-1998) 
As indicated above, between 1950 and 1960 and subsequently, the number of Qanats fell in 
Iran due to the introduction of diesel motor-pump wells (Balali, 2009).  Numerous wells were 
drilled too close to Qanat mother wells and very close to each other and consequently there 
was a dramatic fall in the groundwater table in the central plateau of Iran. When groundwater 
tables fall below the depth of the mother well then the Qanat conduit will be completely dry 
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(Figure 8). Within a few years tube-well construction led to a drop in water table of 10-20m 
(Bonine, 1982). The new and more productive deep wells, which required considerable 
capital, were financed and owned by large landlords. They now had their own substantial 
supply of water in which the common villagers did not have a share (as they had under the 
qanat water arrangements). These landlords irrigated their own lands and changed to 
mechanized agriculture, the latter exempting their land for redistribution under the terms of 
the land reform programme of the early 1960s” (Ehlers et al., 1989). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Source: Author, 2015                    
                     
Figure 8 Qanat system’s deterioration when water table dropped below mother well 
level 
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After the Iranian revolution in 1979, the civil code was terminated by Islamic law, in which 
protection of Qanat systems was prioritized. However, McLahan (1988) reports that by the 
mid-1970s wells were supplying 8×109 m3 of irrigated water in comparison with 9×109 m3 
provided by Qanats. Protection of Qanat systems ceased when government initiated support 
for pump technologies, as it sought to achieve food self-sufficiency for the country in the 
early 1980s. This was to be achieved by increasing production levels and expanding 
agriculture (McLachlan, 1988; Schirazi, 1993), in which it favoured the development of 
motor-pumped wells over existing Qanat systems, which could not supply sufficient water to 
satisfy growing demands (Molle et al., 2003).  
Wells can provide water during drought thus securing water supply, and hence the expansion 
of pumped-wells was accelerated (Molle and Mamanpoush, 2012), although the government 
was unaware of the consequences of this development.  Under Islamic law, the need to protect 
springs, wells and Qanats was addressed by defining a harim (borders) which prohibit digging 
a new mother-well within one kilometres of existing Qanat (this rule is currently applied for 
the pumped tube-wells), however this could not prevent the growth in the number of wells 
(Foltz, 2002).  The pump technology gave richer farmers an advantage in selling their water to 
neighbouring farmers and increased the level of inequity (Ward, 1998; Milton, 2001) which is 
expressed by local farmers in Kashan (Chapter 6). The rationale for developing pump 
technology was twofold: First, to access deep or semi-deep aquifers to enable agricultural 
expansion and intensification, which is typical in much of the Middle East and North Africa. 
However, as a result of uncontrolled individual water abstraction this caused groundwater 
depletion, subsidence, and increased the cost of pumps (Molle et al., 2003). Second, to add 
reliability to irregular surface water supplies as is the case in Vietnam, Thailand, China and 
Iran (Molle et al., 2003). Uncontrolled and unregulated exploitation of groundwater resources 
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has caused the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ in many dry countries and in Iran, in which 
common-pool resources are being exploited at an unsustainable rate by a large number of 
shared owners (Ostrom, 1990) (see Chapter 2).  
In 1983 the law of fair distribution of water resources was approved in Iran, under which 
construction or expansion of wells and Qanats systems required permission from the Ministry 
of Power (Hoogesteger, 2005). Although this restriction prevented expansion of drilling deep 
wells until now, there is a need for more restricted control. Molle and Mamanpoosh (2012) 
suggest that this law made control of groundwater centralised, without considering the local 
hydrology, transparency and interests of water users, which has led to corruption by rich and 
influential consumers who could obtain permission through their power. 
 
PART II: Iran’s Contemporary Water Management Crisis 
3.3.4. Contemporary Water Governance in Iran: The Impact of the National Water 
Management Policies on Local Irrigation Practices   
This section reviews current water governance structure in Iran through reflection on the 
existing water crisis in Iran, particular agricultural irrigation governance system of the country 
and the role of local agricultural institutions in promoting participatory resources 
management. 
3.3.4.1. Water Crisis in Iran 
As previously indicated, the government of Iran faces several long-term challenges in future 
water management (Madani Larijani, 2005). These include the consumption of 73.8% of the 
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country’s ‘Total Renewable Fresh Water’ resources annually, which places Iran amongst the 
most water stressed countries globally (IMPO, 2003). The annual renewable fresh water 
resource is currently declining, mainly due to population growth and a poor culture of water 
consumption. In large cities the amount of water that people consume is as much as that 
consumed by water-rich nations and as a result of increasing population, the water demand 
will increase significantly. The other major problem is deterioration of water quality due to a 
number of factors including sanitation problems, poor wastewater collection, inappropriate 
water distribution systems and expansion of urban areas, and increase of saline groundwater 
due to over-abstraction (Madani Larijani, 2005). Regarding groundwater resources, Iran is 
one of the top abstractors of groundwater globally (Gleeson et al., 2012).  As the main water 
supply source in most of the arid regions of Iran is groundwater, the improvement in 
groundwater use efficiency is critical. Burke and Younger (2000), indicated three conditions 
that may occur regarding groundwater resources worldwide: 1. Access to groundwater and 
abstraction may continue, leading to an intensification of cultivation in response to changing 
demand patterns, 2. There will be limited groundwater demand management as poor farmers 
try to maintain their livelihood, 3. Groundwater will be over-abstracted and farmers will be 
compelled to accept social and economic transitions to leave their land or hand over their 
water rights to other competing sectors such as industry or urban centres (Burke and Younger, 
2000). 
In Iran, the circumstances mentioned above have been observed during different periods. At 
the beginning of the Islamic revolution (1979) the agricultural development brought economic 
growth in the region through expansion of drilled tube-wells, however later over-exploitation 
of groundwater resources and increased costs of pumping, made poor farmers even poorer. In 
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the future, farmers predict that water resources will not be sufficient.  The next generation 
may quit farming and migrate to other cities seeking more profitable jobs.  
 
3.3.4.2. Agricultural Water Governance  
Under the current regime, groundwater resources are considered a national property belonging 
to the government. The operation and maintenance of irrigation systems are public 
responsibilities; however pump ownership is private.  Slight interventions have been made in 
recent Iranian civil law concerning water management that empower and strengthen the role 
of NGOs, reducing the role of government, and investing in community-based management 
systems (Azkia, 2005). The more development of participatory management approaches with 
local resource users can facilitate moving towards implementation of this policy which is 
discussed further in chapter 7.  
In 1993 the formation of an independent council in Iran’s agricultural and rural sectors was 
approved. However, its formation has not been fully established nor implemented by 
communities of local stakeholders. Therefore independent cooperative communities have not 
been created in the form of associations, unions or syndicates. Consequently a ‘pseudo 
participatory’ process has been followed which fails to understand and address the needs of 
farmers (Azkia, 2005). Most of the community or cooperative societies that were created are 
officially authorized by government and facilitate the implementation of government policies 
(Zand-razavi, 2004; Azkia, 2005). Therefore, this study suggests the creation of more 
community-based and local informal institutions that can empower farmers’ capabilities in 
decision-making processes, which will be further discussed in this thesis (see Chapter 7). 
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While management schemes promise to increase the agricultural budget and farmers’ welfare, 
in most cases by inappropriate budgetary allocation to different agencies, they seek to obtain 
public acceptance and farmers’ participation in large-scale government schemes (Zand-razavi, 
2004). Madani (2014) has highlighted Iranian policy makers have pursued populist policies, 
for example financing a new water infrastructure system which can enhance economic status 
of the region.  
The Iranian water crisis has been analysed and described by various scholars over a long 
period of time (Foltz, 2002, Madani Larijani, 2005, 2014; Yazdanpanah et al. 2013) but it has 
not been taken seriously by Iranian water decision-makers. In this situation some scholars 
believe that agricultural water share must be reduced to protect the environment, while this 
may be problematic for poorer farmers with limited water rights (see chapter 6). The current 
Iranian government recognizes water security as a national priority and immediate actions 
have sought to address some of the major problems and ensure the sustainability of water use. 
The groundwater situation is a ‘hidden tragedy’ which needs to be addressed as a major 
environmental disaster. 
The integrated water management approach in Iran, is mentioned in the 4th 5-year socio-
economic development plan of Iran (Hashemi, 2011). The laws of “comprehensive soil law” 
and the “fair water distribution act (1982)” contain some elements of concern for 
sustainability. The ‘guidelines for implementing balanced use of water in agriculture’ which 
was approved in 2008 represents a shift in management perspectives: 
According to Article 6 of this guideline: “Before establishing any hydraulic structure such as 
irrigation and drainage networks the Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Jihad-e-Agriculture 
have to consider all requirements which are needed for the establishment and arrangement of 
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farming systems in order to let producers/beneficiaries participate to foster their effective 
cooperation in all steps of study and implementation, and to accept responsibilities for 
exploitation, maintenance and irrigation management of those hydraulic structure”. 
There is also government regulation to protect farmers’ right and empower them. The goal of 
a recent ‘Farmers’ House’ social organisation is “to harmonize farmers’ activities around the 
country in order to support and protect their political and socio-economic rights and their 
human rights in the Iranian context” (Farmers House constitution, Article 5). The government 
has facilitated creation of some participatory activities for farmers within the past 20 years, 
for example a village council whose members are directly selected by local farmers (Balali, 
2009). 
 
3.3.4.3. Local Agricultural Institutions in Iran 
In the early 1970s the Iranian government established the Agricultural Production 
Cooperative in order to increase the production level of fragmented farm units. This was the 
main strategy of the Ministry of Agriculture aimed at achieving land consolidation. Although 
the number of these institutions increased, they were not successful in promoting land 
integration and collective agreement by farmers (Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam, 2005). The 
creation of these cooperatives was mainly aimed at the integration of lands by participating 
voluntary farmers as members, improving soil and water productivity, improving irrigation 
infrastructures, land leveling, educating farmers in modern methods and technologies, 
developing agricultural industry and improving farmers’ income and social welfare in each 
household village (Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam, 2005).  
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According to Balali (2009) the two major rural organizations in Iran are generally known as 
‘Agricultural Production Cooperatives’ (APC) whose main aim is to increase production 
level, the majority of farmers are members of this cooperation since their development in 
1996; and the second group is the ‘Village Council’ which mainly deals with ‘cultural and 
socio-economic issues’ within a village. Different rural institutions that exist in Iran are for 
example Rural Production Cooperatives (tavoni tolid), Cooperative societies (sahami zeraie), 
Mosha Cooperatives, and Water associations (tavoni abbaran). The most important institution 
is the ‘rural production cooperative’ (tavoni tolid) which exists in every village in Iran.  The 
main reason that farmers are not interested joining water associations is because they have 
their own private tube-well and thus they do not see any need for cooperation (Balali, 2009). 
 
3.3.5. Recent Consideration of Participatory Approaches in Water Policy of Iran  
The long term attempt to establish effective cooperatives in Iran has not been significantly 
successful. As stated before, in the traditional Qanat system, cooperation among peasants and 
landlords was based on hierarchical relationships and created through different generational 
experiences. The traditional system was shaped by unwritten rules and norms which could be 
understood and adopted by all resource users in the same society (Chapter 2). When the 
landlord was replaced by the government many of those rules and customs were destroyed, 
and the new cooperatives established based on a top-down mechanism. According to Balali 
(2009, p. 174) “this unilateral vision of organizing cooperatives which is still continuing is 
one of the main challenges of stakeholders’ participation”. It is indicated that new cooperation 
between farmers and governmental organization require new experiences to build trust which 
is currently insufficient, which the method development in this study tries to achieve (see 
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Chapter 6, 7). The culture of participation behavior needs to be more developed and promoted 
by engaging stakeholder from the beginning in the governmental projects, which this is one of 
the objectives follows by the participatory modelling development for this study (see Chapter 
4).   
Balali’s study (2009) reveals that farmers are more willing and have more positive attitudes 
towards possibilities of increasing collective action in comparison with 20 years ago. They are 
also agreed that the government has improved farmers’ participation in various rural issues. 
However the main remaining problem is the top-down governance approach and the necessity 
for early engagement of farmers into the introduction of a project and implementation through 
the process. Balali has found that projects are top-down and that the role of resource users are 
not included in the identification of the governmental projects from the outset. This has 
prevented resource users from participating in project implementation, reducing the efficiency 
of the project, due to a lack of trust towards the governmental project, and in the profitability 
and sustainability of the project for their particular social and economic context. 
 
3.4. Existing Barriers to Participatory Water Management in Iran  
This section outlines the incentives and barriers faced by farmers to take part in collective 
projects of water/irrigation management in Iran. This part is the critical review of the existing 
literatures on participation, incentives and barriers that were studied in Iran. From the reviews 
(e.g. Safinejad (1990), Sharma et al. (1996), Zand Razavi (2004)), it can be argued that there 
was a shift in the governance structure from traditional community-based Qanats to the 
modern regime. This is characterised by clear shifts in governance structure from community-
based to state-led control, which does not leave room for stakeholders’ engagement into the 
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main management decision processes. This gap in management approach and planning in Iran 
is addressed in the thesis’ method development (see Chapter 4). 
In the traditional context, management decisions sought to address local needs and to benefit 
the majority of farmers. However, the traditional rules were not flexible and adaptive enough 
to system changes. Under the current regime, the hierarchical governance structure in the 
traditional system has been shifted from landlords to the government. Local participation is 
dismissed and traditional values in creating adaptive rules and local-based solutions are 
failing. Currently the conflicting issues are usually dismissed and the main aim is to conserve 
a part of natural resources which has been identified by government (Zand-razavi, 2004). 
Thus, this study tries to develop and implement a participatory research method in Kashan 
case study, in order to actively engage local farmers in management decisions of suitable 
irrigation management at local level. Also the social methods and simulation exercise that are 
developed for this study, reveals farmers’ main perspectives and acknowledges existing social 
conflicts amongst farmers (see Chapter 4, 6, 7). 
From the literature, in democratic governance systems, government is a facilitator for wider 
social participation in management decisions. This particularly highlights the significant role 
of local institutions in creating an effective collaboration with local users. The government 
organisations can provide opportunities for local stakeholders to voice their views and 
perspectives on management issues and participate in a policy decision-making process (see 
Chapter 7). Solutions are to meet local needs and conflicts are recognised from the beginning 
to be negotiated and resolved during the management process, under the support of powerful 
local institutions (Zand-razavi, 2004); these principles were considered when designing the 
research method.   
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A review of some relevant literature in Iran around different experiences on factors affecting 
farmer participation in irrigation practices in Iran (Zand-razavi, 2004; Azkia, 2005), identifies 
three main barriers to participatory management in agricultural water management namely: 
regulatory, economic and social barriers. 
 
3.4.1. Barriers 
A regulatory barrier within the governance system of Iran is one of the main downfalls for 
effective local participation in governmental management projects. This study has addressed 
the need for strong local institutions developed mainly by local stakeholders or independent 
associations that are not structured in a governmental top-down manner and are responsive to 
the local needs. Formation of an independent council was approved in Iran’s regulations in 
agricultural and rural sectors. However the formation of these communities was prevented by 
different formal and informal interventions and it was not created in the form of associations, 
unions or syndicates.  
This classification varies among different scholars. However most of the evidence indicates 
that on a large scale, these obstacles are in regulatory structures in Iran’s civil law, as within 
the past 50 years, there was no rule to identify and recognize any independent agricultural 
community in this sector. Inadequate emphasises on public participation in civil law of Iran 
and a lack of recognition of any independent agricultural communities in this sector are some 
of the main problems. Lack of sufficient regulation and management on implementing 
participatory resource management, and also a lack of emphasis on the importance of public 
engagement in management decisions, makes little room for creation of innovative 
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participatory methods. In addition, it does not receive enough funds or governmental supports 
for implementations in large scale. 
Considering poverty in relation to environmental sustainability is a key issue. This aspect 
requires critical understanding of ecological and economic sustainability of agricultural 
activities; in many regions soil and water degradation is increasing which is threatening 
agricultural sustainability. Traditional inheritance rules have resulted in the fragmentation of 
agricultural land holdings. These small and scattered cultivation units have low productivity 
and consequently result in low investment by farmers in agriculture. This in turn has increased 
the exploitation rate of resources in the region particularly groundwater abstraction rate to 
increase productivity and sustain livelihoods. Although agriculture is assumed to be the most 
important source of income in most of the regions of Iran, poverty is a barrier to make any 
fundamental decisions which can lead to protection of environmental and water resources (see 
Chapter 6). Conducting a simulation role-play with farmers revealed the historical reasons for 
creation of this small and scattered landholding ownership, however the innovative method 
can also improve farmers’ awareness of the ways to make collective agreements for their 
lands consolidation (see Chapter 7). 
The most important social barrier for farmers’ participation lies in previous negative 
experiences in participatory management of water resources in Iran (Zand-razavi, 2004 and 
Yaghobi, 2011), which have resulted in the reluctance of some farmers to accept membership 
of participatory communities. In this study, the attempt was to develop a participatory method 
that does not follow the previous management methods and is mainly designed and developed 
by local farmers within an innovative way which is not governmental, but completely 
voluntary and community-based. The findings (Chapter 6, 7) reflect on the successful 
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outcomes as a result of building trust with farmers and engaging their cooperation in 
developing the methods from the beginning until the end that was significant in this study.  
A study on ‘Qazvin’ province (in central Iran) indicates that one of the main problems of 
transferring water management to local communities was the government’s underestimation 
of farmers’ capability for solving their local water management (Kholdbarin et al., 2011). 
Local communities were not given equal opportunity to participate in water management as 
government organisations. Farmers’ participation was neglected and at the end farmers could 
not observe any changes in their traditional management system. Baghaie, et al. (2011), 
indicates that during the formation of community-based WUA in ‘Behbahan’ (Khuzestan 
province in South-West Iran), there was no common agreement about the aims of 
participation; each stakeholder was following his own benefits from the committee. There was 
no clear plan for improving farmers’ capability, nor any exchange of opinions, dialogues or 
discussion with farmers about their main water problems. This study put emphasis mainly on 
farmers’ perspectives to define and understand the main problems in a particular farming 
context and in relation to groundwater exploitation and irrigating practices. The simulation 
exercise (see Chapter 4) has mainly designed to foster discussion, dialogues and debates 
among farmers which aimed in empowering their decision-making capabilities (see Chapter 
7). Kholdbarin’s et al. (2011) research on a water users association in Kerman Province 
(South of Iran) identified several problems that limited farmers’ participation in collective 
projects. These issues included:   
 1.Lack of awareness in the water cooperative agency about farmers’ main problems and lack 
of effectiveness of these governmental organisations for farmers (mainly due to these 
companies being authorized by governmental bodies); 2.Constructing water canals without 
consulting with local communities, as there was no agreement on suitable location for 
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constructing the canal by farmers; 3.Local people believing that they were able to solve 
problems among themselves, but cooperative companies are governmental organizations who 
try to put higher costs and responsibilities on farmers which will enlarge their existing 
problems. Although there are not many well-known cooperative societies in large-scale 
farming in Iran, there are different kinds of collective activity among farmers and various 
sources of social norms (Baghaie et al., 2011). 
The study on participatory irrigation management in ‘Fars’ Province by Khalkheili and 
Zamani (2008), reveals that farmers’ perception of participation, has direct and positive 
impact on their participation in governmental organizations irrigation management.  In 
summary, these experiences indicate that in most cases, participatory issues are national 
policies which are often in the form of governmental plans imposed on farmers and are not 
generally consistent with their interests. These organizations do not establish any 
collaborative process, regular meetings and discussion with farmers, and essentially negative 
experiences once again appear as an obstacle in implementing the next participatory program. 
  
In this study I expand further on the factors that influence farmers’ rejection of participation 
in governmental irrigation and groundwater management projects (see Chapter 7). I 
particularly argue that this lack of consideration of physical, social, cultural and economic 
factors has led to unsuccessful management outcomes in national agricultural water policy in 
Iran. In this study, I argue that if projects are aimed at engaging farmers in governmental 
schemes, there is a need for more adaptive and participatory management strategies which are 
local-based and adaptable, developed by the key stakeholders (see Chapter 6, 7). 
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A cultural pattern of behaviour is another important barrier for participation, which prevents 
cooperation in agricultural activities. One of the key factors for people to cooperate in a 
collective action management is the level of social capital. Social capital emphasises the idea 
that norms and social bonds are essential for sustainable management of common resources. 
This approach prevents resources being degraded as a consequence of being common 
properties (Pretty, 2003). Social capital in water resources management encourages people to 
invest in collective action decisions, it reduces costs of working together and eventually leads 
to protection of water resources. In Kashan case study area the emergence of private tube-
wells especially the ones invested in by rich and individual farmers has reduced the level of 
social capital regarding cooperation, reciprocity and trust between rich and poorer farmers 
(see Chapter 6). There are four important features in social capital; trust, reciprocity, common 
rules and norms, and connectedness in networks and groups (including bonding, bridging and 
linking) (Woolcock, 2001) (see Chapter 2). These features can be used as key indicators for 
measuring the level of social capital in any community.  In Kashan, the water right allocation 
mechanism and fair water abstraction has been disturbed by farmers who are investing in 
larger lands and buy water rights from poorer farmers (see Chapter 6). This has reduced the 
number of farmers in the region whose farming is the main source of livelihoods as well as 
causing degradation of lands and groundwater resources due to expansion of industrial crops 
by individuals. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated contemporary water management governance and historical trends 
in Iran. It has also provided an overview of the traditional and modern context of governance 
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in Iran. The transformation in the governance regime of Iran particularly after land reform, 
was aimed at reducing inequalities among farmers (by giving small-scale farmers the land and 
water ownership). However, this policy framework was not successful and failed to achieve 
its goal. Analysis of water governance shifts in Iran shows that government could not 
completely convert the social structure (the roles and responsibilities) from traditional 
structure to the modern management system. As a result, inequality in the social and 
economic situation of farmers has further increased, this was particularly observed in the 
Kashan case study area. Within the traditional context, the power relations followed a top-
down hierarchy structure. The emphasis on improving participatory management of water 
resources in the recent national plan of Iran is not significant, and this points towards the need 
for more research on how to achieve effective participation of farmers in water management 
decisions. Developing community-based management practices and building upon existing 
institutions to empower and support these local practices can lead to more locally adaptable 
management solutions (see Chapter 7). This does not require massive changes or expenses for 
large-scale project implementations, but at the local context, the participatory management 
can bring more advantages for farmers (see Chapter 4, 7).  
In rural development planning in Iran, the use of local-based solutions within an integrated 
approach is very limited. In this regard, this chapter summarised some of the main driving 
forces as well as barriers for farmers; participation in irrigation management practices, within 
relevant literature in Iran.  Although these factors are scattered within existing literature in 
Iran, this study will explore other influential elements in farmers’ decision-making behaviours 
and their participation in irrigation management practices (see Chapter 6, 7). These motives 
which play a crucial role in farmers’ behaviour and rational decisions are important to be 
understood and explored in a local context. This can assist policy-makers at regional scale to 
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engage farmers in management decisions and to implement policies or schemes which are 
more adaptable to local management strategies.  
Lack of a powerful organisation to take the main responsibilities, empower farmers’ 
communities and facilitate their participation in management processes has not led to 
successful management outcomes. In this chapter, reviewing the water governance and 
management changes in Iran, highlights the necessity of developing more participatory, 
adaptive and local-based management options for farmers. When local communities are 
empowered through incorporation into management practices process they can influence 
policy-makers’ decisions. As stated by Madani (2014, P. 10) “through bottom-up approaches, 
Iranian society can force the decision makers to change their behaviour, respond to the needs 
of the society, adopt more pro-environmental development actions, and give more power to 
regional water management authorities”. In this study, I will argue that the potential exists in 
local communities of Iran (Kashan) for implementation of participatory studies (see Chapter 
7). I will also argue that adaptive management approaches bring added value for farmer’s 
community and enhance management approaches in the Kashan case study area (see Chapter 
6 and 7).  
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
 
Introduction  
This chapter identifies the techniques and tools used during the research. It justifies the 
selection of the case study area, the logic in adopting the research methods for data collection 
and data analysis and summarises the positionality and ethical concerns of the researcher. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part of this chapter reflects on the 
methodological approach of the study, the primary data collection, including: initial 
fieldwork, social research techniques such as semi-structured interviews, group discussions 
and the recording of participants’ perspectives and concerns. The second part of the chapter 
explains the development of the participatory modelling process for local irrigation 
management practices in Kashan.  
This stage proceeds through the intervention method into companion modelling (ComMod) 
approach (see Figure 11, p.138), and three main associated phases of: information gathering, 
modeling and Role-Play simulation. To conceptualise my method using ComMod approach, 
physical data attributes (e.g. precipitation, temperature as climate factors in a hydrologic 
model), were integrated with social aspects (Role-play game and associated scenarios) to 
create a platform for deeper understanding of the irrigation system, and to foster discussion 
and collective decision-making for improvement of irrigation efficiency and management. 
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This methodological approach followed a bottom-up process, designed and led by local 
farmers within several phases in the Kashan case study area. The participatory modelling 
stage used the hydrologic model output to evaluate and discuss some of the scenarios derived 
from the Role-play simulation. The final part of this chapter describes the design and 
development of the ‘Irrigation Management Role-Play Game’ for sustainable management of 
groundwater resources, including the crucial role local farmers played in the different stages 
of sketching and designing the board game. 
 
4.1. Case Study Area Description 
Kashan: the Setting 
The study area of Kashan city, with a population of 400,000 populations is the largest city in 
Northern Isfahan province in central Iran, located beside the Salt Lake (Figure 9). There are 
two different climates in the region: one is a mountain region with winter snow cover, where 
irrigation waters are supplied by springs, ephemeral rivers and Qanat systems (see Chapter 3). 
In this part of the region, due to greater availability of water, farmers practice different 
patterns of crop cultivations (e.g. fruit trees). The second climate is associated with a plain 
region located beside the great central Kavir desert of Iran, the soil is sandy and the only 
source of irrigated water is supplied by deep or semi-deep wells, and most of the Qanats are 
dry. However, water rights and water allocation mechanisms in both regions strictly follow 
the historic rules established for Qanat water allocation, and this was discussed further in 
chapter 3. In Kashan, agriculture could not remain highly productive given reduced water 
availability and according to the local farmers climate change impact (i.e. prolonged drought 
period since 2010) has limited diversity in crop cultivation patterns. Thus, farmers in this 
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region are particularly affected by a significant fall in groundwater levels and long-term 
inefficient governance regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
                    Source: Author, 2015 
 
The Abu-Zeid Abad valley is located in the plain region of Kashan and contains several 
villages that were selected for this research.  There are nine villages located within the valley, 
30km from Kashan city: Fakhreh, Aliabad, Rijen, Mohammad Abad, Hossein Abad, Abu-
Zeid Abad, Kaaghazi, Yazdelan, and Qasemabad (Figure 10). These villages are associated 
with the major areas of cultivation in the district and their area of agricultural land has 
expanded recently. Farmers in these villages were the main participants in the interviews and 
Figure 9 The Case Study Area of Kashan Catchment, in Isfahan Province (Iran) 
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group discussions for this study. Most farmers have small or medium size farmlands (between 
1 and 5 hectares); they produce mainly for their family and the regional market, while a few 
large-scale farmers produce industrial crops for the national market. Two major cultivation 
practices are orchards (fruit trees) and tillage. Local crops that are produced traditionally in 
Kashan include fruit trees (pomegranate, pistachio, and apricot); cereals (wheat, barley, 
maize, millet, and chickpea); vines, melons, cucumber and vegetables. Farmers in these 
regions have experienced substantial changes in their water supplier and delivery system 
developments, and water governance within the last 50 years. The majority of farmers have 
installed individual or collective tube-wells and they are currently confronted with significant 
reductions in their water availability.  As stated in Chapter 3, around 30 years ago pump 
technology became dominant in the region, having been introduced by the government. 
Subsequent overexploitation of groundwater has forced farmers in some villages to change 
their practice, focusing on cultivation of crops that are more adapted to water shortage such as 
sugar beet, wheat, barley, alfalfa and pistachio.  
Drought and climate variations (such as reduction in rainfall) have been clearly observed by 
local farmers over the past decades (Farmers’ interviews in Abu-Zeid Abad village in Kashan, 
2011) (see Chapter 6). Kashan city and the villages of Abu-Zeid Abad fall under two different 
water and irrigation authorities, the domestic and green-space water management of Kashan is 
under Kashan district’s water authority, and the irrigation management of the Abu-Zeid Abad 
villages are under authority of Aran-Bidgol district (located on the east side of Kashan). 
Groundwater from the Kashan plain’s aquifer (Salt-lake Basin), is recharged by rainfall and 
seepage from ephemeral rivers, and is abstracted by private tube-wells. In dry summer 
seasons there is no rainfall to recharge the aquifer but the main cultivation period is in 
summer and reports indicate that the aquifer does not replenish over the winter precipitation 
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(Research Committee of Water and Sewage Institute of Kashan, 2008).  In many dry regions 
in Iran, and particularly in the Kashan Plain, soil and water degradation is increasing which is 
threatening groundwater quality, agricultural sustainability and expanding desertification 
(Jamshidzadeh and Mirbagheri, 2011). Traditional inheritance rules have resulted in the 
fragmentation of agricultural land holdings (see Chapter 6).  
 
                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Source: Google Earth, 2014 
Figure 10 The case study villages are spread between Kashan city and Abu zeid Abad 
Village 
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4.1.1. Case Study Selection  
The empirical focus of this research is local adaptive management to improve irrigation 
efficiency in an arid region of Iran. Thus, the first criterion in selecting the study area was to 
identify a region located in an arid part of the country whose management draws on the rich 
indigenous knowledge of local irrigators. The second criterion was the accessibility to the 
researcher of the local communities, who have long-term experiences in groundwater 
irrigation practices and needed to be willing to cooperate in data collection and development 
of the methodology. The third criterion is that the study area should be at a regional level and 
include small-scale farming practices, however it should also fall under the remit of state-led 
irrigation development schemes (i.e. drip irrigation systems, land integration), which offer a 
wider context to analyse the irrigation efficiency performances and to evaluate the existing 
policies and the adaptive process of adopting these schemes by local communities. This 
condition offered an exploratory platform to better understand the particular local ecologic 
and socio-political characteristics of Kashan, which could deepen the analysis and provide a 
suitable context to explore new methods of stakeholder engagement.   
In the following sections, I will elaborate on different stages of data collection and 
development of the methodology with farmers. 
 
4.2. Part I: Justification of the Methodological Approaches  
4.2.1. Research Tools and Methods: interviews 
This section describes the social methodology used in this research, the methods of data 
collection and analysis. The concepts of positionality and ethical concerns will be discussed. 
The social research methods are mainly qualitative and a combination of different approaches 
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including semi-structured interviews, group discussions, and social simulation methods such 
as participatory Role-play game. 
The main objective of the method selection was to develop an appropriate research approach 
and research design to address the study objectives. The main objective for conducting 
interviews and group discussions was to obtain information and perspectives from local 
farmers, local institutions and academic experts. Four periods of field-work were undertaken 
over three years (2011-2013), each year for a period of 1 to 2 months and two periods of 
fieldwork in 2013. The first two fieldwork periods focussed on wider perspectives on 
irrigation management practices in Iran, and the particular irrigation context of the case study 
region.  
Thus, the primary field-work was undertaken for observation and data collection in 2011 for 
the period of 3 months. This was of an exploratory nature to inform understanding of the 
existing problems. The main purpose of conducting primary interviews (2011) was to gain a 
better understanding of agricultural status in the region, the main problems in managing water 
resources and irrigation practices, also farmers’ ethical perspectives regarding water values in 
this arid region. It was accompanied by several in depth interviews with local farmers and 
academics in the Kashan region of Iran. Later these interviews were translated and transcribed 
into English and analysed. The Nvivo software was used to code the transcripts, from these 
codes the information was classified and different themes were identified by the researcher. 
The elements of local knowledge, governance, groundwater challenges and management, and 
water crisis were considered to form some of the main research themes. The themes were 
interrelated to existing literatures and interpreted to generate the discussions. The analysis and 
interpretation of conducted interviews and group discussions are provided in detail in the 
discussion chapters (see Chapter 6 and 7). Secondary data collection from relevant agencies 
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provided enough information to be considered for the selection of an appropriate hydrologic 
model, based on the availability and accuracy of the data. At the end of this stage, the 
selection of study sites, relevant stakeholders, appropriate research techniques and initial 
important parameters for modelling was completed. 
Kashan city was selected as a case study area as described above, and three villages of Ali-
Abad, Rijen, and Fakhreh were selected to undertake participatory social simulation 
modelling. This selection reflected the fact that farmers in these villages were relatively 
young and more active in farming, and showed more willingness to contribute to this research 
than farmers in other villages of Kashan. 
In-depth Interviews:  Nardi and Wittaker (2002) consider that for successful adaptive water 
management, direct communication between actors is necessary to maintain the social 
interaction.  Therefore, in this study, I used in-depth interviews in an initial fieldwork period 
to first obtain general understanding of the system and farmers’ practices, from this I could 
explore the main themes and perspectives exist in the irrigation system and management. 
Interviews provided rich and detailed responses with contextual explanation (Silverman, 
2013). In exploring irrigation rules, culture and farmers’ perspectives on water management 
and irrigation, interviews are important in creating a rich knowledge which can be matched to 
particular circumstances of farmers enabling the voice of participants to be heard. The 
primary interviews sought to understand the region’s agricultural status, the main problems of 
water resource management and irrigation practices. 
Semi-structured Interviews: Semi-structured interviews, in the second period of fieldwork 
stage (partly designed based on some of the key points and statements extracted from the 
initial deep interviews with farmers). These were mainly conducted in farmers’ houses or on 
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their farmland. Farmers were the main participants as they are the key stakeholders. Some 
interviews were also conducted with officials in the relevant local agencies, for example the 
Water and Sewage Agency of Kashan, and Agricultural Jihad Agencies in Kashan and Aran-
Bidgol Districts. The questions were designed in Farsi, and a guide was provided, in an 
attempt to obtain more detailed information about individual farmers.   Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with a total of 25 persons, in some cases where older farmers were 
not able to contribute directly, the researcher read out questions to them and they responded in 
short or open ended manner (see Appendix 1). 
Group Discussions:  Most group discussions were conducted in a local mosque which 
offered a suitable arena for farmers to gather and meet. The mosque was suggested by farmers 
themselves as their informal meetings are usually held there. The large group of farmers 
included male and female farmers, and children participated in the more general meetings. In 
Kashan region male farmers are mainly involved with farming practices, some of them own 
the land or mostly are shared-owners, and in a few cases they rented land from another 
farmer. Females and children are not involved in the main farming practices (they might help 
in some labouring activities such as picking fruits, clearing lands, etc.) therefore, later they 
were excluded from the methodology development of the game design. This stage was prior 
to selecting suitable and interested farmers to participate in the design of the social role-
playing simulation. Around 6 group discussions were conducted, to explore farmers’ 
particular challenges in irrigation management and their perspectives towards government 
schemes, as well as discussions around the RPG simulation. As it was argued in Chapter 2, an 
integrated and more effective management approach is when the viewpoints and interests of 
all relevant stakeholders are included in the management process for better understanding of 
the system dynamic.  Thus, within some of the conventional social research methods, an 
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attempt was made to gather wide ranges of information from different resource users in 
Kashan region.  
Role-Play Game/Simulation: This social simulation method was sketched and designed 
mainly by farmers (described in Part III). This method is widely acknowledged as the most 
effective method to foster discussion and achieve social learning (see Chapter 2). The 
selection of villages where the Role-play game would be conducted was based on the level of 
farmers’ interest and cooperation and available time. Also as a critique of irrigation 
management schemes was the main objective, the three villages of Ali-Aabad, Fakhreh and 
Rijen were selected to develop and conduct the Role-play game, (one village had already 
adopted a sub-surface piped-line irrigation system and the other villages had registered for 
this scheme, all three villages had rejected adoption of drip irrigation method).  
Interview with Official Water Regulatory Institutions: The Ministry of Energy is the main 
agency responsible for water development in Iran, including planning, management and 
protection for different sectors. Surface irrigation, drainage systems and large-scale 
groundwater irrigation projects are under the jurisdiction of this agency. In this study, because 
the scope of the research was regional and local management, and given difficulties in 
accessing the managerial board of this department an interview with this organization was not 
possible. However, a number of interviews were conducted with the Regional Water 
Authorities, whose main responsibilities are to manage and maintain the irrigation 
infrastructures (water canals, reservoirs and large-scale groundwater schemes) as well as 
water delivery to farmers. Maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure has been undertaken 
with both private companies and local irrigators, however in recent years part of the 
responsibilities have been transferred to farmers (see Chapter 6). The Ministry of Cooperation 
(MoC) is responsible for organizing and facilitating the activities of rural communities and 
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monitoring their cooperation with the government organizations. One of the main 
responsibilities of this organization is implementation of groundwater schemes and 
cooperative farming, thus interviews with some of the employees of this department were 
completed in two districts of Kashan city and Aran-Bidgol. The other influential government 
organization is the Ministry of Jihad Agriculture (MoJA), which is responsible for the 
management of rainfed and irrigated agricultural practices, as well as drainage and tertiary 
water canals. The main role of this Agency is developing and managing on-farm irrigation 
schemes; therefore 5 in-depth and semi-structured interviews were conducted with different 
management bodies within relevant departments such as soil and water sector in two sub-
district regions of Kashan and Aran-Bidgol. The two tables below summaries the interviews 
conducted with local farmers and relevant agencies (see Appendix 2). 
 
      Table 1 Data Collection in Kashan Villages (2011-2013) 
                 Participants 
Methods 
Local Farmers 
       Ali-Abad 
Local farmers 
    Fakhreh  
Local farmers 
         Rijen 
Local farmers 
in Kashan 
 
Deep Interviews 4 2 3            1 
Semi-structured Interviews 3(total 12 farmers) 2(6 farmers) 1(4 farmers) 1(3 farmers) 
Group Discussion 3 (total 38 farmers) 2 (25 farmers) 1( 8 farmers)  
Role-play session 3 (total 40 farmers)   1 (6 farmers)  
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        Table 2 Key governmental departments interviewed (2011 and 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Roles/Interviewees   
 
Official Agencies 
       
      Official Role  
 
Number of Interviewees and 
Types of Interviews  
 
Agricultural Jihad Agency Chief of rural 
cooperative  
1 Semi-structured Interviews 
Water and sewage agency (in 
two sub-districts of Kashan 
and Aran-Bidgol) 
The head of water 
agencies 
1 In-depth Interviews and 
1 Semi-structured Interviews 
Academic Experts University 
lecturer and PhD 
students 
1 In-depth Interviews with 
academics 
2 Group Discussions with PhD 
students 
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4.2.2. Participant Selection and Positionality  
Any adaptive management process requires a participatory approach to engage people from 
all aspects. The sample interviewees in Kashan required participants from local level and 
state-level including farmers, water and irrigation agencies as well as academic perspectives 
(such as PhD students and local academics). The information provided by these groups, was 
essential to the research. The sample group was able to offer a ‘representative 
characterization’ of all participants in groundwater management (Rice, 2010). 
 
It is important to recognize the differences and similarities between myself and my research 
participants (Hopkins, 2007, p.388). This refers to the positionality of the researcher during 
the study, which defines the situation of individuals in relation to others, and is a relatively 
complex issue (Merriam et al., 2001; Mellor et al, 2013). Here, I used my nationality and 
language to make a closer link to the participants. It is commonly believed that when 
researchers share the same language, culture and race, with participants then access and 
expression will be easier leading to more legitimate results (Merriam et al., 2001). 
Understanding these differences and similarities such as gender, race, class, and culture can 
be used to classify a researcher as an outsider or insider, this is particularly the case when 
researchers go from the ‘West’ to undertaken field-work in the ‘East’.  
Within the context of this research, I have experienced different positions in relation to 
different groups that I worked with. My main position is that I am a young female working on 
social issues in the Islamic society of Iran, interviewing farmers who are mainly men. My 
reflexivity is that as a western educated person I believe in the role of local farmers in my 
research (they are the most knowledgeable interviewees regarding irrigation practices), 
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although in Iranian culture, farmers have been usually perceived as not being sufficiently 
knowledgeable to be engaged in the policy-decision making process by the majority of 
politicians and Iranian academics.  
In conducting the research in Iran which is my home country, there were some cultural 
comforts. I am from the capital city Tehran and grew up in a modern environment and have 
travelled less to other historic cities of Iran (while I was living there), which made my first 
impression on visiting Kashan very impressive. Kashan is one of the most historic and 
cultural religious cities of Iran, and understanding different aspects of people’s life and 
particularly water provision systems was a motivational factor in conducting this study. 
Although of the same nationality and religion, when visiting rural villages of Kashan, I was an 
outsider. Also, as a female researcher from Tehran, a city with diverse ethnicities which does 
not have good reputation in traditional Iranian cities, made me feel a bit uncomfortable. Thus, 
my gender, urban status and social class made my ‘lived experiences’ different from my 
research participants (Mellor et al., 2013). 
 
During several visits, and assuring locals that I had no affiliation with government bodies or 
foreign countries, I created a sense of trust and bonding with several farmers in different 
villages. I had the privilege to receive a higher level of trust and interest from male farmers 
who were always willing to participate in my research, without any financial demand and in a 
very polite and hospitable manner. This made the process easier and more collaborative, as 
hospitality, curiosity and intellect are some of the well-known characteristic of Kashani 
people. 
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In the first year of field-work, I stayed in accommodation provided by Tehran University (the 
Desert Institute). I was introduced to some local farmers for interview through a local person, 
who worked in the same institute in Kashan and was familiar with farmers.  However, in the 
following years, I stayed in a hotel and travelled by car to the rural villages (spread on both 
sides of the road, 30km away from the town centre) (Figure 10). To organise a meeting, 
especially at a local mosque to conduct the RPG, I first contacted (called) a village leader 
whom I had met before. In other cases, I approached farmers directly in their villages and 
interviewed them near their houses or on their fields. In some cases when I arrived in their 
villages, farmers gathered around my car to greet and accompany me to the local mosque to 
conduct participatory group discussions, although this would rarely, or never, happen when 
officials conduct such meetings with farmers. As a result, they willingly participated in 
different stages of my methodology development and provided honest and deep responses to 
my questions and doubts. Also, the innovative methodological approach, which depends on 
local users’ participation, added more trust and openness to enrich my study. During the Role-
play games, farmers’ engagement in evaluating irrigation schemes provided rich and 
insightful results that could solve the ‘wicked’ aspect of the water management problem for 
me. When we were gathering in local mosques usually a few women were accompanied or 
sitting there, which in my opinion was to make me feel more comfortable talking with males, 
also they were willing to add to their personal knowledge. I spoke in Farsi with people. 
However, they have their own local language, and sometimes the leader or dominant person 
in the meetings, used that language to translate what I meant to other farmers. The power 
relationship, which is observant of any social form, was also evidenced in the interviews 
(Bondi, 2003) as well as through group discussion. However, I tried to involve other farmers 
who were quiet into the discussion. According to Sultana’s (2007) observation in her 
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fieldwork in Bangladesh, people in rural area show respect to urban educated people, which 
was evident in this study as well. Although I received some complimentary comments from 
farmers such as ‘we feel proud of you’ or ‘student such as you will be the future leaders’ etc. 
in communicating with government agencies this level of respect and modesty towards 
students does not usually exist or is not expressed. When interviewing officials, and 
particularly when interviewing local farmers, I did not want to come across as pretentious in 
any way (coming from a University in the West), and so I adopted a more considerate 
approach. This was also to develop trust with farmers, so I mentioned that I studied in Tehran. 
In some cases with some more open-minded officials, I mentioned that I was studying at a 
western university, which in one case made an official criticise government schemes in the 
region.  
In many situations, I put myself in an inferior position (Rose, 1997) to avoid participants 
hindering my access to them. Common identities can bring negative or positive influences on 
the interview process (Bondi, 2003). By having a different identity as a female, and through 
soft and bottom-up social methods, my impression is that male farmers were more considerate 
and generous to share their knowledge and to trust me. Farmers later told me that at first they 
assumed that I was a government investigator, but that later they could trust me. They also 
mentioned that an official has never visited them several times and paid such attention to the 
knowledge they provide, without criticising or inferring superior behaviour. Although many 
government agencies or experts visit farmers in the field to educate or criticise their practices, 
I have made it clear that I had no intention of doing so, and was willing to learn from them 
and their experiences in managing irrigation water.  As a result, the farmers greatly assisted 
me in designing and running the simulation board game and even interpreting the outcomes to 
other farmers in the region. 
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Although in interviewing with representatives from official agencies and even male 
academics, I experienced condescension in my position as a young female, I did not have such 
an impression with young or elder farmers. Farmers encouraged my methodology and asked 
me to develop and repeat similar Role-play game process with them for this region. Also 
conducting my group discussions and interviews in the local mosque, which was suggested by 
farmers themselves, provided added advantages in creating a comfortable, familiar and 
interesting environment for participants, there were no obligatory rules among men and 
women for gathering together in the same place and role-playing in a mosque (which as a 
religious arena might be assumed prohibited).  In public places in Iran women have to wear 
scarf, so did I. I preferably dressed in lighter and brighter colours, which could suggest to 
farmers that I did not work for government body, as they usually arrive in villages with 
labelled (branded) cars and dressed formally. However as a religious city, the people of 
Kashan expect religious considerations from each other and whoever visits them. 
 
4.2.3. Ethical Concerns 
To interview official agencies, I needed an official header letter with university stamped, 
which I presented. Prior to recording my interviews, I requested verbal permission.  I recorded 
most of my interviews and video recorded some parts of my Role-play game for better 
observation. However, it was appropriate to ask farmers for permission. Some did not want 
me to include their names in my thesis, so I reassured them that it will be anonymous. Women 
did not allow me to record their voice or take pictures of them for cultural and religious 
reasons and so I did not. In some cases I had to explain that my research would not bring 
immediate benefits or changes to farmers. In some cases farmers expected me to 
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communicate their requests or problems to the agencies, which I did, and later informed them 
of the result of my meeting with officials. 
After reflecting on my data collection in the first part of this chapter, the next section 
describes the development of my interventional participatory methodology. 
 
4.3. Research Method: Role-Play Games  
In this study, several tools, methods and modelling processes were used to provide a better 
understanding of a complex and dynamic Iranian irrigation system. Following the literature 
reviewed in the previous chapter, in order to move towards adaptive management process, it 
is essential to first understand the irrigation system’s dynamic and its interaction with 
groundwater resource thus in the first stage of the methodology, qualitative social research 
method of data collection was undertaken to provide the basis for subsequently conducting the 
companion modelling process. In the literature review chapter, it was argued that future 
groundwater resource management and irrigation projects need more holistic and integrated 
approaches, which include the perspectives of various stakeholders. This provides more 
legitimate and collaborative management options which is also applicable for the local 
resource users. Interview with knowledgeable local farmers provides better understanding of 
the irrigation system dynamics and farmers’ perspectives on different management issues. 
Particularly the use of game is helpful to create a shared platform of understanding and to 
achieve collective-agreed solutions for local groundwater irrigation management (see Chapter 
7). Conducting irrigation management game put groundwater resource users in their actual 
roles within the irrigation system and this can reveal their real behaviors, motives, driving 
forces for collective action and also conflicts at local level.  
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Groundwater irrigation is a common-pool resource (Ostrom, 1990) therefore adaptive 
management approach is chosen which can address the complexity and uncertainties in 
management decisions for groundwater resource in Kashan (see Chapter 2). This approach 
uses participatory modelling process, which includes different perspectives and users’ interest 
in decision-making process. The adaptive management approach provides more deliberative 
management strategies that are more sensitive to local conditions. The community-based 
participatory approach is also chosen as a principle method to explore the potentials in local 
farmers to join and develop participatory groundwater resource management at local level in 
Kashan within an authoritative governance regime of Iran. In capturing the complexity of 
natural resources, particularly groundwater, there is a need for integrated models that include 
hydrological as well as socio-economic variables. The physical and social integration 
provides more effective management-decisions considering the complexity and uncertainty of 
the future management options. The use of the WEAP model (see Chapter 5) in this study 
integrates uncertainties of climate change and water demand and also tests different scenarios 
of the future water management at local level. This physical model can also be used as a 
mediation tool to support dialogues and exchange of viewpoints on wider subject around 
groundwater sustainability, which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 5 and 7.   
 
In developing the methodology, emphasis was given to the engagement of stakeholders, the 
community-based groundwater and irrigation management, collective resource allocation and 
agreements. Simulation games are proposed as the most effective methods for users’ 
participation in adaptive management process at local level (see Chapter 2). 
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The main stakeholders involved in the modelling process included farmers, government 
agencies, regional water and irrigation institutions and academics (in agricultural water and 
land management disciplines), who all have an important role in groundwater and irrigation 
management.    
The growing importance of public engagement within sustainability sciences, has transformed 
traditional tools and methodologies in natural resource management (Kasemir, 2003; 
Bousquet et al., 2005). In participatory approaches to natural resource management, models 
have been used as tools for engaging both researchers and local participants in the 
management process (Kasemir, 2003; Voinov and Bousquet, 2010).  Participatory modelling 
is regarded by Voinov and Bousquet, (2010) as a powerful tool that can improve participants’ 
knowledge of the system dynamic within a collaborative learning process. The models are 
also used to define and clarify the possible solutions and their impacts to support decision-
making, policy regulations or management issues.  
In managing groundwater resources particularly, the identification of social and ecological 
boundaries is harder. The resource is invisible, and thus the water allocation and distribution 
mechanism is more complicated. Moreover, managing groundwater irrigated systems as a 
common-pool resource is challenging because of the various conflicts of stakeholders and 
different management interests at local, private or public organisation (Voinov and Bousquet, 
2010). 
Through the next section the role of the games as a driving force in managing common-pool 
resources and collective action will be reviewed. This is to support the arguments provided in 
Chapter 7 on the role of games in understanding the system dynamics and in promoting 
collective action behaviour and collective decisions in common-pool resource management.  
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4.3.1. Investigating the Role of Games in Promoting Participatory and Collective 
Irrigation Management  
In the past, simulation games have proven an effective social method to investigate and elicit 
knowledge from local users on the management of common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom et al., 1994). Games have been used to extract knowledge and explore farmers’ 
motives for collective action and elucidate behavioural approaches to water resource 
management issues in different contexts (Burton, 1989; Hagmann and Chuma, 2002). In this 
study, an innovative Role-play game was used to provide deeper understanding of irrigation 
systems and farmers’ perceptions in Kashan for groundwater irrigation management practices. 
‘Role Playing Games’ provide basic situations to increase farmers’ understanding of the 
environment and assist them in deciding in real situations (Greenblat, 1975).  
Games should simplify a complex system to help participants understand the system and 
express deeper perspectives within a participatory management process. The successful 
participatory modelling process is when a simulation game creates a simple but realistic 
representation of irrigation systems and social relations. This provides a platform that engages 
farmers in a conversation and elicits their knowledge and behaviour towards collective action. 
There are various existing participatory simulation games in the field of irrigation 
management (Burton, 1989; Daré and Barreteau, 2003; Steenhuis, et al., 1989). The use of 
games specifically for irrigation management extend back to the early 1980s (Smith, 1986; 
Chapmen, 1981) with the development of various participatory simulation and gaming tools 
(Burton, 1989; Daré and Barreteau, 2003; Steenhuis, et al., 1989; Lankford and Watson, 
2007). Simulation games typically use existing values, norms and social capital to assist 
farmers in formulating their own water management and distribution strategies (Lankford et 
al., 2004; Hagmann and Chuma, 2002). In this study a simulation game was chosen for 
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participatory irrigation management. Irrigation system is a suitable context for developing a 
participatory game because irrigation system exemplifies farmers’ knowledge, their motives 
for participation and collective action, and behavioural approaches in decision-making. The 
innovative and context specific Irrigation Management Game (IMG) was particularly 
developed for this study by local farmers in Kashan. 
Irrigation is an inter-linked and complex issue, which usually involves conflicting water and 
land ownership claims. The biophysical structure, the institutions and the established rules of 
the system influence the incentives and behaviour of resource users in managing water 
resources, and inevitably this varies according to cultural and economic context (Ostrom, 
1990). As reviewed in the previous chapter, different incentives influence farmers’ particular 
behaviours and decision-making, which I will later reflect on further through conducting the 
IMG exercise (see Chapter 7).   
Irrigation games are effective because they reveal farmers’ preferences and the potential 
barriers to change, and encourage co-operation within existing social networks. Game 
simulations can also be used as a decision support tool to facilitate negotiation and foster 
discussion that provides insight to the facilitator, as well as to the farmer (Ubbels and 
Verhallen, 2000; Burton, 1989).  Simulation games put participants in a simplified version of 
the real system. This is illustrated by Lankford and Watson, (2007) with a metaphor in which 
water flow is represented by glass marbles in their river basin game study providing a link 
between model and reality which improves the quality of the simulation. 
Simulation games have been widely used to create experiential learning for participants and to 
support negotiation and social learning processes (e.g. Burton, 1989) where specific 
agricultural policies and climate change scenarios can be explored, analysed and discussed. 
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This provides deliberative information and wider perspectives from farmers within the 
process of adaptive management, which can motivate farmers to join participatory actions and 
find solutions for their environmental problems (Bluemling et al., 2006). As discussed 
previously, a critical aspect of participatory groundwater irrigation management and selection 
of a suitable irrigation technology to improve irrigation efficiency is the concept of social 
learning. This helps to investigate how the understanding of a specific natural and social 
system of irrigation management and groundwater resource has been changed among local 
farmers as a result of exchanging knowledge and perspectives. Another objective is to 
examine how the simulation game influences can encourage them to participate in the 
implementation of a collective irrigation system. Social learning occurs during the iterative 
adaptive management process, when constructive debate and discussion between participants 
enhances their understanding of each other’s interests and viewpoints through dialogues and 
collective agreements (Muro and Jeffrey, 2012). 
This study used the Companion Modelling (ComMod) approach as the concept/framework of 
the methodology. ComMod is a participatory modelling process, which utilizes Role-play 
games and simulation models as well as physical models to address complexity of the system 
and has been applied for different renewable resource management. The first recognition of 
the role of stakeholders’ involvement in the physical model results and implementation was 
during the 1970s (Greenberger et al., 1976), when the models entered into the field of policy-
making. For many decades physical models were developed by experts, who knew how the 
system worked. However within recent years, stakeholders’ involvement has been seen as 
essential to diversify viewpoints to achieve more legitimate management decision, as which 
has been a positive development, although in many cases these engagements might be only 
nominal (Voinov and Bousquet, 2010). Whilst without resource users’ engagement in the 
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management decision, the proposed solutions may not be adaptable to the specific physical, 
social and cultural conditions at local level and be rejected by resource users (see Chapter 6). 
As indicated previously, this approach includes different perspectives from participants in an 
iterative process of adaptive management strategies and social learning (Bousquet et al., 
1999). Stakeholder engagement throughout the modelling process can make the model truly 
adaptive. New information or perspectives about system dynamics can be incorporated and 
adjusted to the goals of physical modelling, policy decisions or management requirements 
(Lynam et al., 2010).  In this process dialogue, social learning and collective decision-making 
are fostered in an iterative process by engaging participants in different stages of the 
modelling (Bousquet et al., 2005; Barreteau and Bousquet, 2001). Traditionally groundwater 
models are developed based on the dialogues between experts and water managers (Refsgaard 
and Henriksen, 2004), but these models were not including wider social, economic and 
cultural aspects of water management. Public participatory modelling with stakeholders that 
involves managers and experts creates a shared language for dialogue to reach more 
legitimate decisions (Henriksen, et al., 2007). 
The Role-play game is used to solve the ‘black box’ effect when using physical models with 
stakeholders for resource management (Etienne et al., 2003). Computer models, such as MAS, 
are not essential when developing a companion modelling process, and in this study none of 
the conventional Agent-based Models were utilised. However, the process is developed by 
integrating a hydrologic model of WEAP (this is the first time this model has been used 
within the companion modelling process), and the process is progressed by following the two 
main criteria which must be considered in adopting the ComMod approach. This approach 
usually contains two main objectives: a. to capture and understand a complex biophysical and 
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social situation and b. to support negotiation and collective decision-making processes for 
managing natural resources (ComMod Group, 2003; Bousquet et al., 2005).   
 
As stated previously, a wide-ranging qualitative research method has been carried out within 
two years of field-work study, which will be explained in the first part of this chapter. The 
second objective of this approach is achieved by developing a participatory Role-play 
exercise which is developed in the later stage to incorporate the main assumptions and 
perspectives into a single platform and create a successful tool for decision-making and 
negotiation process for local irrigators. The formulation of the methodological framework and 
different phases of an intervention process into a companion modelling approach will be 
explained in the second part of this chapter. This study uses a hydrologic model (WEAP) and 
social simulation to integrate stakeholders’ perceptions, institutional management policies and 
hydrological variables (in the form of different scenarios), through which different 
management options can be explored and discussed with farmers. This phase of the 
methodology will be discussed in the second part of this chapter and further details on this 
hydrologic model will be provided in Chapter 5.  
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                                      Adapted from: Barreteau and Bousquet, 2001 
 
4.4. Part II: Integrated Modelling Procedure and Different Phases 
As described in chapter 2, the companion modelling approach and its main objectives were 
applied when developing my methodology. This approach was introduced in the mid-1990s 
by a French research group (CIRAD). The main principles of this approach, which are 
considered in my methodological intervention include: constructing the model with 
stakeholders, transparency of the procedure, and the outcomes should be adaptive (Voinov 
and Bousquet, 2010). This approach is widely used for natural resources management and 
usually seeks to raise the awareness of participants, incorporating different perspectives in the 
process and testing the outcomes. This approach has led to successful social learning 
outcomes in many case studies and can be used for educational purposes, or to achieve 
technological or institutional improvements within a collaborative management-decision 
process.  
Figure 11 The Companion modelling cycle, including RPG and 
WEAP tools 
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In this section, different steps of my methodology are described, including: 1. 
Contextualisation of the framework and development of the ComMod process, 2. 
Development of a Role-play game simulation, 3. Integrating scenarios into a hydrological 
model and evaluation of the outcomes by farmers.  
 
In this approach, participants are directly involved in model design, indicator selection and 
evaluation of modelled scenarios (Barrereau, 2003). Different phases of this methodology 
were developed at different periods during my field-work study. The structured framework of 
this methodology follows the general steps in constructing participatory modelling (Voinov 
and Bousquet, 2010). In order to make my methodology effort scientifically repeatable, I have 
structured the different stages of my methodology into the participatory adaptive modelling 
framework (Figure 12). The following steps were taken in developing my participatory 
modelling approach through a co-construction process with local stakeholders. 
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                  Source: Author, 2014   
 
Phase 1- Formulation of Research Questions, Objectives and Identification of the 
Stakeholders (April-June 2011) 
The first stage of the participatory process was to understand and identify the main problems 
which need to be tackled, and the main goals of developing the model (completed in the first 
part of the methodology). As mentioned in the previous section, in this step primary field-
work study was conducted to define the project aim and objectives, to identify system 
Figure 12 The Main Stages of a Participatory Modelling Process 
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boundaries, data availability, location of the case study area (spatial and temporal), map and 
access routes to the rural communities and the relevant agencies and main stakeholders. Using 
semi-structured interviews and observations, farmers’ perspectives towards water values, 
water management, traditional methods of harvesting water, irrigation mechanism and 
farmers’ main problems/interests were collected and analysed during two years field-work 
studies (see Part I). In the first stage, agriculture had been identified as the main water 
consumer sector, the main stakeholders (local farmers) and their interests also existing 
problems/conflicts were gathered and later incorporated to construct an overview of the 
catchment area. 
Phase 2- Hydrologic Model Structure Identification (April-June 2011) 
In this stage, different methods regarding stakeholders’ engagement in the development of 
participatory process were considered. The suggested hydrologic model (WEAP) and its 
capability of representing results were discussed in a seminar with PhD students and 
academics (total numbers of 10 PhD researchers in the relevant fields of desertification, 
agricultural water and land management) in Iran. In this process, the aims in using the model, 
the suitability of the model for the case study area, data availability, and relevant indicators 
were discussed.  
Phase 3-Defining Indicators and Conceptualisation of the Modelling Process (2011) 
In this study, different stages of the methodology follow the ComMod approach with the aim 
of including different stakeholder’s perspectives into a participatory physical modelling 
development. This approach suggests the direct use of participants in the design, identification 
of indicators as well as evolving scenarios into the participatory hydrologic modelling. In this 
study, to capture and understand the complex biophysical and social situation of the irrigation 
system of Kashan and to create a shared platform for further negotiations and dialogues 
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among stakeholders, different parameters are formulated based on farmers’ perspectives. In 
this step, different views and perceptions regarding the most influential factors in irrigated 
water use were gathered from relevant stakeholders. As a result of different parameters 
elicited from farmers’ perspectives and from expert knowledge, the most relevant parameters 
were identified, such as biophysical and climate variables, population, land and water 
ownership. To create a primary modelling platform and to facilitate analysis, relevant 
parameters were grouped into two different clusters of social and biophysical elements and 
their relations within irrigation system of Kashan. Some of the physical factors such as 
climate and hydrological variables were used as input data into the hydrological model of 
WEAP to obtain graphical results (Figure 13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Source: Author, 2011-12 
 
To validate/upgrade the hydrological model and incorporate more accurate assumptions, and 
trustworthy scenarios in the modelling process, a participatory RPG by local farmers was 
conducted at a later stage. Different climatic, social and technical factors in the form of 
Figure 13 ComMod approach: Social and biophysical relations within groundwater irrigated 
system, and farmers’ interactions and perspectives 
Figure 6 ComMod approach:Social and biophysical relations within groundwater irrigated system, and 
farmers'interactio and perspectives 
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scenarios, were elicited from Iranian farmers’ perspectives within the simulation, and were 
utilised in the design and simulation process. The hydrological model ran under new scenarios 
in WEAP model that will be present in Phase 5 of this chapter. 
Phase 4-Conducting a RPG Simulation (2013) 
In this stage, the use of the RPG included different objectives. The main aim of the study was 
to encourage communication and facilitate a negotiation process among farmers and 
eventually obtain the collective-agreed management scenarios; the other purpose was to use 
the simulation as a mediation tool to validate the method approach. In my study, conducting 
RPG has added considerable value to the research findings; it has also facilitated the 
formulation of more accurate scenarios and provided a holistic view of the problem from 
farmers’ perspectives, for testing in the hydrological model. Within the simulation process, 
group discussion was fostered leading to commonly-agreed decisions for improving irrigation 
management strategies. In the third part of this chapter, the designing and conducting an 
Irrigation Management Game (IMG) with farmers will be explained. The outcomes of 
integrating scenarios into a hydrologic model will be discussed later in this chapter and 
further in discussion Chapter 7.  
Phase 5-Validation of WEAP model Assumption, Testing Scenarios (2012-2013) 
The WEAP model produces predicted future water demands for agricultural water use under 
different scenarios such as improved irrigation efficiency and climate change (see Chapter 5). 
As mentioned, for executing the first version of the WEAP model historic hydrological data 
as an input including climate variables (i.e. temperature, rainfall pattern, water supply and 
water demand), collected from the local water and irrigation institutes, were utilised. The 
model was initially run with fewer scenarios (i.e. future decrease in rainfall and increased 
temperature), obtained from national/regional climatic and population status for the future. 
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Because the conceptual hydrological model cannot exactly predict the future groundwater 
status of the region, it was essential to consider and compare more pertinent future scenarios 
that reflect farmers’ predictions. To obtain more local-based scenarios, an RPG simulation 
was used in the next stage (described in detail in the following section), in order to elicit more 
knowledge from farmers which could be used in defining modelling assumptions. Following 
validating the model assumption based on the outcomes of the RPG simulation, the model 
was run for the second time and the final results were discussed with farmers. The modeling 
process was undertaken in an innovative and experimental way by introducing WEAP into the 
simulation process. This model could be effective as it can be run with limited data (See 
Chapter 5).  In creating the ComMod platform, a combination of tools such as agent-based 
systems (ABM), Role-playing games (RPG) or conceptual models can be used to involve 
participants in developing the methodology (see Chapter 2). In this study to develop a 
companion modelling process, conventional agent-based models (ABM) (such as Netlogo/ 
Cormas) which are usually used for this approach, were not used. In this methodological 
intervention, however, the modelling process and evaluation of the relevant scenarios (elicited 
from local farmers) were undertaken using the Water Evaluation And Planning system 
(WEAP) model (see Chapter 5 for details). The model selection reflected the different 
objectives of this research study, the lack of required data, limited expertise for model 
implementation and validation. 
The main advantage of using this model is its ability to compare different scenarios 
graphically; it also has the capacity to be used as an educational tool to effectively describe 
complex water systems in a simplified and visual manner (Cockerill et. al., 2004). This 
capability can facilitate dialogue and broadens discussion on model structure and results 
(Harris, 2007).  This hydrologic model is used as a mediation tool to give an integrated view 
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(including physical parameters) to our thoughts and approach. The main purpose of 
incorporating a particular hydrologic model is to create a suitable decision support tool in 
order to assist farmers to decide and evaluate which irrigation management options are more 
appropriate, and to observe the future trends in their agricultural water demand under 
particular conditions that scenarios are simulating. This process can bring more in-depth 
discussion and dialogue amongst participants in an iteratively simulating manner. 
After implementation of the RPG and formulation of the relevant scenarios, testing of the 
scenarios and evaluation of the outcomes with farmers was conducted, I will reflect on in this 
section. Some of the scenarios that were obtained from farmers’ perspectives such as 
improved irrigation efficiency, future climate and population changes in the region and land 
integration were tested in a hydrological model to observe how agricultural water demand will 
change under each specific scenario (Figure 14). These scenarios are tested so that the 
outcomes could be discussed with farmers and to expand discussions. This is also to add 
complexities and including future uncertainties to the farmers’ existing assumptions by 
incorporate hydrologic and climate variables.  
Construction of the hydrological model and each individual procedure could not be discussed 
in details with farmers, due to lack of expertise and availability of time and funding. 
However, some of the models’ outcomes could be discussed and evaluated by farmers (see 
Chapter 7). In many cases participants are new to models and when learning about a model 
for the first time, it can be difficult to engage and interact (Voinov and Bousquet, 2010). 
When developing the hydrological model, the researcher attempted to engage participants 
from the beginning in developing a conceptual model and later by running the Role-play 
simulations, which helped farmers engage in co-construction of the modelling process. 
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Phase 6- Farmers’ Analysis of Hydrologic Model Results (July-Sep 2013) 
The method contributes to the ComMod approach as it links some aspects of the conducted 
IMG to the physical hydrologic model of WEAP. As part of this approach the outcomes of the 
modeled scenarios need to be discussed with local farmers who participated in the IMG 
development. In this stage some of the results that were recognised to be more relevant to 
farmers’ interests were presented to them to obtain their reflections on the outcomes. In the 
group discussion with farmers, they were first reminded of the previous RPG session held 
Figure 14 Schematic view of the WEAP model and Scenario Management Screen 
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with them during the previous field-work visit, brief steps and outcomes of the RPG were 
summarised for them, and some of the farmers who had previously attended the RPG session, 
assisted in explaining the procedures to the other farmers.   
 
To analyse the hydrologic model results, first the outcomes of simpler modelled scenarios 
were shown to farmers. These graphs were first shown to a smaller group of farmers on paper 
and after it was observed that farmers could interact and give meaningful feedback on their 
results, within the next group discussion, the results were shown to a larger group of farmers 
on a lap-top computer, and the user-friendly result interface of the WEAP model software was 
used to discuss the outcomes with farmers and generate more dialogues (Figure14). A group 
discussion was subsequently conducted to explore their thoughts and opinions regarding the 
accuracy of the modelling results, as well as their confidence and trust in the final outcomes. 
My role as a facilitator was to make the graphs easier and more understandable for farmers, 
thus, after presenting each graph the facilitator explained each graph, the meaning of the 
different colours and the changes in bar charts and the trends to clarify the outcomes. It was 
explained to farmers that, these graphs were produced based on available regional data, 
gathered from different local water and irrigation agencies; also it was explained that the main 
scenarios were formulated from the previous RPG (in which they played a major role in 
designing and simulation of the game).  
In this study, the aim was not to make stakeholders to accept the WEAP model as an accurate 
or analytical tool, (there was not any organised workshop to explain the model functions and 
outcome for farmers). The attempt was not to make farmers to choose any outputs of the 
model or RPG in their daily practices, but it was used to influence their perspectives and elicit 
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knowledge. In this case, the effort was to direct the process towards development of self-
management irrigation practices and empower local decision making ability to apply more 
efficient water use strategies. The hydrologic model was used as an appropriate tool that can 
represent integrity of different factors and compare different assumptions in a very simple 
outlook. However developing RPG with farmers was intended to obtain relevant scenarios 
and therefore give farmers a sense of trust and ownership of the participatory model results. 
Although not every element of the game could be simulated into the hydrologic model or vice 
versa, the development of the game and hydrologic model with farmers has broadened 
discussions and engaged their participation in the model development.  
 
Phase 7- Communicating the Participatory Model and Farmers’ Feedback (2013) 
Farmers’ analyses of the results and suggestions were taken into account for future 
improvement of the modelling effort. Presenting the model result to a larger audience is a 
useful step in disseminating the main messages and including wider perceptions for results. 
This session was similar to the debriefing session that was conducted after the Role-play 
simulation in the previous part. The details of this stage will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
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                             Sources: Author, 2013 (Ali-Abad Village) 
                  
4.5. Part III: The RPG Development 
A game for natural resource management is a serious learning method in terms of both 
communication between participants and collective decision-making. Game allows 
stimulation of participants’ behaviors and actions in a near reality modelled system. Role-play 
is used in this study as a legitimate tool (Bloor, 2001; Lankford, 2006) for conducting a 
qualitative social research method. Regarding using Role-play game for common-pool 
resources management Barreteau et al. (2003, section 1.1) believes that games are “a means to 
reveal some aspects of social relationships by allowing the direct observation of interactions 
among the players”. The main aim of using game for this study is to elicit farmers’ knowledge 
to evaluate different irrigation policy schemes in the case study area. Role-play game 
facilitate eliciting farmers’ knowledge and perspectives on various management options and 
Figure 15 Presenting model outcomes to farmers on the laptop 
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finally come to a common-agreed solution for a more sustainable groundwater irrigation 
management in the future.  
In the final part of the methodology chapter, the development of a Role-play game with local 
farmers in Kashan is explained throughout different phases. The discussion of the simulation 
outcomes will be expanded in Chapter 7.  
 
4.5.1. Self-designed irrigation management game (IMG) with farmers 
In summary the RPG began with a farmer-led exercise of collaborative resource mapping to 
produce a board game reflecting the specific local context (field location, crop type, existing 
irrigation canals) in which the rules and specific context of this game were created. Farmers 
were allocated a farm on the board while they defined the existing rules of their farming 
systems and were invited to respond to a number of irrigation scenarios during a RPG.  
 
A participatory and self-designed groundwater irrigation board game was developed with 
local farmers. The aim of utilising a Role-play game (RPG) was to elicit knowledge of local 
farming systems and irrigation practices in Iran, and evaluate government policy prescriptions 
from the perspective of participating farmers. The other objective was to explore further 
scenarios to improve irrigation efficiency by farmers. The main question to be addressed 
during the game is why the drip irrigation method (proposed by one government policy 
scheme) has not been adopted by the farmers in this region.  This section describes the game 
design.  
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The biophysical structure and the established rules of the irrigation system influence the 
incentives and behaviour of resource users in managing water resources, and inevitably this 
varies according to cultural and economic context (Ostrom, 1990). In this study, water 
allocation rules play vital role in defining farmers’ relations to each other, so it was included 
in the design of the game. A wide range of local rules give clear guidelines for water 
allocation based on location, time, type of water user and other factors, which are effective in 
resolving potential conflicts in water allocation. The irrigation and water allocation rules used 
in this game design were established for Qanat systems in the past and also apply to motor-
pump groundwater abstraction wells (see Chapter 3). These allocation rules, the location of 
the tube-wells and irrigation pipes were carefully located on the board by farmers.   
Incorporating farmers’ real roles and community-based rules can help replicate their 
behaviour successfully during the simulation, thus removing possible constraints on 
participant’s behaviour and their attitude to the game (Toth, 1988). In developing and playing 
the irrigation management game (IMG), the main participants were local farmers who 
designed the board game and were situated within the simulation exercise by their actual roles 
and responsibilities as in the real system.  
Different initial game designs were tested in a pilot study with PhD students in the UK and 
Iran. This improved the game design, in terms of better understanding of the cultivation 
pattern, land use and irrigation techniques in arid regions of Iran, and also provided different 
perspectives on implementing modern drip irrigation methods in agricultural fields. During 
pilot study with PhD student in Iran and in UK, different rules and roles were written on a 
card and given to participants; however in the field given literacy problems and farmers’ 
limited time, this was not possible. Also farmers were not given different or controversial 
roles: they acted in their actual role in real farming activities which could address the aim of 
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this game (to elicit relevant knowledge and generate dialogue through farmers’ perspectives 
on different irrigation issues). 
 
4.5.2. Description of the Board Game and the Setting 
Materials- The basic materials for the game were provided in the case study at negligible 
expense. A wooden panel (1m x 1.5m) was prepared for the game using iron rings to 
represent boreholes, green or yellow sticky paper to represent farmlands with different crops. 
Blue paper lines were used to symbolize the water canals extending from boreholes and to 
farmland. 
Rules- In this study, the government ‘Tooba’ scheme (installation of drip irrigation system), 
and associated policy of reducing water abstraction to one-third, and land consolidation, was 
used to design the initial rules of the RPG. Subsequently other rules, relating to water rights, 
were derived by the farmers themselves during the simulation. Water allocation rules were 
explained by farmers during the group discussion, and these were incorporated into the game 
design by the facilitator.  
The water allocation rules, which were applicable to the underground piped-water system, 
were explained and discussed by the farmers. During the simulation, thick blue lines were 
used by the facilitator to represent underground piped-water (or cement-lined canals) on the 
pre-designed board game, whilst narrow lines represented a less efficient water transmission 
network. Each water outlet from the transmission canals was linked to one of the nodes 
(representing allocated water).  
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Roles: 
 Irrigator farmers (2 players- see next section): In each round of the simulation process 
after proposing an irrigation scheme as a scenario, irrigators should assign a suitable 
size of blue papers to represent the efficiency of the proposed scheme. They should 
locate these symbolic pipes or canals from their shared tube-wells to their farmlands. 
Also, they were asked to respond and engage in the discussions and share their 
knowledge during the simulation exercise. 
 The Tractor driver: He was selected based on his knowledge and experiences 
regarding scattered land ownership status in the region. He has important 
responsibilities that could significantly affect farmers’ production levels and income, 
as he does the ploughing, land surfacing, harvesting, and land clearing after harvest for 
farmers. This farmer was invited to the game session to share his knowledge in 
different rounds of the game.   
 Well-chief: In each round of the simulation, when the scenarios of different irrigation 
schemes were proposed, the well chief was asked to explain different rules in water 
allocation, distribution and maintenance, and to summarise specific difficulties or 
advantages that could be brought by a particular scheme for shared-well owners 
regarding their system’ irrigation efficiency.  
 
Each farmer played his actual role in the irrigation field, and when asking different questions 
by proposing a scenario, he was expressing his knowledge and perspectives regarding the 
question and shared dialogues with other farmers. For farmers acting in their actual role could 
bring their relevant experiences and perspectives into the simulation and this was insightful 
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for other farmers to understand the difficulties associated with that farmers’ particular 
role/responsibility. 
Participants- Four participants were selected for the RPG; one of the irrigator farmers was a 
member of the rural council so he could also provide insights into a discussion on the 
governance and management problems in organisational level. The other irrigator farmer was 
an older and experienced farmer, who owned several small and scattered pieces of land. The 
tractor driver was also a local farmer who owned a tractor and the manager of the local 
abstraction well (well-chief) who was also a farmer. The well manager was trusted by the 
local community and was responsible for repairing the motor-pump and collecting fees for 
using the motor-pump (to pay for electricity, etc.), as well as providing pesticides and 
fertilizers from the agricultural agency for farmers.  
Those four farmers, who were selected, were able collectively to represent the main 
institutions responsible for irrigation practices in the case study. Women and children were 
not involved in the main irrigation or farming activities because they are not actively involved 
with the irrigation or farming practices in Kashan. 
Organization- In the particular village of Ali-Abad, the village leader had an assigned role in 
bringing farmers together for local meetings and mediating between farmers and official 
organizations. The researcher based on the established trust with local farmers’ communities, 
communicated with the rural leader and he was willing to organise the group meeting for 
conducting the Role-play game (in total 12 farmers were in the meeting, however four of 
them showed interest and were selected to participate in the Role-play game). The farmers 
proposed the local mosque in Ali-Abad village as the most convenient place to meet and 
conduct group discussions for the RPG. Also, the debriefing sessions (discussion after 
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conducting Role play game) were held in the local mosque. This provided suitable and 
comfortable environment for farmers and the researcher, particularly during summer and in 
Ramadan, gathering farmers at prayer times mid-day or in the evening, could provide useful 
information and productive collaborations (see Chapter 4).  
Group discussions were conducted before the game session and after the game session for 
debriefing. Each group discussion before the game took 1 hour and a half. The RPG session 
took 2 ½ hours. The game was played with four farmers and within three rounds (according to 
the three proposed scenarios). The outcomes of the game were later reported by participants to 
others and also debated among farmers who could not attend the game session, due to their 
busy time schedule. Participants played their role in their own place and there was no 
changing role amongst farmers because of the time constraint. All the group discussions and 
game sessions were recorded, and the transcript was translated and coded in English 
afterwards. Some parts of the RPG were video recorded for further analysis and to understand 
farmers’ interactions and behaviour. After the RPG session, farmers were given a reasonably 
priced gift. The transcripts of the RPG discussion sessions were coded in Nvivo, the 
highlighted codes were used to extract different themes to analysis the responses, which are 
discussed in Chapter 7.  
This particular Role-play game designed for this study will be termed Irrigation Management 
Game (IMG), throughout the rest of the thesis. 
 
4.5.3. Implementation of the Irrigation Management Game (IMG) 
Generally, natural resource games tend to represent a particular conceptual model with 
specific socio-ecological features, which prompts the imagination of game participants 
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thereby facilitating discussion (Meadows, 2001). Games should generate communications and 
exchange between participants so they must replicate the reality of the system (Schelling, 
1961) also simulates actual institutional characteristics or policies. In this study, the game 
provided a simplified representation of a groundwater irrigation system for farmers. The use 
of ‘real life’ rules, recognized by participants, provides a number of opportunities for 
participant learning (see Chapter 7). The simulation required participants to consider a wider 
perspective, and focused on historical rules which are closely related to current practices.  
In this part, in order to make the presentation of the Role-play game simpler, I will explain the 
process within different phases which ran by farmers’ participation.  
 
Stage 1: Selection of Participants and Design of the Board Game 
In the first phase of the simulation, group discussions were conducted in a local mosque to 
introduce farmers to the scope and the overall structure of the session. Vital information about 
the current rules and management strategies was obtained. The provision of deliberative 
information and wider perspectives from farmers can be elicited through group discussions 
which also make the game setting more realistic (Daré and Barreteau, 2003) (see Part I 
expanded in Chapter 6). 10-12 farmers were invited to a local mosque by the facilitator and 
the village leader (often the oldest and most respected person in a village). The farmers all 
belonged to the same tube-well, but also had a share in other wells. The group discussion 
assisted the facilitator in recognizing key individual roles and assigning responsibilities 
regarding the irrigation system. Participants were asked to provide information on the 
structural characteristics of their farmland, the transmission canals to access irrigation water, 
cultivation patterns of their farmland and the rules governing water allocation and 
distribution. At the conclusion of the session, one of the farmers drew a sketch map of the 
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area which was used as a model to design the RPG for the next meeting. The sketch map of 
the village started by locating the mosque as farmers stated this is the main area in each 
village of Kashan, then the access roads, the tube-wells and the canals distributing water to 
the farmland were located on the map (Figure 16).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The group discussion provided an opportunity to improve communication between the 
farmers, and provided details of the farmers’ irrigation rules and understanding (for the 
facilitator) of the interaction between farmers.  At the end of the session, some of the farmers, 
who were interested in cooperating, and who could also represent different institutional roles 
were selected as participants in the game session.  
 
Stage 2: Validation of the Board Game 
In the second phase of the RPG, the researcher’s pre-designed board game was used to 
present a controlled environment, whilst also enabling realistic simulations (Figure 16). The 
Figure 16 The sketch map of the irrigation system for designing board 
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game was conducted over two days.  In the second group discussion on day two, the pre-
designed wooden map was completed and validated by the farmers (Figure 17). The 
geography and settings of the game design were solely based on maps provided by the 
participating farmers, which replicated the characteristics of their farmlands and water canal 
systems. The aim was to provide a better understanding of the location of farmers’ land and 
their interactions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 The validation of pre-designed map and setting rules 
by farmers 
Figure 17 Pre-designed game board, later completed by 
farmers during the game session 
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Participant farmers indicated which tube-wells they had a share in, so it was decided to locate 
two common tube-wells on the map; from these two wells the main water canals were drawn. 
Farmers emphasised that the distances between tube-wells in reality should not be less than 
100 metres, so when preparing the board game this scale criteria was considered as a rule. 
The farmers indicated that their summer crops were barley and wheat and that some land was 
not cultivated (for example some of the alfalfa plots in summer are lie fallow (or uncultivated 
to restore soil fertility). So these plots were located on the board game in places where 
farmers decide to put their actual farms. The farmers then identified their farm location on the 
map.  At the same time, different crop patterns were illustrated by different green and yellow 
papers.  The other rule was that farmers had to reduce their water abstraction rate to one-third 
of the current rate. This was initially stated by farmers and was considered during the 
discussion of the game sessions. 
 
Stage 3: Conducting the Game Rounds 
After validating the pre-designed board game, the farmers were then encouraged to participate 
in the RPG. Different crop patterns were illustrated by green and yellow papers that farmers 
positioned on the board. The restriction rule of reducing water abstraction rate to one-third of 
the current rate was part of the drip irrigation scheme, so this was embedded in a proposed 
scenario of ‘Tooba’ scheme and was discussed under policy evaluation during the simulation. 
The main scenario of the simulation was to change the muddy, or canal irrigation system, to 
cement-lined, to underground pipes, or into a drip irrigation method. This was proposed in the 
form of different scenarios and farmers who had drawn their farms, reservoirs and tube-wells 
on the board game were asked to discuss different schemes and play the game using symbolic 
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water canals of different sizes. This selection was based on their understanding of the 
increased efficiencies and other advantages that each proposed scheme could bring for them. 
The farmers linked the irrigation canals to their lands by using different symbols. As noted 
above, blue paper lines of differing thickness were used to represent high and low-efficiency 
irrigation canals as this was found to be practical for farmers to use while they were 
explaining their irrigation management strategies. Each round of discussion commenced with 
questioning farmers about current irrigation policy schemes.  
The new scheme of piped-line irrigation system was discussed with farmers. Irrigator farmers 
mainly participated in the discussion and explained to the researcher and other participants 
how this intervention technology could match their traditional water allocation mechanism 
(see Chapter 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The facilitator (researcher) asked farmers to discuss different scenarios attached to the Tooba 
policy scheme which might affect their agricultural practices. For the initial design of the 
Figure 19 The completed designed map of the farmlands and 
water canals by farmers 
161 
 
Role-play game, some scenarios were drawn from the existing policy scheme and the attached 
rules to them (i.e. Tooba scheme), throughout the game.   
The researcher began the game by questioning farmers about pre-defined scenarios (e.g. 
implementing a drip irrigation system; reducing water abstraction rates). This stage clarified 
farmers’ perspectives on irrigation schemes and yielded new scenario of land integration for 
future development, which is discussed in more details in chapter 7. During the game, a 
particular scenario of land integration emerged and this was discussed by farmers, as it was 
found very critical factor for farmers to reject drip irrigation installation because of their 
fragmented lands and high costs of the new system for poorer farmers. The farmers drew 
different pieces of land on the other corner of the board game (symbolized by small green 
pieces of paper by the facilitator) to illustrate possible ways in which farmers might exchange 
their closest pieces of land to create larger plots (see Chapter 7).   
 
 
 
 
 
At the conclusion of this element of the RPG, farmers were asked to evaluate the RPG session 
by reflecting on the game that they had designed. 
Throughout phase 2 of the RPG and during the subsequent debriefing, farmers were asked to 
list their main water-related management problems. They were encouraged to discuss and 
Figure 20 Light green square papers on 
left side, were used to represent 
neighbours’ lands and how farmers can 
reach an agreements to join their land 
pieces or swap them with each other 
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agree on new ways of improving the management of their groundwater resources and were 
asked to decide whether they should accept or reject government policies.  Some of their 
concerns included: 
 How might the policy of modernizing the irrigation system affect future 
agricultural water status for farmers in Kashan? 
 What kind of support would farmers need from government to improve water 
management and agricultural practices? 
 How might the RPG provide useful material for the farmers and would they 
be willing to participate in a similar simulation study in the future? 
 
During this stage, farmers were asked to express their ideas, consider the negotiation phases 
and evaluate how they reached the final decision regarding the most appropriate irrigation 
management strategies and suitable irrigation technology.  Finally, they were encouraged to 
list some of the locally based solutions in terms of the most suitable technology and also land 
management practices to improve irrigation efficiency in the village, which will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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                Source: Author, 2013                                                          
 
4.5.4. Debriefing Session 
Debriefing was conducted after the game session finished for an hour within group 
discussion. Debriefing is described as the processing of the experiences and reflection on the 
observations, which will lead to learning outcomes. For this stage, after the game session 
ended, I questioned farmers about their feelings during the simulation process and afterwards. 
I also asked farmers about their first reaction and attitudes towards the game design and 
procedure. They reflected on the usefulness of the game, the similarities and differences 
between the designed board game and the reality and the lessons they learned from the session 
about their system and regarding other farmers in their village. Discussing scenarios of actual 
irrigation policies and their implementation (such as adoption of ‘Tooba Scheme’), provided 
Figure 21 Map of the designed farmlands and canals in the board game (refers to the sketch 
map Figure 19) 
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opportunity for farmers to reflect on real-life problems, which they could later extrapolate 
back to their experience. Primarily scenarios and rules were designed to create a productive 
and familiar environment for farmers. The objectives were to simulate the realistic procedure 
of policy decisions and enable farmers to evaluate specific policies. The scenarios provided 
the initial basis for individual simulations. Thus, the well-known scenario describing the drip 
irrigation policy scheme was initially used as it is currently the farmers’ main challenge. 
I will discuss the outcomes of this simulation exercise (such as generating social learning and 
collective motives), as well as the debriefing session in more depth in Chapter 7. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has described the main methodological approach and the different stages taken to 
develop a participatory research process for adaptive irrigation management. Different data 
collection methods and tools were used to facilitate the flow of information and foster 
discussion. The qualitative research methods of interview and group discussion were used to 
collect social data. The interviews were conducted to provide general understanding of the 
irrigation system in Kashan, the main problems regarding irrigation efficiency and 
sustainability of groundwater resources, irrigation rules and management practices as well as 
existing cultures and farmers’ perspectives. Group discussions proved useful for engaging 
farmers in debates, particularly prior to and within the Role-play game exercise and this 
created a basis for conducting a simulation game for irrigation management (see Chapter 7). 
Farmers were given equal opportunity to express their views and engage into the conversation 
with other participants to provide a rich knowledge.  
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In this study, particularly the incorporation of physical and social dimensions of irrigation 
system could provide richer knowledge. The spatial characteristics of the irrigation system 
dynamics were transferred to the board game and social interactions and policy regulation 
comprised the rules of the game. The simple and familiar outlook of the board game and the 
scenarios of the actual irrigation policy scheme combined a simple as well as complex 
dynamic of the irrigation management. The game can also be designed to simulate land 
integration with farmers to improve further future development of the irrigation management 
system.   
Participatory modelling using the Companion Modelling approach was adopted for this study 
as a methodology approach to integrate social and biophysical dimensions of groundwater and 
irrigation system dynamics and to create a shared platform to enhance communication and 
collective agreed solutions. The participatory process facilitated the flow of information and 
fostered discussion on the wider socio-hydrological aspects of irrigation management 
practices in the arid region of Kashan, Iran (see Chapter 7). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 WEAP Modelling 
Introduction 
Effective water resources management requires an integrated approach that considers both 
physical and social aspects and their interactions for local or regional water management (e.g. 
Gurunathan, 2013). Hence interdisciplinary approaches to complex water systems which 
address both socio-economic and environmental interests are crucial. This can be partly 
achieved through the implementation of integrated models such as Water Evaluation and 
Planning System (WEAP) model. In situations where water resource availability is limited, 
for example by various ecological and socio-economic factors, managing water resources is a 
challenging issue, which must consider both ecological and sustainable use of water resources 
(see Chapter 2). The concept of integrated water resources management (IWRM) has 
developed over recent decades, and integrates technical and social aspects, in order to 
improve management approaches. The main concerns emerging from this approach are water 
demand management, improvement of water quality and ecosystem conservation (Chapter 2).  
In this study, the WEAP hydrological model is used to test different scenarios of climate 
change variables and changing agricultural water demand.  
 
As part of the Companion Modelling process described in the methodology chapter, the Water 
Evaluation and Planning System model (WEAP) was integrated into the participatory 
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adaptive modelling process. In the process of model development, stakeholders’ perspectives 
were obtained through a number of different social methods, to formulate appropriate 
parameters for input to the model and subsequently, to discuss the modelling results with 
participant farmers. In this study, the scenarios of irrigation management, population growth, 
climate change, ‘Tooba’ irrigation scheme (including land integration and technical changes) 
were evaluated using the hydrologic model (described subsequently in this Chapter). This 
chapter is a standalone methodology chapter that seeks to justify the adoption of the WEAP 
model within the participatory modelling process. The chapter outlines the model structure 
and provides background for its wider implementation and suitability for this study. The 
application of the model to the case study area and the steps taken in constructing the model 
are described. The chapter concludes by summarising the outcomes of modelled scenarios for 
future water demand in Kashan.  
 
5.1. Hydrological WEAP Model: Description, Characteristics and Applications 
The WEAP (Water Evaluation and Planning) model was developed by the Stockholm 
Environmental Institute (SEI) (Jack Sieber in 1988). WEAP is an integrated water resource 
planning tool that provides a flexible, user-friendly and integrated framework for policy 
analysis. WEAP attempts to include different values of concern and given its focus on policy 
orientation, it provides a mechanism for testing alternative scenarios and management 
strategies. WEAP provides a forecasting capability by simulating water demand, water 
supply, flows and storage, treatment and discharge and generation of pollutions (SEI, 2009). It 
also facilitates the evaluation of various management alternatives and water developments in 
multi-stakeholder situations. WEAP is a hydrological and scenario-driven platform that is 
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based on evaluation of a series of selected scenarios under defined biophysical and socio-
economic conditions (Raskin et al., 1992). It integrates demand and supply-based data 
together with hydrological simulations to facilitate the analysis of wider policy options and 
uncertainties, thereby contributing to adaptive water management. In this process, the 
responses of the social and environmental systems that face future uncertainties with respect 
to water development and climate changes are simulated (Varela-Ortega et al., 2011). WEAP 
is specifically designed to aid scenario development; thus, scenarios reflect optional choices 
and allocation priorities. The scenarios can enable simulation of different water rights 
regimes, water supply facilities, water and land use management, water equity and other water 
related subjects (Rodrigues et al., 2006).  In addition, WEAP allows the simulation and 
analysis of scenarios of water demand management and more important, scenarios describing 
users’ behaviour (Levite et al., 2003). Levite et al. (2003) argue that different scenarios, 
established within a WEAP model, can answer a wide range of ‘what if questions’ such as: 
What if population and economic growth rate changed? What if irrigation technology or crop 
patterns change? What if a new water demand management scheme is implemented?  The 
features of WEAP and its associated hydrological model can be linked to external models, 
including the MODFLOW groundwater model, water quality QUAL2K, as well as socio-
economic models (e.g. GAM). Some of these integrated models can facilitate a path for 
greater changes in communities’ livelihood and improve water allocation (Rodriges, et al., 
2006).  
It has been suggested that the main advantage in using WEAP is that it combines demand and 
supply sides in one equation while the main disadvantage is its reliance on scenarios, whose 
validity or accuracy might be doubtful or uncertain (Haddad et al., 2007). To address the latter 
shortcoming in this thesis, scenario building is developed within a participatory process to 
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validate the reliability of the scenarios, and contribute to the local policies and irrigation 
schemes in Kashan. Conducting IMG (see Chapter 4) has provided legitimate and validated 
scenarios of future development of groundwater development and irrigation practices to be 
tested and discussed with local farmers in Kashan and to achieve adaptive management 
options. 
The integration of a WEAP model into a participatory social simulation modelling approach 
has yet to be widely attempted, especially in semi-arid regions, such as Iran. Hence in 
reviewing research on the development of WEAP, this chapter focuses on the use of the 
model within participatory management studies. There are few examples of WEAP model 
applications in a participatory modelling approach. For example, Varela-Ortega et al., (2007) 
used WEAP in a participatory approach to determine the vulnerability of stakeholders to the 
future water availability in the arid region of Upper Guadiana in Spain. In their study a 
participatory and innovative agro-economic modelling approach was developed at farm level. 
The different economic, social and environmental factors were incorporated to provide an 
analytical framework and finally to improve policy decision-making. The use of an agent-
based model, and Role-play game was suggested by Varela-Ortega et al. (2007), however 
there was no structured methodology nor were there clearly defined steps to explain the use of 
these methods. 
WEAP enables forward-looking studies which change physical and social variables to assess 
their impact on water availability, water flow, and predict unmet demand for different 
scenarios. This can enhance understanding of future water conditions and management 
strategies for model users. While this aspect of the model was not the main objective of this 
study, the possibility of integrating climate variables and social-technical aspects into the 
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participatory modelling approach has added more complexity and enhanced the discussions 
amongst farmers. 
Specifically in water management case studies, WEAP can be used to investigate scenarios 
for future water development in catchments, including water utilization for domestic, 
agricultural water and industry (Rodriges, et al. 2006). WEAP can represent different adaptive 
water policy options and the responses of the social and environmental systems; and hence the 
model can be used to address future uncertainties in developing water resources and 
responding to climate change (Varela-Ortega et al., 2011). To provide an overview of the use 
of WEAP, different examples of the application of WEAP within the academic literature are 
presented in the next section.  
The functionality of WEAP makes it useful as a multi-scale water management tool whose 
strength has been demonstrated in studies worldwide (Varela-Ortega et al, 2009; Purkey et al., 
1998; Levite et al., 2003; Purkey et al., 2007). The experience of the Hydrologic Engineering 
Center of the US Army Corps (2000) indicates that WEAP can enhance the quality of 
decision-making with improved levels of analysis and quicker decisions. There is an 
advantage in developing a model in cooperation with policy-makers in order to enhance 
institutional capacity to improve policy-making, thereby reducing effort and decreasing 
regional vulnerability to establish an adaptive management process (US Army Corps of 
Engineers, 2000).  
WEAP can be used for education as a tool to describe complex water systems in simplified 
and visual outcomes (Cockerill et. al. 2004). Moreover, Sorisi (2006) suggests that presenting 
the outcomes of WEAP at community level can result in better understanding of water 
management problems and their consequences. His survey of the Spanish Guadiana River 
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basin suggests that using the WEAP can be useful in raising public awareness for educational 
purposes (Sorisi, 2006). The use of this model for this study, has also offered educational 
advantages for local farmers in Kashan regarding their improved understanding of the 
function and shape of the available groundwater resource and also future water demand 
changes under climate change variables and population growth (see Chapter 7). WEAP can 
have different audiences and users, and there are different ways which stakeholders can 
interact with this model: for example, water planners and local stakeholders might find it 
easier to describe the study area using the schematic overview that WEAP provides 
(Rodrigues et al., 2006).  
WEAP has been used in several case studies to predict trends in water availability (and in 
water quality) under scenarios including population growth, adoption of a new technology or 
construction of a new infrastructure, the implementation of a new policy or economic changes 
(Rezaian and Jozi, 2011). In this study these factors were used to stimulate future 
groundwater demand trend in Kashan, as described subsequently in this chapter. The 
predictions of WEAP (depending upon quality of the data) provide evidence of future water 
and agricultural water changes. It can make politicians more willing to make difficult 
decisions regarding resource allocation and authorise investment (Harris, 2007). For example, 
Harris (2007) used WEAP in a catchment in Guatemala, applying the model to evaluate the 
impact of future climate change. The aim of her work was vulnerability assessment and 
developing adaptation strategies. Model outcomes were shared through participatory 
workshops to inform the stakeholders and improve decision-making ability and finally 
recommend collaborative cross-sectoral management policies. However, Harris did not work 
with stakeholders from the beginning in identifying the main parameters and assumptions 
when building the model and this resulted in a lack of trust in the model’s results by local 
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stakeholders. In this study, this lack of integration of stakeholders in the design and 
development of the model assumptions and scenarios has been addressed. By constructing the 
initial conceptual model (Chapter 4), stakeholders are involved in identifying the main 
parameters and criteria for model development from the outset, rather than only being 
considered in the implementation of the policy or model outcomes and recommendations. 
The application of WEAP model in Iran is limited to only a few studies. For example in a 
study of Golestan province in north Iran, different solutions were defined and tested in the 
form of scenarios within a WEAP model to provide the best water management solutions for 
this region, alongside other alternative management options (Rezaian and Jozi, 2011). 
Another study by Gohari et al. (2013) in the Zayandeh-Rud River Basin in central Iran used 
the two climate variables of temperature and precipitation to develop different adaptive 
management scenarios. They concluded that due to future increases in temperature and 
reduction in rainfall, crop productivity and crop yield will decline; and hence they suggested 
changing from highly water consumptive crops such as rice and corn to more adaptable crops 
for the arid region of Isfahan (Gohari et al., 2013).   
In the following section, different stages of developing the model, data requirements and the 
results of modeled scenarios are presented.  
 
5.2. WEAP: Modelling Steps and Data Requirement 
Applications of WEAP involve the following steps (SEI, 2001): 
i. Identifying the problem; 
ii. Identifying the current status of all water supplies and demands;  
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iii. Establishing scenarios based on existing water policies, technology, population growth and 
any other factors that might affect demand and supply or hydrological status; 
iv. Evaluating scenarios that concern different water management criteria such as water 
resource sufficiency, water cost (Levite et al., 2003); 
In this study, these steps were used to develop a WEAP model. However, the model 
assumptions are limited and only the main supply and demand sites are represented for this 
catchment. The different steps are explained below. 
 
5.2.1. Problem Identification: Interviews and Group Discussions  
The first step involved identifying the main water consumption sources, agricultural water 
demand and water supply (groundwater resources) at a local level in Kashan catchment. The 
purpose was to derive a schematic view of the case study area. The information on both 
demand and supply sites are represented schematically by two green and red nodes and are 
linked together to create a network system (Figure 22). The model uses very few nodes to 
keep the model in the simplest format, to avoid complexity of the results. The assumptions are 
created around a few nodes representing the aggregated demand and supply sites. Usually, to 
provide and establish different scenarios in WEAP, comprehensive information is required to 
represent the future trend of water resources. However, as the comprehensive modelling effort 
does not address the main objective of this study, which is to engage stakeholders in 
evaluation of the model outcomes, the simplicity of the model development and results are 
prioritised so that they can be later related to local farmers. For groundwater resources, the 
required data include: maximum abstraction, natural recharge, primary storage and storage 
capacity, moreover, population growth, annual per capita water usage, water consumption, 
water demand during different month, demand priority are necessary to construct the model.  
174 
 
 
 
5.2.2. Database Structure 
Water supply and demand sources 
The main water source in the region is groundwater abstraction, which is widely used for 
irrigated agriculture. Domestic water for Kashan city and abstraction for agricultural land in 
Kashan, constitute the main water demand in the region (see Chapter 4). 
 
 
Climate and Hydrology:  
Catchment Hydrology 
The catchment hydrology is defined by local precipitation and evapotranspiration. Average 
precipitation and temperature were calculated according to the estimations by 5 different 
Figure 22 Schematic View of the Catchment Area 
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meteorological stations within Kashan catchment area (Regional Water Agency of Kashan, 
2008-2011). 
Different hydrological data are required to establish the model water balance as tabulated 
below: 
            Table 3 Data Used for Building the Model Baseline 
      Area  Population  Annual 
activity level  
Annual water 
use rate 
Climate Variable 
data Used 
 
Kashan 
Catchment 
 
7076km2 
 
390,000 
 
1470km2 
 Precipitation 
Actual ETs 
Runoff  
Agriculture 20,000ha   350 MCM  
Kashan City 270,000   47 MCM 
(1500m3/person) 
 
Source: Regional Water Resources Management of Kashan (2008-2011) 
 
Secondary data provided by the Kashan’s regional water resources agency were obtained 
from the annual report for the water resources management authority in the Isfahan Province. 
Although the data may not have high quality and accuracy to provide high standard modeling 
results, these regional data (average quality) were used in developing the WEAP modelling 
assumptions. It was explained to farmers that these data are local-based in order to improve 
their trust into the model’s outcomes.   
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      Table 4 Groundwater Data Used for Modelling (Units are based on Million Cubic Metres) 
Storage capacity    - 
Initial storage 500 Mm3 
Maximum withdrawal ~350 Mm3- 216 Mm3 
Natural Recharge ~226 Mm3- 219 Mm3 
Reservoirs  12 Mm3 
Total Abstraction from Aquifer 
(Current Account Year) 
358.4 Mm3 
             Source: Regional Water Resources Management of Kashan (2008-2011) 
 
5.2.3. Scenario Development for WEAP Modelling within Participatory Processes 
One of the most important steps in building a WEAP model is scenario development. The 
literature suggests that one of the main shortcomings in previous studies using WEAP has 
been invalid scenarios. This shortcoming is addressed in this study, by establishing relevant 
scenarios that were derived from local farmers’ concerns and policy context through a 
community-based participatory simulation exercise. In this study, to include local farmers’ 
perspectives in the WEAP modelling assumptions and improve the accuracy of the model 
outcomes, scenarios were developed and formulated based on the views and perspectives of 
farmers for the future irrigation management in the region, within the social simulation 
exercise (see Chapter 4).   
Scenarios are developed based on stakeholders’ viewpoints and interests, which can enhance 
the quality of the decision-making process for irrigation management in Kashan.  
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Scenario development largely depends on the views and perspectives of various stakeholders 
that have potential interest and historical water rights, which makes it essential to incorporate 
local water users when planning different management development stages. This involvement 
is required prior to undertaking WEAP simulations; stakeholders’ perspectives and decisions 
should be identified and incorporated into WEAP model assumption, prior to the simulation.  
 
5.2.4. Calibration and Results 
For this modelling project, and based on the outcomes of the participatory simulation 
exercise, different scenarios were identified for testing in WEAP. The following section 
explains the modelling steps and evaluates the scenarios through the methodology. 
 
5.3. WEAP Modelling Steps for Kashan  
The basic structure to build scenarios in WEAP comprises three steps. First: creating a current 
account year, this is the base year of the model for a particular time horizon (in this study 
from 2000-2010). The current account represents the basic information of the existing water 
system. The second step is to create a reference scenario which is established from the current 
account year (in this study reference scenario is set from 2011-2020). The reference scenario 
is the ‘business as usual’ scenario from which more scenarios can be generated. The reference 
scenario excludes any interventions or future changes into the model assumptions; this is to 
understand the best predicted situation within the studied time-horizon. The final step is to 
establish scenarios and run the model to evaluate the future impacts of implemented policies 
and technologies. 
178 
 
The model was developed for a small-scale area of Kashan catchment with an area of 
7076km2 and a population of 390,000. After defining the area and setting the boundaries in 
WEAP, the time horizon was selected from 2000-2010 (this is the baseline data until the last 
year of scenario in 2020, based on calendar month). The major demand sites are agricultural 
fields and domestic water use in Kashan city, and so the aggregated agricultural water demand 
in the catchment and the domestic water consumption are represented by two separate demand 
nodes.  
To set up the model, the current account year was created using the data presented in Tables 3 
and 4. The monthly variation in groundwater level has been entered into the current account 
assumption. Under the climate indicator for the Kashan Catchment area, for the two variables 
of precipitation and ET, the monthly values were used.  
In the data view, the key assumption of ‘unit irrigation water use’ was changed to reflect a 
new annual pattern for the period 2011-2020. This scenario illustrates the water demand trend 
under the current water consumption rate until 2020, without improving the irrigation 
efficiency.  
 
5.3.1. Scenario Building  
Preparing the Ground for Scenarios 
Scenarios in WEAP represent self-consistent story-lines outlining the evolution of the water 
system under given socio-economic conditions and a particular set of water or agricultural 
policy and technological innovations. In this study, the scenarios are intended to evaluate 
changes in water demand in the region. Scenarios inherit data from baseline data time series 
(2000-2010) and are used to address a wide range of ‘what if’ questions such as population 
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growth, or ‘What if irrigation efficiency improved?’ or ‘What if summer precipitation 
decreased?’ The scenarios are based on the yearly time-series Wizard, including the decline in 
water demand after improving efficiency until 2020. The amount of water that can be saved 
through applying the ‘Tooba Scheme’ was estimated using secondary data collected from the 
water agency in Kashan. The WEAP model can represent the results of annual as well as the 
monthly water demand changes for agriculture under the different scenarios. The agricultural 
practice in the case study area, assumes a seasonal pattern of cultivation. Thus, the results of 
the monthly water demand changes could represent clear water use trends in different months 
for the participants and this effectively fostered discussion among local farmers (see Chapter 
7). 
The Table below illustrates some of the scenarios to be tested in the model. The scenario of 
the ‘Tooba scheme’ aims to increase irrigation efficiency by introducing a drip irrigation 
system and a land integration programme. It is formulated from the existing policy and the 
main concerns of farmers in the region. These scenarios were built to analyze the agricultural 
water demand for the period of 2010-2015 as illustrated in Table 5. 
               Table 5 The scenarios to be tested in the Model 
Level of Scenario  Scenarios Remarks 
0 Reference Models of catchment based on baseline data and 
no changes to a system 
1 Unimproved irrigation 
efficiency  
The continues trend under the current 
consumption rate, Increased population to 0.2% 
in the region within future ten years 
2 ‘Tooba’ scheme Improving irrigation efficiency by applying drip 
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irrigation system and land integration, to 
medium and large-scale farms (based on 
available data in regional water agency~15Mm3 
water saving in future 15 years)  
3 Climate variability Reduced rainfall and increased 
Evapotranspiration in most arid regions 
worldwide  (IPCC report, 2008) 
              Source: Author, 2014 
 
5.3.2. Testing Scenarios and Evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23 Schematic View of Scenario Development in WEAP 
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Scenario1:  
Unimproved Irrigation Efficiency  
In modelling the scenarios, the time horizon was first changed to 2000-2020, (the current 
account year remains 2010, and the last year scenario was changed to 2020). The first 
scenario assumed a population growth rate of 0.2% for the first ten years (based on the 
regional figures provided by the water agency in Kashan), with no change in irrigation 
efficiency to observe the impact on groundwater demand.  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The result of the first scenario indicate that under population growth and the impact of climate 
variables in the region (temperature and precipitation) the water demand for agriculture 
increased slightly over 20 years (Figure 24). The agricultural sector consumes > 90 per cent of 
groundwater resources while domestic water use accounts for around 6 per cent (Regional 
Water Agency of Kashan, 2011). The graph shows low water demand for Kashan city with no 
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Figure 24 Water demand under unimproved irrigation efficiency and population growth, 
based on million cubic metres (MCM) 
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significant increase in water demand in the next 10 years. However, agricultural water 
demand shows a steady increase in future in this region.  
 
Sceanario2:  
Demand Management, ‘Tooba Scheme’ Project  
In developing scenarios to represent the main irrigation policies in the region, a new node 
(representing aggregated water demand under improved efficiency), was allocated as rural 
demand site. The new scenario utilised the same climate and population growth rate as the 
reference scenario (2020). The new scenario evaluates the impact of reducing water demand 
by reducing the water consumption rate (in this case by adopting new drip irrigation 
technology). In the participatory model with farmers, it was suggested that it would be 
appropriate to develop a model scenario that assumed that half of the farmers (50%) accepted 
the new irrigation technology to reduce water consumption to one-third (66.6%) of the current 
rate (i.e. the scenario was: what if half of the farmers in the region (50%) implement this 
irrigation system?). In this model scenario, under the above mentioned assumptions for 
aggregated agricultural demand, the annual rate of water use was 3.5%. This is the percentage 
of saving, or increasing, the share of efficient water use, that the model anticipates (the 
demand management formula is adopted from the modelling tutorial).   
Demand Management: Aggregated: % of saving or increase the share of efficient water use 
66/100* 5= 3.5% 
Another method of updating the water consumption rate under ‘Tooba Scheme’ would be to 
enter the saved amount of water as the table below illustrates. 
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Water saving by applying drip irrigation method 15 Mm3 (million cubic metres) 
Water saving by land integration 92 ha   (10,000 m3 per ha) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Figure 25 illustrates until 2010, under unimproved irrigation efficiency agricultural water 
demand was very high. As discussed previously, the high water demand rate is due to climate, 
and specifically the aridity of the region and inefficient irrigation systems. Particularly, after 
2000 a sudden reduction in groundwater demand rate can be observed when the model 
illustrates the change in groundwater demand when irrigation systems start to fall under the 
irrigation policies of the ‘Tooba Scheme’ (this scenario starts from 2000), in which 
agricultural water consumption falls considerably. Data for Kashan city remained the same as 
the reference scenario and there is no change in future water demand for Kashan city. The 
WEAP model can represent the water demand trend under monthly or yearly periods (the 
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current account year for the model is from 2000-2010, and the model assumption for 
developing scenarios is the yearly time series for the period of 2011-2020).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26 illustrates monthly water demand for agriculture, based on averaged monthly data 
over 2010-2020. As figure shows, water demand for agriculture varies in different months due 
to reduced abstraction rates by farmers in certain months. The lowest water demand is in 
February when precipitation provides supplementary water for agriculture. Kashan City is 
included as its input data for the modelling assumption and process is required. 
 
Sceanrio3:  
Extended Drought 
To calculate the drought index in Kashan region, the dryness was calculated using the 
Domarten method* (UNEP, 1991). As Kashan has 4.8 dryness coefficients it is classified as an 
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arid region with high drought intensity, which is considered in the WEAP modelling 
assumptions. 
 
*I= Domarten Climate index 
 P=Average annual precipitation (mm) 
                             T=Temperature (0C) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 27 illustrates monthly changes in agricultural water demand, under two scenarios of 
extended dry climate (extended drought) and higher population growth. Water demand during 
spring and summer seasons is higher and the graph illustrates that under extended drought in 
the region, summer water demand shows a slight increase and during May reaches its highest 
level (when it is in a middle of the cultivation season). However, during February, water 
demand does not show a significant increase, due to increased water availability as a result of 
precipitation in this month (see Appendix 6). 
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5.4. Discussion and Conclusion 
The conflict on scarce common groundwater resources requires a holistic approach to manage 
different components of the hydrological cycle. The transparent technical tool of WEAP 
makes it suitable for reflections of various groups of water stakeholders. In this study, WEAP 
is developed utilising different socio-economic and management factors to investigate 
different policy-based strategies to advance the sustainable management of groundwater 
resources. This includes climate change uncertainties in developing model assumptions, 
which has assisted in developing adaptive water management options for the case study area. 
The user-friendly model interfaces make it easy to use in discussions facilitating collaboration 
on water resource management between water stakeholders. This can also provide wider 
awareness and understanding of the main issues in water management among public users. 
The integrated hydrologic model of WEAP was used in this study to test the scenarios of 
water demand management in the Kashan case study. Different climate change variables and 
irrigation efficiency management were formulated under specific scenarios and were tested 
and evaluated in this model. Considering the importance of validity of scenarios in this model 
and to increase the accuracy of the model assumptions and the results, the scenarios were 
formulated within the participatory social simulation with local farmers in Kashan (see 
Chapter 4). At the end of the participatory modelling process, the outcomes of the model were 
discussed with farmers and who evaluated the results (see Chapter 7). The scenarios of 
‘Tooba Irrigation Scheme’ (including changing the irrigation system to drip method and the 
land integration scheme) as well as population growth and the impacts of future climate 
change in the region are embedded in the formulated scenarios. In this study, using WEAP 
model has several advantages such as its user-friendly feature that allowed the researcher to 
present and discuss the results with farmers. The model was also educational as it could foster 
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more discussion and dialogues amongst participants during the participatory modelling 
process (see Chapter 7). Due to limited data availability, this model was useful as it required 
few data for running the model at a local scale. The model illustrates that, under unimproved 
irrigation efficiency, the groundwater demand will increase until 2020 in the region. Improved 
irrigation efficiency as a result of demand management projects in the case study area, will 
reduce the demand for groundwater, specifically for the agricultural sector (agriculture sector 
consumes ~90 per cent of available groundwater resources). The climate change scenario 
illustrates different water demands under the extended drought conditions. However, the 
result of this scenario could not be discussed with local farmers given the complexities 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Groundwater Irrigation Management and the Existing Challenges from the 
Iranian Farmers’ Perspective 
 
Introduction 
This chapter investigates existing challenges in groundwater irrigation management in my 
case study area in Kashan, and the need to develop participatory and adaptive management 
approaches in this specific region. This chapter particularly reflects on the findings obtained 
from interviews with local farmers and water agencies on their role within this irrigation 
system and the existing management plans for the future sustainable use of groundwater 
resources. As discussed previously, groundwater is the chief source of water for domestic and 
agricultural practices in Iran (see Chapter 2) and in the arid Kashan area. In the Kashan case 
study, current groundwater abstraction is not at sustainable rate, thus its future maintenance is 
under threat. Local farmers are seen to play a vital role in the irrigation management process 
and sustainable groundwater abstraction. However, as the previous chapter noted, they have 
been largely neglected within the management-decision process in Iran. The sustainability of 
groundwater in Kashan is under serious threat due to harsh climatic conditions, long-term 
overexploitation of aquifer, declined water quality and lack of effective controlling and 
monitoring mechanisms for abstraction. Under these conditions farmers in Kashan play a 
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critical role in maintaining their irrigation practices by adoption of locally based adaptive 
solutions and collective management strategies such as appropriate crop pattern selection 
under water scarcity conditions so sustain their livelihood. This chapter explores the main 
irrigation challenges from the local farmers’ perspectives and provides more in-depth 
discussion on the reasons why farmers in this particular case are not willing to join or 
collectively participate in the government imposed schemes for irrigation efficiency 
management and contribution in a more sustainable use of scarce groundwater resources. The 
literature on farmers’ behavioural approaches (including farmers’ main incentives and 
obstacles for joining governmental projects and adoption of particular irrigation 
system/method) in the field of groundwater irrigation management in arid regions of Iran is 
very limited (see Chapter 2). Thus, this study identifies for the first time, some of the 
influential factors that affect farmers’ decision-making for participation in local irrigation 
management practices in Iran. As reviewed in Chapter 2, global or national water problems 
require locally based solutions.  Local knowledge could lead to improving and empowering 
local capacity by utilising their knowledge in embracing alternative solutions (Von Korff et 
al., 2010).  In this study specifically, the crucial role of local knowledge and community-
managed systems has been considered and this has greatly influenced and shaped the 
understanding of the traditional and current management practices in this case study. 
The chapter reflects on different factors causing challenges for the farmers in my case study 
area from their perspectives, to better understand the local irrigation system and the dynamics 
as well as farmers’ particular behavioural approaches. In general, irrigation practices in Iran 
including surface/ groundwater irrigation face many challenges. The common-pool 
groundwater resource is invisible; as the major source of water supply in arid regions, its 
abstraction measurement and control is problematic. Some of the groundwater irrigation 
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management problems are created at national policy and managerial level, and some are 
developed as a consequence of water scarcity, ineffectiveness of the local institutions or 
farmers’ decision-making behaviours at local level. Different challenges in Kashan’s 
irrigation system could be analysed under some general themes, including water crisis, 
governance, local indigenous knowledge, and socio-economic issues.  
Empirical findings suggest that farmers in this region face particular challenges which prevent 
them from collaborating in collective actions and management decisions. These include: their 
differing perceptions of the causes of water crisis, different definitions of irrigation efficiency, 
the difficulties created by management transfer for small-scale farmers (such as shifting costs 
on farmers), and an unhelpful focus on governmental schemes which promote technological 
solutions without considering the socio-ecological conditions of the systems (i.e. importing 
technologies that are not adaptable to the local need).  
The empirical findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the existing challenges when 
scarce groundwater resources are the only source of water supply for domestic and irrigation 
practices for local farming and livelihoods. This emphasises the need for local solutions to 
improve resource management, engaging local knowledge and farmers’ main concerns into 
the management-decisions. This could be effective approach for water management in similar 
climatic regions globally, and also in similar circumstances in arid or semi-arid areas at 
national level.  
This chapter particularly reflects on the perspectives of different groups of farmers who 
participated in this study during group discussion and semi-structured interviews. The data for 
the current chapter is gathered from the qualitative interview method which was conducted 
with some experienced farmers and local water manager authorities in the region (see Chapter 
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4). However, the main findings of conducting innovative participatory irrigation management 
game are reflected and discussed in detail in Chapter 7. There are different classifications of 
farmers based on various criteria in Iran. The classification that is offered by the Statistic 
Centre of Iran (1993) is still the most valid in the country. To introduce the main groups of 
farmers in the Kashan region, Appendix 4 characterises different farming types.  
 
6.2. Exploring the existing challenges for groundwater irrigation management in 
Kashan city by local stakeholders 
The analysis of the outcomes from the interviews and group discussions with local farmers 
show that the perspectives on water values, the main purposes for groundwater protection and 
sustainability of water resources, differs between local communities and official authorities. 
Thus there is a need to tackle different viewpoints to identify commonly-agreed 
understandings. 
The contemporary water status and governance of Iran has been described in detail in Chapter 
3. Currently one of the major failures in government management of groundwater resources is 
a significant inefficiency in agricultural water use, as well as unfinished water projects and an 
inadequate budget for future water development schemes (Panahi, 2000). Particularly in 
groundwater irrigation, the main existing challenges are the over-use of water, inappropriate 
water delivery systems and extensive water seepage from the main canals to the farmlands, 
muddy canals, poor leveling of lands, and drainage problems causing low efficiencies and 
dropped level of groundwater table (efficiencies is between 33 to 37 percent) in the country 
(UI Hassan, et al., 2007). Environmental degradation such as desertification, salinization, land 
subsidence and desiccation of wetlands are some of the major consequences of inappropriate 
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agricultural water management, which has occurred in Iran and globally (see Chapter 2). 
Several researchers have therefore concluded that groundwater conditions in Iran are in a 
critical state (Hojjati and Boustani, 2010; Izady et al., 2012; Soltani and Saboohi, 2009). 
However similar to many countries around the world, most of the controlling mechanisms 
over groundwater resources which aimed to increase irrigation efficiency have not been 
successfully implemented in Iran. 
The case study area of Kashan is one of 277 regions, of a total of 609, which are experiencing 
a critical decline in groundwater levels and a water scarcity problem (Forootan et al., 2014; 
Joodaki et al., 2014; Madani, 2014). The current declining trend in groundwater level in Iran, 
increased demand for food and potable water, while intensive abstraction rate for agricultural 
practices is taking place are some of the major challenges for managing groundwater 
sustainability. The over-exploitation of the aquifer is also because of the existing crop pattern, 
inefficient irrigation system and huge water wastage occurs under the traditional irrigation 
practices (Madani, 2014). This suggests the need for adopting modern irrigation technologies 
which are adaptable to specific local/regional conditions and are more efficient for farmers. 
Increased water demand and insufficient recharge rate and reduced water availability 
(Forouzani and Karimi, 2010) have aggravated the ‘tragedy of the commons’ problem (see 
Chapter 2). Regarding groundwater use, this is more catastrophic as there is not sufficient 
controlling and monitoring mechanism for maintaining sustainability of the groundwater 
resources, particularly in developing countries.  
 As indicated before, in the Kashan district of Iran, the government is encouraging 
smallholder farmers to participate in large-scale (>10 ha) irrigation schemes (termed ‘Tooba’) 
in which irrigation systems are being converted to drip irrigation systems to improve water 
use efficiency. Currently, national agricultural development policies specifically seek to 
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widen the adoption of drip irrigation methods. The particular reasons for farmers to reject this 
scheme are analysed further through conducting a RPG simulation which will be discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
The governmental suggested micro drip irrigation system (under the ‘Tooba’ scheme) 
provides water (and fertilizers) through a network of narrow plastic tubes and water is 
delivered directly to the root zone, or soil surface, to supply plant water requirements. This 
method can prevent groundwater over-exploitation and reduces water wastage (Lamaddalena 
and Sagardoy, 2000) especially in semi-arid or humid regions. However as my study argues, 
its implementation in arid regions face many difficulties and challenges which require careful 
measurements and precise studies on different aspects of irrigation system and dynamics (see 
more in this Chapter). The more recent irrigation development scheme of sub-surface piped 
water technology has included the use of 30cm diameter polyethylene irrigation pipes 
installed at depths of ~1m. These were introduced by the government in 2012, to improve 
irrigation efficiency by reducing water transmission losses. However, different water 
distribution systems (such as canals or pipes) are usually tested and evaluated by farmers, and 
their reflections on these systems help local agencies in improving or introducing different 
methods or devices.   
There is a lack of critical evaluation of the local farmers’ perceptions of these governmental 
schemes within the literature on Iran. Particularly there is no local-based evaluation of the 
‘Tooba’ irrigation scheme. Furthermore, there are no studies of management plans within 
participatory and adaptive modeling process with farmers (see Chapter 7). 
However, here the main problematic issue is the purpose of these schemes, which is to 
improve irrigation efficiency while a different definition of efficiency is perceived by local 
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farmers that discourages adoption of such governmental schemes. In Kashan, introducing a 
drip irrigation system is not the sole project to improve efficiency of water use in agriculture; 
some other schemes identified by the manager of the water and soil department (in the 
Agricultural Agency in Kashan) included projects on: land integration, installation of piped 
water and paved access roads, land preparation, introducing cement lining on muddy canals to 
reduce water seepage (which also keeps the waterway clear of vegetation). Other major 
schemes include the rehabilitation and cleaning of Qanat systems, and installation of devices 
to control abstraction rate (smart water meters-functioning based on the initial abstraction 
permissions in hours, issued when the wells were drilled).   
As one of the Iranian government’s long-term mechanisms to control over-abstraction of 
groundwater, electricity subsidies have been reduced by the government. Although energy 
prices for using electric or diesel pumps have increased significantly, water and energy prices 
are insufficient tools to prevent groundwater over-abstraction (the harsh climatic conditions of 
the region does not allow reduction of the abstraction rate), and thus farmers continue to 
abstract considerable volumes of groundwater. Rather, groundwater is controlled and 
restricted by the state; farmers also initially agreed that their water use should be controlled to 
ensure future water availability. For instance one of the farmers’ motives in reducing water 
abstraction is to avoid higher electricity bills which shows governmental strategy worked for 
him.  
Although smart water meters on deep wells allow monitoring of abstraction rates, in reality in 
most cases the only limiting factor for groundwater abstraction is a fall in water level, which 
is evidenced by local farmers and increases in the cost of pumps. Morris (2006) suggested that 
increasing water charges can be an effective mechanism to increase water use efficiency. 
However, increasing water prices at times when water is limited and when the economic 
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return per unit of applied water is high, can present major difficulties for farmers. In most arid 
and semi-arid parts of the country when tube-wells dry up, richer farmers who can afford to 
dig deeper wells gets permission and install more powerful motor pumps.  
Different schemes to improve irrigation management efficiency have been introduced by the 
government over a long period of time to evaluate the adaptability and their acceptance by the 
local farmers.  However, there is a need for studies to critically and more in-depth analyse 
Iranian farmers’ reason for not adopting these schemes. 
To briefly outline the challenges in participatory irrigation management in a context-specific 
region of Kashan, I will expand on the following factors including: 
1. Conflicting viewpoints on the causes of water crisis, and thus the proposed solutions 
such as irrigation efficiency for future sustainable groundwater usage in Iran; 
2. Irrigation Management transfer (i.e. in Iran, from community-based to authoritative 
management, and then later under the contemporary governance regime to transfer 
some responsibilities from the government to the farmers’ communities- See Chapter 
3), the consequences of this policy is expressed from the farmers’ points of view ; 
3. Pump-technology and increasing inequity to access water supplies among large-scale 
and small-scale farmers; 
4. Governmental enforced schemes and interventions in irrigation technologies which are 
not adapted to the local conditions (I will expand further in Chapter 7). 
 
6.2.1. Water Crisis and Efficiency Management: Reconciling Different Viewpoints  
One of the main problems in Iran’s national water management policy is that the majority of 
governors or agencies believe that the main reason for the water crisis in the country is long-
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term drought, and they put far less emphasis on inappropriate management or water 
governance (Foltz, 2002). Usually the water crisis has been blamed by Iranian policy makers 
(i.e. the Ministry of Energy and Agricultural Jihad Agencies) on climate change and increased 
drought frequencies. The government press in Iran, blame drought events which are natural 
disasters and out of their control hence consider it as a temporary and a periodic crisis 
(Madani Larijani, 2005).  
To investigate the perspectives on the main causes of water crisis in my particular case study 
region, I interviewed some of the main managers of the water and sewage agency and the 
agricultural Jihad agency in Kashan and Bidgol districts of Kashan city. These organisations 
are particularly responsible for irrigation practices and management and providing farmers 
with agricultural facilities and educational workshops. Regarding my question about the main 
reasons for water crisis in the region the manager in Kashan’s agricultural water agency 
responded: 
“The main reason (for water crisis) is drought which has occurred within the last 5-6 years in 
the region.  In the past it was said that drought is an event but recently it has become a 
natural phenomenon, unfortunately”. 
Many academics and water experts in Iran believe that the water crisis is partly related to 
drought events, and they believe that 50% is due to mismanagement (Foltz, 2002). As stated 
by Madani (2014) the main water resources management strategy was to restore the previous 
condition rather than a comprehensive study of the main causes of the water crisis. Water 
management of Iran requires serious and immediate actions to prevent more tragic 
consequences as a result of deterioration in the quality and quantity of the available water 
resource.  
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Most groundwater quantity or quality degradation is due to inappropriate groundwater 
governance, disintegrated management plans, or poor land use management, and not only 
extensive groundwater abstraction or drought. Although it is expected that water planners in 
Iran, will sensibly plan to meet current and future water challenges, unfortunately there has 
been a lack of planning for decades (Madani Larijani, 2005). Lack of agreement amongst 
water experts and policy makers about the main causes of the water crisis has not led to the 
formulation of any comprehensive plan for future water management. Consequently different 
solutions to the problem have been suggested such as improving water use efficiency, the 
definition of which differs particularly between local communities and the main governmental 
decision-makers. 
Recent literature challenges the concept of efficiency in irrigation practices (Lankford, 2014).  
There is a belief that what is usually known as irrigation efficiency is a misleading concept of 
efficiency. In some cases, the governmental proposed schemes to improve water use 
efficiency are in contrast with what local users perceived as efficiency in irrigation. Therefore, 
understanding the definition and accurate meaning of efficiency (particularly at local scale) is 
essential in planning for a particular water system.  As Lankford (2014) stated the condition 
under which the efficiency can be concluded to have improved, is that the usage of resource 
has reduced and the lesser water consumed has freed up more of the resources to be saved to 
be later allocated to other purposes such as environmental or industrial activities.  
Farmers in Ali-Abad (2013) defined the improved irrigation efficiency as: 
“Based on each farmers’ water right (refer to the Qanat allocation system), a farmer needs to 
receive his water at time and if the total water reaches his plot increased by saving (water) 
from seepage through the transmission canals, then it means efficiency has improved so he 
can cultivate more lands… and his final revenue is higher” 
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Another farmer in Ali-Abad village (2013) stated: 
“For farmers, improved irrigation efficiency is evidenced when their production level 
increases, so it shows that their water availability has improved by reducing the water 
wastage through canals” 
Socio-economic conditions, livelihood arrangements, technological, institutions and 
ecological dimensions exist at each local level and must be understood separately, as they can 
greatly affect water management and efficiency (Lankford, 2006). The statement indicates the 
crucial importance of water right and allocation mechanism among farmers, as this provide 
fair access and distribution of irrigated water among them (see Chapter 7). This also indicates 
the realisation of farmers regarding the huge water wastage occur during water transmission 
when using poorly efficient water canals. The main measurement for improved efficiency for 
local farmers seems to be the improvement in the accessibility to their allocated water right, in 
order to maintain or increase their production level. This is particularly recognisable from 
some of the farmers’ statement regarding improved irrigation efficiency, as indicated below: 
“When efficiency improves it means more water available to reach our plots, less seepage 
and evaporation which occurs through delivery canals; therefore our productivity and 
agricultural revenue will increase…” 
 
Lankford (2006) describes that at local level, irrigation efficiencies are wrongly assumed by 
experts and managers not to contribute significantly to basin-level water management. This 
means that improving local efficiency is incorrectly assumed by them to be unnecessary.  He 
argues that local irrigation efficiency is important to water management and productivity, as it 
can replicate the opinions of experts and farmers on irrigation practices in a basin level. He 
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believes that “efficiency at the local level is bound up with equity, timing and scheduling, 
affecting the performance and costs of irrigation and drainage, and with perception of water 
misuse, affecting policy choices and conflicts” (Lankford, 2006. p.346).  
In this study, local irrigation efficiency is considered important by the researcher for Kashan 
case study area, as irrigation contains its own particular timing and equity measures, 
established historically in Iran and the water allocation rules are adjusted and protected by 
local irrigators (see Chapter 3). The concept of “local irrigation efficiency” or “classical” 
approach was introduced by the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID) 
(1978), in contrast with the “neoclassical” or “effective irrigation efficiency”.   
The classical definition of irrigation efficiency is summarised by Bos and Nugteren (1990) 
and Wolters (1992), and indicates that within the irrigation system, the aim is to allocate the 
limited amount of supplied water with the right amount to every part, or plots, of the irrigation 
system, which does not include recapturing (re-use) or water recycling. This emphasises 
appropriate control over quantity and timing in delivery and distribution of irrigated water in 
canals or pipes (Lankford, 2006). Lankford argues that irrigation efficiency management 
employs knowledge to control irrigation mechanisms to schedule water rights and to divert 
irrigation water to the correct plot of land and at the right time to improve irrigation 
performance (Lankford, 2006). Worldwide there is “no guidance on what should be measured 
and how data might be interpreted to demonstrate ‘efficient use’” (Knox et al., 2012, p.5). 
Thus, it mainly depends on local measures how to define efficient use of resources and 
sustainability of the groundwater resources during their daily practices. In the case study, 
while improved efficiency for farmers means increase accessibility to their specific water 
right, the government enforcing mechanism to reduce water right and to install drip irrigation 
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systems for improving efficiency and secure sustainability of aquifer, has resulted in 
contradiction and farmers rejecting the scheme (see Chapter 7).  
In the local irrigation system in Kashan, the rules-in-use for irrigation management follow 
traditional and precise mechanisms of water allocation and distribution, in which the equity 
and timing play a major role in water delivery and division. Farmers stick to these rules and 
water right allocation because of the legacy of the Qanat systems (see Chapter 3), and they 
believe that their irrigation is in parallel with the definition of efficiency that they perceive. 
This factor points towards the need to understand local culture in planning water 
management. In farmers’ point of view the sustainability of future groundwater resources is 
under threat, however they believe that their historical water allocation and irrigation rules 
provide each farmer with his own water right, therefore sustain farming practices, whilst 
governmental approaches do not consider these mechanism will not be successful to manage 
groundwater resources. 
In Kashan, while farmers’ main objective by improving efficiency is to have more available 
water reaching their plot (to increase or maintain their production level, depending on 
farmer’s type) the water authority’s main objective is to reduce farmers’ access to restricted 
groundwater. This is to protect the aquifer from over-abstraction, and to maintain water 
availability over a longer period of time in terms of sustainability and to be used for 
agricultural or industrial activities. Thus, the main difficulty is how the efficiency should be 
measured by the water regulator and how the abstraction permission should be issued to not 
deplete the aquifer and to meet the both farmers and governmental agencies’ objectives.  
One statement indicated by local farmers in Kashan (Ali-Abad village, 2013) is that: 
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“They (government) say because groundwater is reducing, therefore within the next 10 years 
our water ends, so let’s reduce the water usage to some extent, so that water exist for 15-20 
more years to be used by farmers” 
It was observed that farmers’ definition of efficiency is different from the officials, as their 
main concern is not about maintenance of groundwater resources for the future (young 
generation have already migrated to larger cities), but to improve or maintain their crop yield 
and livelihood every year.  
One water agent has also criticised the policy-makers’ attitudes regarding improving 
efficiency through restricting farmers’ access to water resources as he stated that:  
“The challenge felt by authorities is to put more pressure by different means or bodies to 
make farmers accept drip [irrigation] systems, but they mainly observe the problem from 
their own perspective and thinking of groundwater protection by using as less as possible 
water to be used or abstracted by farmers”. 
Moreover, the concept of sustainability of groundwater use is different for farmers and in 
some cases it seems not to be a very critical issue. In response to the question of: “whether 
farmers chose to reduce their water abstraction and continue farming for longer periods or 
continue this trend of abstraction without considering its sustainability for the future?”  
As one farmer in Fakhreh village of Kashan (2013) stated: 
“If we try to keep groundwater table in its sustainability status, we would not get anything (it 
won’t be profitable) and it’s like wasting time and energy, so when our wells get dry then we 
will leave farming and will find a new job”. 
The controversy or conflict between environmental issues and farming practices can be 
observed here, which usually results in conflict between agencies and farmers. As the current 
situation in the region illustrates, the government tries to protect the sustainability of 
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groundwater resources, while farmers’ reliance on groundwater and economic constraints 
does not allow any significant improvement in groundwater protection. Rogers (2002) states 
that generally tube-well owners pay the construction, maintenance and operation of their wells 
but they usually don’t pay those external costs resulting from extensive groundwater 
abstraction on environment or aquatic ecosystems. The water regulatory body (the 
Environment Agency) aims to balance the abstraction amount with the water demand of 
aquatic environment thus conserving water to ensure environmental sustainability (Knox et 
al., 2010b). In this regard, Knox et al., (2012) has suggested formulating a framework through 
an adaptive approach which can reflect the need of farmers as well as regulators whose aim is 
to protect the environment.  Similarly, within the context of developing nations, Lankford 
(2006) argues that notions such as sustainability are not necessarily transferable in developing 
nations, where poor local farmers depend on natural resources for their livelihood. The 
economic conditions act as barriers for improving or concerning environmental protection, 
therefore in most cases the natural resources get depleted and environmental consequences 
will be inevitable. In this study, my effort is to engage the main stakeholders to discuss and 
formulate common-agreed solutions to improve irrigation practices and increased productivity 
by more efficient use of available water, therefore prevent further damage of groundwater 
resources. 
It is also indicated that the sustainability of the ecosystem is not carefully valued by policy-
makers’ decisions. In this regard, some official agents criticise national water policies that 
have affected regional and local water management, by not carefully considering the long-
term consequences of their policies on the sustainability of the resources.  
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One example of inappropriate agricultural management policy by the government in the past 
was given by a farmer in Ali-Abad village (2013): 
“We have problem from policy maker level, because they believe in expansion of agriculture 
and export products which are related to virtual water trade, but policy makers have not 
realised the actual value of water. They used to put very high subsidies on water and 
electricity for agriculture and cheapest water tariff on irrigated water, farmers were not 
bothered to even switch off their pumps when they did not use water”. 
 
Groundwater resources are strategic as the main water supply sources for agriculture. 
However, the critical status of unsustainable use of groundwater resources in the country 
requires that the Iran’s national policy re-consider the urges in their long-term policy plan for 
food self-sufficiency. Iran’s water management sector prioritises improving agricultural 
productivity by adopting modern irrigation technologies while aiming to increase water use 
efficiency for protecting groundwater resources. However, there is a need for more effective 
management plans and government support to introduce funded irrigation technologies that 
are adaptable both to the local circumstances and to future water availability for agricultural 
expansion. 
 
Regarding farmers’ decision on adopting particular irrigation management strategies, their 
main concern is how the particular irrigation scheme can improve farmers’ access to the 
available water resources thus, improve their water use efficiency. For example, cement or 
sub-surface tube water canals can provide higher access to water for farmers. Therefore, 
farmers consider these irrigation systems more advantageous over using muddy irrigation 
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canals (Figure 28). This could significantly affect their decision-making behaviour on 
selecting suitable technology (Further discussed in Chapter 7).  
Source: Author, (2011-2013) 
 
Regarding improved irrigation efficiency, over-abstraction of aquifers and occurrence of 
externalities is as a result of the disfunction of the whole basin management and not only 
farmers must be blamed. Farmers are the main stakeholders who suffer from the impacts of 
water scarcity, thus there are the main group who will be affected by water reallocations. In 
this basin, better efficiency in irrigation systems does not necessarily advance farmers 
significantly. This point is addressed by Lankford (2014), who raises the critical question that 
if we save the resource who will get the ‘saved’ materials? And who will obtain the benefit of 
the so called ‘efficiency gain’?  
As stated by Seckler (1996), with high competition over water, efficiency gain for farmers is 
limited. The efficiency which may be gained through demand management or economic 
incentive tools is not considerable. In Kashan the efficiency gain through adoption of a drip 
Figure 28 Different irrigation systems in Kashan Villages, a. muddy flood irrigation canals, b. lined 
cement canals, c. Sub-surface tube canals 
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irrigation system in such a highly competitive environment to access more water is not 
considerable in comparison with the economic return by abstracting more available water. 
Furthermore, the concept of efficiency gain comes with a paradox as what it is saved from 
resource use does not return to nature and thus does not reduce the resource consumption 
(Lankford, 2014). For example in my case study, the impression is that by adopting drip 
irrigation systems the discharge rate to groundwater resources will be reduced. Other 
influential factors in this region such as: high aridity and evaporation rate; highly water 
consumption due to intensive cultivation patterns; the deep level of the groundwater table; and 
reduced recharge rate to the aquifer, all prevent the irrigated water from returning to the 
common pool source. Therefore the sustainability of aquifer is still under risk.  
By protecting groundwater from over-exploitation, the gain for farmers is through 
maintaining their water source for more years, on the other hand, huge volumes of water are 
planned to be used in industrial developments or for energy generation by the government, 
which overshadows the gain for farmers. In the case study, when there is not sufficient control 
over aquifer water level, where some stakeholders have better access to scarce groundwater 
resource and under water scarcity, the re-allocation may aggravate competition over water 
sources and lead to environmental degradation.  
 
6.2.2. Small-scale Farmers’ Main Adaptation Strategies  
When groundwater is the only source of available water for agricultural-dependence 
livelihoods, control of groundwater over-exploitation is a difficult and challenging task. 
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The empirical findings in the case study area show farmers' adaptation strategies to cope with 
prolonged droughts in Kashan, mainly include deepening tube-wells or changing cultivation 
patterns.  
 
Literature on the use of groundwater resources in similar climatic geographical areas in the 
world indicate that farmers usually use two main strategies to cope with groundwater 
resources 1.Chasing groundwater resources by deepening existing tube-wells or increasing 
water availability through governmental surface-water transferring schemes, 2. Resilience 
strategies to continue intensive cultivation and face prolong droughts, which are based on 
farmers’ long-term experience and knowledge. Other adaptation strategies by farmers in India 
and Nepal are indicated by Moench, (2007) including: 1. Diversifying income sources from 
other non-agricultural livelihood strategies. 2. Water-harvesting methods to increase access to 
water sources and secure water for domestic and livestock need. For example, drilling deeper 
wells, purchasing water from informal markets 3. Reducing the water consumption rate 
(Moench, 2007). Although not all these strategies are economically or environmentally 
sustainable, different possible strategies are tested and analysed by farmers. Large-scale 
farmers in Kashan have got permission from the government to deepen their tube-wells, and 
because of having larger integrated pieces of lands they can have more water rights over 
small-scale farmers. Moreover due to financial affordability, large-scale farmers can install 
modern irrigation systems and expand their agricultural lands. Under drought condition rich 
farmers’ main strategy is to deepen their tube-wells and to continue abstracting more water 
while farming is their second job.  
This condition is different for small-scale farmers, as they cannot afford to deepen their tube-
wells or to engage in large-scale governmental schemes for installing modern irrigation 
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technologies. When small-scale farmers find the governmental schemes not feasible to be 
adopted by them they create their own adaptation strategy, or different coping mechanism to 
face water shortages and to improve their irrigation water use efficiency (e.g. cultivating less 
water demanding crops). Small-scale farmers cultivate seasonal crops that use less water but 
are less valued in market, however due to short-term growth period they can obtain short-term 
revenue by selling their products to local market. Water shortage provides a strong incentive 
to adopt different coping mechanisms and adaptation strategies amongst farmers (Williams, 
2011). In my study it appeared that with reducing groundwater resources and extended water 
scarcity in the region, local farmers tried to adjust to this situation by taking on different 
adaptive management strategies. Particularly small-scale farmers have coped with the reduced 
water level by crafting some adaptive solutions such as making more investments in 
deepening shared tube-wells to cut the expenses, or establishing of ponds in farmlands to 
increase their access to water. In some cases small-scale farmers collectively act to purchase 
and install small-scale micro-irrigation systems.  
Regarding some of the main local adaptation strategies when there is a drought, one farmer in 
Ali-Abad (2013) stated: 
“When its drought and water availability is reduced we have to cope with the situation by 
applying various traditional solutions … first of all we change our crop patterns to less water 
consumer crops such as barely instead of wheat, also we reduce our land size to use less 
water, … beside farming we keep small husbandry and our wives are financially assisting us 
by weaving rugs.” 
Consequently some of these management strategies (such as changing cultivation pattern) 
have reduced their overall income because their pumping costs increased, while they chose to 
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cultivate less valuable crops and to reduce their land sizes. However, farmers found historical 
management strategies which are created based on their indigenous knowledge as an 
appropriate alternative responses to water crisis under lack of governmental support. 
Some of the ways in which the local farmers in this study adapted to sustain their livelihoods 
have been discussed with them and were listed as: 
 Extending their sources of income (e.g. husbandry, weaving carpets, working in 
factories) 
 Keeping small livestock to be sold during the period of financial crisis 
 Collective action to reduce the cost of labour 
 Sharing the cost of land and drilling tube-wells and their maintenance   
 Renting harvested lands to other farmers for grazing their domestic animals in 
exchange for reducing the cost of labour for clearing the land  
 Relying on their social network to provide food or cash during a time of financial 
crisis 
 Engaging in an informal market for water and land renting, and dairy products 
 
The various coping strategies adopted by local farmers in Kashan, revealed that they can 
create the most appropriate management alternatives to sustain their daily activities and 
livelihood.  A farmer in Fakhreh Village in Kashan (2013) indicated: 
 
“Our lives and livelihoods depend on farming and these clever but simple management 
decisions that we debate through our local meetings before implementation, have always 
made us get through difficult times… without deep thinking and consulting in our community 
we could not sustain our farming practices under this harsh climatic situation.” 
209 
 
It was stated by farmers that these management plans and coping strategies that are discussed 
amongst farmers in their local meetings and get approval to be adopted have been more 
successful and advantageous in addressing their needs under water crisis conditions. These 
various management strategies created by local farmers over a long period of time, are 
perfectly adaptable to the particular irrigation system context.   
 
Discussing these adaptive management strategies crafted by small-scale farmers in the region, 
has raised their awareness towards the crucial importance and effectiveness of community-
based and adaptive management solutions which this study is pursuing.  
 
One farmer in Ali-Abad (2013) indicated that: 
“From discussing our adaptive strategies, it is obvious that we can still learn from each 
other’s experiences; so the government should also consider farmers’ knowledge and 
experiences by discussion and to develop management plans based on our final collective 
decisions”. 
 
The local adaptive management strategies are alternative solutions implied by farmers under 
critical situations, which are not governed, controlled or imposed by the government. If 
farmers realise that government management plans are not well-developed or will not be 
profitable or advantageous for them in the future, they will stick to their own management 
strategies and reject the proposed governmental policies which is to avoid possible 
consequences of the government under-developed and possibly inapplicable management 
proposals. 
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6.3. The Role of Governance and Trust for Collective Action Behaviour 
The role of trust in improving governance structure and management of groundwater 
resources particularly has been emphasized in literature (Ostrom, 1990; Mitchel et al., 2012). 
Establishment of social capital in terms of trust can greatly affect farmers’ collective action 
and improve participatory behaviors for collaborative water governance for irrigation 
management (Lockwood et al., 2010). 
As water master (Miraab) in Kashan stated:  
“We trust government (with hesitation), but if they implement schemes correctly, our situation 
becomes better, sometime these schemes (or technologies) are brought from abroad, that we 
cannot trust and even adopt them, otherwise for farmers it would be good to try different 
management options” 
This indicates the crucial role of trust for farmers to collectively respond and act towards a 
particular management strategy. This is evidence that in the absence of trustworthy rules or 
management techniques, farmers lose their willingness to participate in collective action and 
improvement of their resource management (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1992). The sense that the 
scheme is not localised and is imported from abroad, as well as difficulties regarding technical 
issues for elder farmers in the operation and maintenance of a particular irrigation technology 
can significantly affect farmers’ acceptance and trust in the scheme (see Chapter 7). 
Farmers want every village to be dealt with based on their particular problems by authorities 
and not general solutions, in this way they can build more trust with the governmental 
management options. As one farmer in Ali-Abad village of Kashan (Group discussion, 2013) 
stated:  
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“The best way is that officials in agricultural jihad sit and find the root of the problems, in its 
own region (district). Each district must have meeting with above hand officials to find out 
how they can increase production level and then discuss it with farmers” 
 
Farmers believe that there is not enough communication and mutual agreement between 
farmers and officials, which has destroyed the trust between them. On the other hand, when I 
interviewed an official in the agricultural agency in Aran Bidgol district, he indicated that:  
“We agree to consider farmers requests, and if we only consider it scientifically and do not 
listen to farmers we will be loser. We believe that farmers are one step ahead of us. We 
personally believe in this, and every month we have meeting for integration scheme and 
farmers chief participate and we listen to farmers viewpoints.  In several occasions because 
of their opinion, our plan has been changed and we improved it by integration of their ideas” 
 
Whilst this was expressed by the official, farmers disagree that officials consider their 
concerns and believe that their meetings with officials lack effectiveness. 
Another farmer indicated the statement below and other farmers concurred. 
“I believe that government should listen to farmers and then adopt a new policy, and should 
be matched with farmers’ need the policy should be supported by the government and farmers 
to be satisfied”. 
 
One consequence is the differing perception of the problem and solution at local level as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. The different consequences of an appropriate governance 
approach (i.e. introducing unsuitable technologies and lack effective local institutions) will be 
discussed under different headings in the following section.  
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6.3.1. Management Transfer and its Impact on Agricultural Water Management 
Performance  
Iran is one of a few historic societies in which the water allocation and distribution system in 
the past has been created based on scientific and participatory management and sustained for 
many decades. However, a major change of shifting responsibilities of control and 
maintenance of water supply and distribution system from communities to the governmental 
authorities has occurred after irrigation management transferred from feudalism to the state 
governance regime in Iran (as a consequence of land reform in Iran, see Chapter 3).   
As a result of this change in governance regime, several consequences have occurred for local 
farmers. Farmers in Kashan expressed their perspectives on these issues, which I reflect on 
here. The changes in water valuing system amongst local farmers when the water supply and 
delivery system transformed from Qanat to tube-wells is discussed here. Farmers could 
manage to adapt to this modern development, as they have adjusted their historical water 
allocation rules to the new pump technology. The introduction of pump-technology in Iran is 
assumed to be successful as it was largely adopted by farmers, although it has threatened the 
sustainability of groundwater resources. The other important factor governing the acceptance 
of technology is its fluidity and the different advantages it can provide over previous systems. 
For example, pump technology is described as ‘the source of health, irrigation, power and 
control’ (Kamash, 2012). Farmers in Kashan indicated that when the government introduced 
pumped-well technology they were encouraged to drill tube-wells and were provided by 
different types of incentives such as a cheap tariff on groundwater and subsidized electricity, 
long-term loans, free manure and aerial spray of pesticides on their farms in order to support 
development of agricultural practices at local level. In the next section I reflect on some of the 
main challenges that this modern development has brought for local farmers in Kashan. 
213 
 
According to the experience gained from this analysis I evaluate the adoption of introducing a 
new irrigation technology, and the factors required to be considered by the government.  
 
6.3.2. Modern Development and the Challenge to Traditional Values 
Farmers stated that in traditional systems the collective action could be observed in different 
participatory activities such as irrigation, harvesting, land preparation and cultivation and in 
cleaning and maintaining Qanat and canal. 
The other crucial factor is that in contrast with the past, when the main landlord was 
responsible for the maintenance of the water supply resources, after shifting management this 
responsibility has been transferred to the government, which gives them the power to control 
and monitor abstraction rates by farmers. Farmers believe that protecting and controlling 
groundwater abstraction rates is not their responsibility, although when they were using Qanat 
systems they had more responsibility for the maintenance of the water supply system.  In 
recent decades the majority of farmers (medium and small-scale farmers) are tending to reject 
modern irrigation systems (e.g. drip irrigation method) (see Chapter 7).  
Today, the controversial viewpoint which affects groundwater management is recognition of 
the body responsible for common-pool groundwater resources monitoring. Farmers strongly 
assume this is the government. Thus, they do not feel pressured to consider the sustainability 
of the aquifer, but only the operation and maintenance of their irrigation system and water 
delivery and distribution facilities.  
A farmers’ representative in Kashan stated (Group discussion- Ali Abad, 2013): 
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“Groundwater is called national property it belongs to the entire nation. The government is 
responsible for it on behalf of the nation to overtake its ownership. It belongs to nation but 
government has its authority”. 
Under the traditional Qanat system and when the population was low, water resources were 
abundant and could readily supply a village’s agricultural and domestic water need.  
The main ethical vision of older farmers towards water is that water is perceived as a free 
source which is provided as a gift by God. One farmer in Abu Zeid-Abad village of Kashan 
(2012), regarding the value of water stated that: 
“Water is a gift by God and must be free… When it rains it is a blessing by God, rainfall is a 
freshwater and it is like manure for the crops…” 
 
Another old farmer in Rijen village (2012) stated that:  
“Water is a foundation of life, we have been created from water, and Quran told us if God 
does not give water, what could happen to us. Water is truly created for cultivation, without 
water we don’t have life…” 
 
The main reason and motivation factor for farmers in Kashan to stay and continue farming is 
because of water availability. Recently farmers are more prepared to acknowledge the value 
of water as a scarce resource. They all admit that the water of the Qanat was of much higher 
quality and it was more sustainable in terms of cost and constant providing freshwater. 
After introducing tube-well technology the availability of water which provides profit has 
become the main criteria of valuing water and land. 
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One farmer in Abu-zeid Abad village in Kashan (2012) stated that: 
“Today it’s the water that gives value to the land. The value of water is increased because its 
price has increased…We stayed here because of available water”. 
Water authorities believe that over the past 30 years farmers continued in their traditional 
culture of ‘wasting water’. However, farmers state that due to increased aridity of the region 
and decreased water level the crops require more water and without sufficient irrigation they 
cannot have any harvest.  
The social relations around using irrigation systems (particularly Qanat) in different parts of 
Iran have been created over centuries and within scientific and participatory management. 
Woolgar (1998) argues that social relations are one of the outcomes of technological choice, 
and it is the particular type of technology which creates particular sets of rules for using it, 
and formulates interactions between users and their relations. Thus these rules have been 
integrated in each community cemented through social capital and adaptive rules, which are 
very difficult to be changed by governmental interventions. Because individual technologies 
can greatly affect social relations among farmers, this element of human relations makes them 
resistant to accepting technological innovations (see Chapter 7). This is because society is 
scared of changing traditional and recognized relationships, as new technologies may 
potentially bring different social interactions into a society (Kamash, 2012). Introducing 
pump-well technology brought many challenges and difficulties for farmers who decided to 
adopt it. However, this technology could increase their access to more water resources, and 
the traditional rules of Qanat have been transferred to tube-wells by farmers. Here, I argue 
that any new technology that does not bring value for farmers or improve their access to water 
(improve efficiency), and does not match with their water allocation mechanism is very 
unlikely to be adopted (see more in Chapter 7). The successful introduction of a new scheme 
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or technology could be more effective if appropriate participatory methods including social 
learning process and engagement of the main stakeholders with various interest and views be 
developed and conducted (see Chapter 7). 
Any restrictions on water rights are set in the national parliament and must be adopted by 
provinces through a new regulatory framework and in every district it is implemented by the 
Agricultural water agency (see Chapter 3). In Kashan, tube-wells have initial permission 
which clearly states the amount of water that can be abstracted (e.g. 20, 15 or 25 lit/s). The 
agency has installed smart water meters on most tube-wells, which will automatically switch 
off the motor pump when the abstraction rate exceeds the permitted amount. In this case 
farmers have to re-charge their smart cards when their 3000 hour allocation of abstraction is 
reached. This scheme has yet to be approved and adopted at a local scale, but the smart cards 
are in use and farmers have to pay to re-charge their cards as they always exceed this amount 
and need more water for irrigation.  
In response to this question of whether the new water allocation rule has been re-assessed 
recently and is appropriate for the current crop water need in the region the agricultural water 
agent responded:  
“This is not a new regulation, in their initial permission it is stated to abstract no more than 
3000 hours in year, but it was not implemented because water was available and no one was 
preventing farmers, but now the government wants them to stick to this rule”. 
The agency agrees that there is an implementation problem for this scheme to be accepted by 
farmers, but on the other hand the agency has to deal with groundwater over-abstraction.  
In response to the following statement by the researcher that: “Farmers understand that 
groundwater level is decreasing but their concern is that by having 8 hours water instead of 
24 hours the formula cannot be adopted by them.” 
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The agent responded: 
“Yes, it’s because they have been used to traditional water right system, any time they wanted 
can switch on the wells and now reducing to 8 hours will definitely make some problems for 
them”. 
The initial estimation of groundwater abstraction rate needs to be re-evaluated because it’s not 
compatible with current need. As one farmer in Fakhreh village (2013) stated: 
“Farmers cannot cope, government has to evaluate any new policy first with farmers and 
then set the rules, we cultivate based on our water right and if the policy interferes with this 
we cannot accept it...” 
Many farmers stated that this state-oriented policy of water right allocation can affect their 
historical water rights, and that the new irrigation systems are neither suitable nor effective for 
a particular region. State control of groundwater resources and implementation of restriction 
rules on water rights could potentially disturb the water allocation mechanism in every 
farming system in Iran, and add extra uncertainty and increase the inequity among farmers to 
access water (see Chapter 7).  
 
6.3.3. The Impact of Modern Pump Technology on Groundwater Resources and its 
Failure to Bring Equity  
Infrastructural changes in irrigation systems and methods in Iran, and particularly the 
transition from Qanat systems to pump-well technology, represents a significant 
transformation of irrigation arrangements and water distribution mechanisms. 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, introducing pump well technology has led to significant 
agricultural expansion and rural developments in most villages of Iran. The expansion of 
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agriculture after the introduction of tube-wells and population growth has changed the 
regional groundwater economy. 
The pump also brought flexibility in accessing groundwater resources and was adaptable to 
uncertain precipitation patterns (see more in Chapter 3). Communal construction of tube-wells 
also made it relatively easy to fix and share the costs and all these factors together initially 
made the pump technology successful in Iran.  
 
It has required the modification by farmers of the social relation and water allocation rules at 
a local level to enable them to adapt to new abstraction method and water delivery systems.  
Kamash (2012) argues that the technology is interconnected with the history, culture and 
norms in each society. Thus technology cannot be separated from history and society, and it is 
the main factor shaping people’s identities, to the extent that modifying technology means 
changing peoples’ behaviour and characteristics (Kamash, 2012). 
As defined by Morgan (1990, p. 160), the fluidity is recognized by the adaptability, flexibility 
and receptivity of a technology. In Iran the expansion of tube-well technology was due to a 
significant rise in irrigation practices and the need for agricultural expansion. Hence their 
construction was related to the apparent need to increase water supply for agriculture. 
Therefore pumps could be seen to hold some features of fluidity and ‘social appropriateness’.  
Farmers all had to survive and compete for a greater share of groundwater resources. If 
circumstances and water availability allowed, farmers would not have changed the traditional 
Qanat system.  As farmers in Kashan expressed their vision on introducing pumps to the 
agricultural system they emphasise that:  
“Agriculture has expanded not under Qanat but through construction of deep wells” 
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The introduction of wells to expand agriculture, created short-term economic benefits for 
most farmers but has also led to a number of problems (see Chapter 3). By introducing the 
motor pump technology, groundwater has become the main source of water. It is a more 
resilient supply source in the drought prone region of Kashan, and sustains the livelihood and 
income of the poor. Researchers have described how “Groundwater development usually 
helps to improve the socio-economic status of the poor to a greater extent than traditional 
surface water”, because it needs much less initial investment to dig a new well, and it can be 
drilled inside the farmland (Dep Roy and Shah, 2003). However, as it was not adapted to the 
irrigation culture of Iran and was not managed in a sustainable manner, the benefits are very 
short-term. The fact that the cost of pumping has increased and the abstraction rate has been 
controlled by the state has left poor farmers more vulnerable. As pumping costs have 
increased the costs of irrigation have likewise increased and government subsidies have been 
removed.  
Some of complaints refer to the governance system towards which the farmers were critical: 
“In each period the national policy has some faults, around 15 years ago they wanted to 
expand agriculture so during Rafsanjani presidential period they invested a lot on pistachio 
cultivation under modern irrigation systems and supported these rich farmers and the 
capitalism! We are confused about their policies. They make rich people richer and poor 
poorer.” 
Farmers indicate that the main reason for the collapse of Qanat was the construction of 
numerous wells which were very close to each other.  The farmers’ assumption is that wells 
lower the water table and thus groundwater does not flow in the Qanat. An inappropriate 
governance system over irrigated agricultural system in the country, which coincides with the 
Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, has reduced controlling mechanisms on natural 
resources management in general (Azkia and Hooglund, 2011).  This is also due to the focus 
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of water policy worldwide that has prioritized development of water supply sources rather 
than establishing water demand management over past decades (see Chapter 2). Managing 
water demand has not been the central objective, thus provoking water wastage (Rogers, 
2002). Within 15 years of the construction of numerous tube-wells and reflectance of the 
sustainability of the scheme, today water quantity and quality is not enough to maintain 
existing agricultural activities.  
At a local scale this increased uneven water distribution and accessibility has greater social 
and economic disadvantages for farmers.  Inequity in access to water resources is the main 
social disadvantage that has been initially brought by pump technology. While richer farmers 
have sufficient capital to purchase more land and water rights, their production levels and 
revenues are much higher than poor farmers who have limited access to water. Higher 
revenues mean that rich farmers can easily pay the ever increasing expenses for labour, 
electricity bills and obtaining loans to adopt modern irrigation facilities. Richer farmers 
purchased water for a cheaper price in the past. They bought even more water right from 
poorer farmers to improve their land and grow crops such as pistachio. Moreover, although 
rich farmers work individually, farming is not their main job in comparison with poor 
farmers. Thus the high number of shared owners of wells has reduced the benefits each can 
gain and reduced their income/ ultimate profits.  
Differing access to groundwater resources, has divided farmers in the region into small-scale 
and large-scale farmers. Large-scale farmers with higher water rights and lands are eligible 
for receiving governmental loans and can cultivate industrial crops such as pistachio, under 
modern irrigation facilities. 
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A large-scale farmer in Rijen village (2013) who produces pistachio to industrial level stated 
that: 
“A large-scale farmer cultivating only pistachio, mono cropping is due to that they have 
another job. Although their water right will be reduced but because they are financially able 
to purchase more lands thus their water right will be increased. Reduced groundwater level 
and water quality are the main limiting factor for land expansion and continuing agricultural 
activities for large-scale farmers in Kashan and will not be profitable enough”. 
 
Small-scale farmers, who cannot afford to purchase more water rights rather than keeping 
their historic allocated water, believe that richer farmers who have better access to water 
sources have created a level of corruption within recent years. Groundwater is less susceptible 
to corruption in comparison to large-scale surface schemes; however groundwater when it is 
the only source of water can be corrupted for use in other sectors such as energy or industry. 
Regarding inequity in access to groundwater resources, farmers urge that the government 
should interfere and control corruption, that primarily committed by richer farmers.  
One small-scale farmer in Ali-Abad (2013) stated that: 
“Government should stick to rules for such investors, they must not let rich farmers to buy 
more than 24 hours water right in one well. If he wants more water he must invest in a new 
well, so other farmers will be able to work with more freedom, he must not ride on poorer 
farmers”. 
When one rich farmer purchases water rights from poor farmers the number of water right 
sharers is reduced and he captures their jobs and removes them from farming. Under this 
situation other share farmers have to accept anything he suggests or decides as he has the 
most water right. 
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6.3.4. Shifting agricultural costs and responsibilities to farmers under current 
governance 
As part of the contemporary water governance regime in Iran, the government tries to 
promote a decentralized management approach and to improve engagement of stakeholders in 
the irrigation management practices.  
Regarding this, one of the main strategies is to transfer management responsibility to water 
users by adopting an Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) framework (see Chapter 2). The 
effort has been started and has largely applied to most agricultural regions in Iran. However 
this framework will only be successful with increased participation of resource users into 
management-decision processes, but it will be impossible unless the government establishes a 
new relationship with the resource owners. 
Under the new governance structure, the government has attempted to reduce support for 
farmers to reduce expenditure, and gradually transfer irrigation management to farmers. 
However, I argue here that the adoption of this policy requires capacity building among small-
scale farmers who are still dependent on governmental financial support for implementation 
and maintenance of their irrigation technologies. The policy of decentralization seems to just 
shift the agricultural costs to poorer farmers, as well as the cost of installation and 
maintenance of the recently introduced technologies, without sufficient financial support, 
education and establishment of capacity building among local farmers through the local 
institutions. From this argument, it can be concluded that the government is not the final 
arbitrator for groundwater irrigation management and sustainability. Managing groundwater 
resources requires collaborative efforts between local farmer communities and responsive 
governmental organizations. While the role of government’s financial supports in developing 
countries is crucial, farmers also need to have their own self-regulated strategies and 
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alternative management solutions. The role of government should be eliminated and most 
responsibilities be transferred to the local institutions and farmers’ communities. However, it 
is essential that the government still provide financial supports and infrastructures for poor 
systems, as well as trying to establish effective institutions to engage farmers in management 
decisions and empower local capacity to undertake parts of governmental roles and 
responsibilities.  
Within the past few decades, numerous cooperative organisations have been created to 
improve the role of local users in decision-making (Azkia and Hooglund, 2011). However, 
these cooperatives are governmental organisations. The effectiveness of these cooperatives is 
very low and as local farmers in Kashan stated (2012), they are officially not interacting with 
local farmers’ need. Based on Balali’s study (2009) 22% of farmers indicated that traditional 
cooperative systems exist in their villages. However one of the main reasons why farmers quit 
these cooperative organizations was because of land reform, scattering lands resulted from the 
land inheritance mechanism that divide land pieces among inheritors, declining of Qanats and 
other local issues (Balali, 2009).  
Farmers in Iran have positive attitudes towards the possibilities of increasing collective action 
in comparison with 20 years ago (Balali, 2009). They are also agreed that government has 
improved farmers’ participation in various rural issues. However the main remaining problem 
is the lack of trust and a top-down governance approach. This highlights the necessity for 
early engagement of farmers in the introduction of a project and during its implementation. 
Balali (2009) found that because resource users are not included in the design of the irrigation 
management projects, they have not adequately participated in the management process and 
could not build trust in the governmental schemes. This lack of trust will consequently reduce 
the success and effectiveness of the project.  
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One of the main shortcomings in the water governance system of Iran is that in the absence of 
strong local institutions and the mechanisms to enhance farmers’ capacity (through actively 
engaging them in the local management decisions) achieving any adaptable and effective 
management solution will not be possible. The governmental enforcing mechanism to put 
pressure on farmers for accepting their schemes (such as threat to reduce farmers’ water right 
to one-third of the current amount), has only raised dissatisfaction and destroyed trust and any 
sense of cooperation with local governmental agencies.  
For most projects, because government support is insufficient, farmers have to provide 
funding to install new irrigation systems. A member of the water agency stated that: 
“In some of the irrigation efficiency projects, farmers are responsible for the costs but if we 
be financially able we will try to assist them”. 
Some natural phenomena such as hail, droughts and floods can significantly affect farmers 
and reduce crop production by up to 3 to 4 ton per year. However, the mechanism of 
insurance has changed. The government entitles loans only to the farmers who can certainly 
return it. Therefore, the government requires two guarantors with official jobs to guarantee 
farmers who want to be entitled to receive loans. One small-sale framer believes that: 
“Large-scale farmers have influence in Jihad agricultural agency, the loans mainly go to 
large-scale farmers who produce and contribute to the national economy”. 
Removal of subsidies from chemical fertilizers, due to environmental protection, as well as a 
reduction in some government expenditure has led to a considerable increase in fertiliser 
prices. In the past cheap and available chemical fertilizers were widely used by farmers which 
in the long-term can accumulate in plants, affecting crops and soil as well as human health. 
Chemical fertilizers are now offered by the ‘free market’ and farmers can only receive 
subsidized fertilizers in specific amounts set by the government for every individual. 
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“Recently government has stopped supporting agriculture, I do not know maybe it wants to 
remove agriculture from here, they left us all on our own and we have to manage all by 
ourselves”. 
The management transfer, instead of sharing responsibilities and transferring part of the 
power from the governmental bodies to the local farmers, has mainly shifted the costs to 
farmers who lack strong local institutions. Shifting the costs to farmers and privatization of 
services are aimed to reduce governmental expenses.  For the last 15 years, particularly after 
the government of Iran decided to cut part of its major financial support to local farmers as a 
national policy, for many year farmers in Kashan were not supported by subsidised water and 
energy (Nattagh, 1986). In a situation when government does not support or cut its financially 
supported technologies, farmers would not afford to collectively purchase and install modern 
equipment (e.g. to install sub-surface piped water) (see more in Chapter 7). 
 
6.4. The factors influencing farmers’ adoption of a Governmental Irrigation Schemes  
Apart from water scarcity problems and the governance issues, which make difficulties for 
farmers in Kashan and act as barriers for their participation in governmental irrigation policy 
schemes, there are other factors that affect farmers’ participatory behaviours. From analyzing 
interviews some of the main influential factors for farmers’ acceptance of new technologies or 
governmental schemes are explored and discussed in this section. The main schemes 
discussed here are the ‘Tooba’ scheme and associated policies (e.g. installation of drip 
irrigation system, reduced water right and land integration), changing cultivation pattern to 
pistachio, installation of piper-water irrigation systems.  
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To make the read easier, the outcomes of interviews and the analysis of the main findings 
from conducting a RPG simulation are synthesized in this chapter, and all the influential 
factors in accepting governmental schemes by farmers in Kashan are classified and discussed 
under different headings in the next section.  
In addition to this, some of the underlying reasons for farmers to reject particular 
governmental scheme of drip irrigation system which is elaborated from conducting a RPG 
exercise, will be discussed further in Chapter 7. These factors could not be simply elicited by 
conducting interviews with farmers. Although interviews can provide trustworthy outcomes, 
the role-play simulation processes can stimulate farmers’ imagination by associating 
particular role for a farmer and therefore elicit their deeper knowledge more effectively. The 
interviews can address the concerns of farmers for the current situations or the histories of 
traditional practices in the past. However, the scenarios of the future irrigation management 
within social simulation exercises can reveal farmers’ thoughts and future perspectives 
towards different irrigation management alternatives. Instead the participatory simulations 
exercise revealed more insightful outcomes and generated wider perspectives from the local 
farmers (see Chapter 7).  
The factors which discourage farmers to participate in irrigation schemes are also mainly due 
to poverty, the lack of financial affordability to invest in a project, the lack of agreements and 
existing cultural differences, the lack of efficiency and coordination by rural institutions and 
unsuitability of the project for farmers in term of its profitability. On the other hand, poverty 
is the main factor underpinning capacity for farmers’ adaptation to water shortage conditions. 
Balali (2009) stated that poverty and land ownership status are the main driving forces that 
shape farmers behavior and actions.   
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In the following section, different influential factors in accepting or rejecting governmental 
schemes/technologies by farmers are summarised and classified under different headings. 
These factors include: biophysical adaptability, economic return, cultural and social 
adaptability, which are analysed from the empirical findings and appropriate literatures.  
 
6.4.1. Biophysical Adaptation 
As stated earlier, the shift in water supply systems and the transformation of water abstraction 
mechanisms has led to significant changes in the irrigation and distribution infrastructure in 
Iran. However, government policy particularly over the last 30 years has mainly focused on 
improving irrigation efficiency by introducing different irrigation technologies and by 
encouraging farmers to adopt devices to control abstraction. Empirical evidence (e.g. Morris, 
2006) suggests that farmers do not accept many of these policies, controlling mechanisms, or 
technologies, as in most cases these are not adaptable to the local circumstances. Introducing 
any new technology (e.g. drip irrigation method) requires social and material adaptability and 
the most successful technologies are those that are flexible to the existing social, biophysical 
and cultural circumstances (Kamash, 2012). Bijker et al. (1989, p.13), argue that 
technological choices often require an iterative process of negotiation between members of 
each group to eventually shape and confirm the best technological options. Implementation of 
each technological solution may bring different advantages or problems for local users; 
therefore it is important that the technology be evaluated and adaptable to different aspects 
such as ecological, social and cultural conditions (see Kamash 2012, page 28). 
The climatic and biophysical characteristics of a region are also influential factors in adoption 
of a particular irrigation technology. For example, in my case study area, reducing water 
228 
 
abstraction rates to one-third of their current amount, farmers outlined their main reasons for 
rejecting this scheme. According to the farmers’ viewpoints given the harsh regional climate, 
it is very difficult to use less irrigation water. At present, they are irrigating continually (for 
almost 24 hours a day) and yet they still cannot achieve a good yield, and so question how 
they might produce more with much less water. 
Therefore, regarding the adaptability of drip irrigation systems to the regional climate, one 
farmer in Ali-Abad village (2013) said:  
“This region is a desert land and it must be irrigated with flood method and consumes lots of 
water because the region is hot, and the soil is clay, so within 10 days we should irrigate 
again” 
The other main limitation to adopting the drip system is that it is only suitable for wells where 
the electrical conductivity is less than 3000 μScm-1. Where water has a higher EC, the drip 
system becomes blocked by sediment, and the EC of groundwater in most villages in the 
Kashan plain is above this threshold. 
Another farmer in Ali-Abad village (2013) stated that the permitted water abstraction amount 
and the rate by which farmers’ must reduce their abstraction hours copies the practice in other 
countries in the region, and it has not carefully assessed based on the basis of local water 
needs and climate. Finally, farmers suggest that water rights should be gradually reduced by 
the government, as a sudden reduction will present many financial problems. 
It is evidenced that although farmers have struggled to maintain traditional water right 
systems, which could potentially ensure equity in access to groundwater resources, some 
government policies, such as encouraging drip irrigation systems, affect existing water right 
regimes in ways that present particular difficulties for poorer farmers as discussed earlier in 
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this chapter. Farmers were able to explain how drip irrigation systems were inappropriate for 
this landscape, particularly as given their scattered land holdings, it is not feasible to use drip 
systems to irrigate pistachio trees.  However, in the role playing game (will be discussed in 
Chapter 7) farmers explained that the structure of the recent sub-surface piped water scheme, 
particularly the water outlets matches the time slots of their traditional water allocation 
mechanism, which could make this irrigation technology more acceptable for local farmers in 
Kashan. On the other hand, farmers who were interviewed mentioned that the other 
advantages of using pipe-lined water (apart from increasing water availability) are that pipes 
do not allow grass and other plants to grow inside the tubes and block the waterway. The 
pipes are therefore not damaged under exposed sunlight and evaporation losses are much less 
in comparison with cement canals. 
 
6.4.2. Economic Advantages/Returns 
Economic factors act as both incentives (in terms of providing higher agricultural revenue) as 
well as barriers (financial constrains) for farmers’ acceptance and adoption of a particular 
irrigation scheme or technology. Under water scarcity and reduced farmers’ income 
(Forouzani and Karami, 2010), any new system that could improve the production level by 
increasing water availability for farmers is an advantage and this would help the technology to 
be accepted by farmers (i.e. acceptances of sub-surface piped irrigation systems, see more in 
Chapter 7). On the other hand, farmers’ financial constraints can affect their choices of 
particular scheme or irrigation technology. Here, I argue that financial status of farmers 
should be considered when introducing a governmental scheme. The government is required 
to provide sufficient financial supports or loans for farmers, based on the correct estimation of 
the project’s cost.  In the region, due to the water scarcity problem, the area of cultivated land 
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has fallen, and farming costs have increased (because of electric pump, using machinery, 
removed subsidies, etc.). This has caused more financial difficulties for Iranian farmers to 
invest in suggested irrigation infrastructure to improve their efficiency and income.  
The empirical findings of conducting interviews showed that farmers are aware of the 
importance of sustainable abstraction and irrigation practices. However, their poverty status 
(mainly as a consequence of their small and fragmented land ownership) is the main obstacle 
for them to consider the sustainability of their actions. As mentioned before in this chapter, 
amongst local communities increasing agricultural productivity varies according to the type of 
farmer (their land-sizes), farm location and access to water supplies and farmers’ financial 
status to install modern agricultural technologies. Wealthier farmers who can afford to 
purchase more water rights are usually interested to consolidate the fragmented lands to 
expand their land size and adopt modernized irrigation facilities to enhance their valued crops 
and economic revenues. Regarding poorer farmers who own small or medium-scale land 
sizes, the acceptance and adoption of new technologies are problematic (see Chapter 7). 
 
Farmers are faced with economic uncertainty in their agricultural production because the state 
does not provide sufficient support for capital investment and due to water scarcity in the 
region, there is a significant barrier for farmers to adopt new technologies which might have 
economic risk for them.  
The other influential economic factor in accepting a particular scheme is the crop values, 
which are the most important aspect related to farmers’ agricultural revenue. As farmers 
became more educated and wealthier they move from low value to higher value or cash crops 
(as water availability increased through expansion of private tube-wells led to silent 
revolution- see Chapter 2). This has compelled them to use more efficient technologies and 
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have national or regional market for their production (Rogers, 2002).  However, this has only 
occurred for wealthier farmers: medium or small-scale farmers in Iran have had to retain their 
traditional crop pattern to sustain their livelihood and they could not join the industrial 
agriculture. Recently government has sought to persuade poorer farmers to partly change their 
cultivation patterns to crops using less water; aiming to conserve groundwater resources in the 
region (this scheme also requires land integration by farmers).  
Regarding the government plan to encourage a change in cultivation patterns to pistachio 
trees, one major consequence would be the associated changes that would occur in the life of 
local farmers whose livelihood depends on short-term crops such as wheat and barley. It 
seems that small-scale farmers adopt an economic strategy based on the profitability of 
individual cultivated crops. One farmers’ strategic behaviour in choosing appropriate crop 
pattern, stated by a farmer in Rijen village (2013) that: 
“Our strategy is to see which crop is profitable for us in a short term, if it has economic 
return then we plant it otherwise we don’t follow governmental crop pattern. Because we 
have to pay for everything so it must be profitable for ourselves. Officials just express their 
request blindly but they do not stick to their promises to support us”. 
 
To implement new irrigation systems provided by government, farmers, particularly the 
poorer farmers, expect and need more financial aid or support. However, as their production 
does not contribute to the national economy, the government has cut the major financial 
supports and allocates the budget to large-scale industrial cultivation. 
“If they want to remove agriculture we are not disagree, but they should give us another job, 
we are ready for work. If our small-scale farming does not profit the country they must 
provide industrial job for us we need to earn money, but we need financial support. Our kids 
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left farming because in industry every month they are paid much higher, but in farming no 
one will pay them”. 
 
However, some farmers’ concern is that by removing agriculture from this area in the future 
and introducing industrial activities, for majority of them particularly older ones sustaining 
livelihood will be problematic and leaves them with a catastrophic situation, as they do not 
have any experience in working at industry.  
The other main governmental policy, as stated previously is to reduce water rights to one-third 
of their current volume, thus the economic disadvantage that can bring for farmers is the main 
barriers for accepting this policy. One farmer indicated that the government would not give 
farmers any choice and the scheme would have significant economic disadvantage for small-
scale farmers. One farmer complained that: 
“When one litre fuel for the motor bike costs 400 Tomans, every day we travel between our 
lands 2 or 3 times, if we pay let’s say 2000 Tomans per day for the fuel (and all other 
expenses) and if the government wants to reduce our water right, our harvest and revenue 
will diminish and we have to quit farming and leave the region (70% of the rural livelihood is 
from the agriculture).  For example if a farmer has to irrigate with 2 hours water per 5 days, 
it would not be profitable for him to travel between his lands…” 
 
The adoption of this policy by small-scale farmers is not adaptable to their economic 
situation, and the reduce in water right means significant reduction in their agricultural 
revenue, which leave them with no choice but abandoning farming practices and migrating to 
other cities searching for new jobs. 
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6.4.3. Social and Cultural Adaptability 
Flexibility of technologies to local irrigation traditions and allocation rules is a crucial factor. 
Many cases exemplify that technological solutions when they were not socially acceptable 
could not be widely adopted (Pannell et al., 2006). The importance of social norms (in my 
study, such as water rights and allocation rules) is a key factor in influencing communities in 
acceptance of new technology or practices (Minato et al., 2010). However, there is a gap in 
understanding different social aspects related to groundwater irrigation management and 
governance (Mitchell et al., 2011). 
As stated earlier, it is essential to consider social and cultural factors when adopting a new 
scheme or technology. Issues such as water right and allocation mechanism, as well as 
cultivation pattern and landholding systems are historical circumstances which are rooted in 
farmers’ local culture and social norms which creates sense of social capital among them to 
cooperate and trust each other and the local agencies (see Chapter 7). Changes in any of these 
conditions will be consequential. 
When I asked an agent the reason why farmers do not accept a drip system, given that 
government loans are provided to encourage their implementation, the agent replied that 
“farmers are afraid of committing any risks and also cultural aspects are very important and 
influential in this case”. For example, one controversial element of the drip method is that 
farmers assume that they must irrigate crops with less water than their water rights, and this as 
a cultural factor affects their selection of drip irrigation method. In response to this question 
that despite Qanat systems that could provide free and abundant water for irrigation, drip 
system may create confusions about water allocation measures among farmers (as a cultural 
factor), a manager in agricultural jihad agency responded:  
He added his opinion about the main reason that farmers reject drip system: 
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“In flood system (under Qanat), because farmers used to see 5-10 cm water on top of soil now 
they don’t accept drip method, they say that, tree fails. Maybe under drip system, long rooted 
trees fail (because of insufficient water seepage through soil layers), it is based on farmers’ 
experience but scientifically drip system is approved, and for their new crops they can adopt 
this system”. 
 
The other crucial factor that has been evidenced in the case study area is that the technologies 
or policy schemes are not localised (refer to Lankford, 2006) and therefore the rules are not 
adaptable to a particular climate or to the socio-economic conditions of the region. For 
example regarding changing cultivation pattern one farmer in Ali-Abad (2013) anxiously 
emphasised that farmers would regret changing the cultivation pattern to mono-cropping 
within a few years. He stated that: 
“I am not against pistachio cultivation but I’m saying that farmers get regret in 10 years. 
Now farmers say that cultivating tree is easier but if all cultivate pistachio, farmers would not 
bother to plant any wheat. Because the main livelihood is bread, if we do not have anything 
we can just eat bread but pistachio is an economic crop and cannot feed us. Under that 
situation, government may import more wheat.... I think government is trying to make this 
region economic or industrial…” 
 
To emphasise the important role of their historical cultivation pattern, which has particularly 
sustained their income, one farmer in Ali-Abad (2013) indicated that: 
“The land value is not that much, if the land be under barley, wheat, alfalfa or even empty 
land, farmer can rent the water right and obtain some revenue, with pistachio tree farmer 
would not be able to rent the land, this scheme is particularly not suitable to be adopted by 
older/poorer farmers”. 
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The change in cultivation pattern scheme neglects/threatens the traditional sustainable 
livelihood, which emphasises the integration of agriculture and husbandry activities. Farmers 
historically used groundwater resources as resilient options to reduce the risk-levels of water 
shortage. Traditionally agriculture and animal husbandry are interlinked, creating a resilient 
system for vulnerable farmers, and any minor impacts has a significant impact on other 
activity. One farmer explained that: “for example, if someone wants to have husbandry he 
must have alfalfa or barley production beside it”. Farmers indicated that husbandry has 
reduced because the price of fodder has increased (unstable market for barley) and it is not 
profitable to continue husbandry. The majority of farmers find it unprofitable if they do not 
keep farming and husbandry along with each other. It seems that having husbandry can 
significantly help traditional farmers to pay for agricultural costs. Thus retaining the existing 
diverse cultivation pattern represents a more strategic and resilient option for farmers rather 
than changing to an industrial crop such as pistachio. Crop selection, when performed by 
farmers, is undertaken on the basis of water availability and climate, also cultural tradition 
and economic need. Changing cultivation patterns are one of the strategies that farmers use 
when one crop has low yields; however the crop they choose must be adapted to saline and 
water deficit conditions. Government attempts to introduce new crops into the region are 
based on observations of a few large-scale farmers’ experience in pilot studies, but these crop 
patterns usually differ from the majority of farmers’ circumstances, who are practicing small-
scale farming, and have financial limitations. 
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6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the main challenges in groundwater irrigation management and 
practices in the arid region of Kashan from local farmers’ perspectives. The main challenges 
that farmers in Kashan are facing include: differing perspectives on the causes of water crisis, 
lack of agreement on appropriate solutions, and differing definitions of irrigation efficiency.  
In this chapter, it was also emphasised the necessity for articulating local knowledge and local 
solutions in management-decisions in the region. The chapter argues that by considering the 
role of local irrigation culture and social economic factors in shaping current water 
management regimes and existing obstacles for farmers’ participation in governmental 
schemes, there is a possibility to develop a more integrated approach to irrigation 
management in the region.  There is a need for more local adaptive management solutions to 
respond to shortages in governmental financial support. These kinds of solutions will only 
become more necessary in the light of an uncertain climatic (e.g. increased temperature and 
reduced precipitation) and socio-political future. The climate variability, population growth 
and changes in irrigation management system are reflected in the scenarios that formulated by 
local farmers in Kashan; the scenarios are tested and evaluated within WEAP model (see 
Chapter 5).   
My interviews with farmers for this study, suggested that the irrigation technologies used to 
improve efficiency need to match the definitions which exist amongst farmers. They want to 
increase the accessibility of available water to their lands and to maintain their production 
level and this is the case for particularly small-scale farmers. There are also challenges related 
to governance issues in the region, which have consequently resulted in shifting agricultural 
costs and responsibilities on farmers. Because of a lack of capacity building programmes to 
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empower farmers’ decision-making abilities, this has increased the social and financial 
constraints facing poorer farmers.  
This chapter also reflected on some of the main influential factors on farmers’ decision to 
select particular irrigation scheme or technology. These included the adaptability of the 
irrigation management solution in terms of its biophysical, economic, social and cultural 
adaptabilities within the local irrigation context. To introduce new irrigation schemes or new 
technologies there is a need for the system to be tested and evaluated through pilot studies and 
after observation of the suitability of the project, it could be implemented at wider scale. The 
adaptability of the irrigation technology to the dry climatic conditions, the traditional culture 
and social norms of water allocation mechanisms must be carefully considered, in order to 
work with, rather than against farmers’ prevailing values and behaviours. An in depth 
understanding of these challenges, and the main factors in implementation of successful 
irrigation management scheme in the region, points towards the need for more adaptive and 
participatory management process for irrigation management practices in Iran.  According to 
the study’s findings (further discussed in Chapter 7), there is good potential for farmers at 
local level in Kashan village, to adopt participatory irrigation management. Farmers are 
willing to improve collective action and they accept strategies which are adaptable to their 
irrigation practices to improve water use efficiency. The following chapter proposes a 
transition in the Iranian governance structure towards more community-based and adaptive 
approaches for future sustainable water and irrigation management.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Towards Adaptive Agricultural Water Management in Iran 
Introduction  
In this chapter, I discuss the outcomes of designing and testing Role-play simulation I refer as 
the ‘Irrigation Management Game’ (IMG) with Iranian farmers.  Based on the outcomes of 
the IMG, I will argue that there is feasibility and potential among local Iranian farmers for 
conducting a successful participatory management approach. Designing and testing an 
irrigation management simulation exercise (Chapter 4) has revealed that local farmers in 
Kashan villages have the capacity and interest for participation in a more participatory and 
collaborative management processes. Farmers proved to have an influential role in 
management decision-making and policy evaluation. My findings support my 
recommendation for enhancing participatory and adaptive management practices, particularly 
in an authoritative system of Iran for the future sustainable groundwater management.  In this 
chapter, I will also point out that existence of local management institutions can greatly 
facilitate communication and collective action among local farmers.  
After expanding my discussion on the outcomes of the Role Play irrigation management game 
(IMG), in the next section, I will highlight that the combination of some of the factors of role 
play simulation exercise (e.g. scenarios) with the physical hydrological model (as part of the 
method development process), could widen perspectives and foster more dialogue amongst 
farmers. This collaborative effort has revealed that this intervention can open a new way of 
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engaging policy considerations and managerial perspectives into the creation of more flexible 
management approaches and alternative options. Overall, farmers suggested that this can pave 
the way for future collaboration between locals and agencies in the region.  
In this chapter, I will demonstrate how participatory management processes as mediation 
provide better opportunities and more reflective results for management practices, under 
which the management can move towards establishment of more participatory and adaptive 
approaches. In conclusion, this chapter deliberates the conditions under which building 
successful participatory and adaptive management for groundwater resources at local villages 
of Iran could be promoted.  
 
7.1. Participatory RPG as a Democratic Approach  
As discussed in chapter 2, groundwater management in developing countries is faced with 
several managerial and administrative challenges. There is a gap in literatures on using 
different participatory research tools/methods, for promoting adaptive water management in 
countries under state-led governance regimes. Particularly the Iranian literature on using 
participatory management approaches for water and irrigation management practices at local 
level is very limited, and studies are usually undertaken by researchers or governmental 
agencies. The implementation of adaptive participatory research methods employing 
simulation games in developing countries therefore appears to confront some obvious 
challenges (Mitchel, 2009). In these countries the governance regime is usually state-based, 
structured in a top-down manner, and management approaches are in general resistant to 
change.  
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Participatory approaches to rural development have played an influential role since the 1970s, 
(Belshaw and Chambers 1973; Uphoff et al., 1979; Von Korff et al., 2010). As mentioned 
previously, it is important to bear in mind that when designing a participatory management 
tool, this process may not always lead to successful outcomes. Therefore in conducting a 
participatory method each process must be designed and adapted within a particular condition. 
The importance of context-specific circumstances is emphasised by several scholars (e.g. 
Stern and Fineberg 1996; Webler, 1999; Delli Carpini et al. 2004). It is through local-
managed systems run by local users that data can be manipulated to be used in a beneficial 
way. In this study, the attempt was to design such a process which is developed based on local 
knowledge and the particular socio-cultural circumstances of Iran.   
The particular value and effectiveness of participatory tools within authoritative governance 
regimes remains underexplained. My study therefore uses the case of natural resource 
management in Iran to examine the capability, usefulness and limitations of conducting local-
based participatory research methods for groundwater management.  By consulting with local 
farmers in the villages of Kashan city, I designed a suitable participatory tool that was mainly 
sketched and run by the local farmers.   
7.2. Participatory Simulation Exercise: Implementation and Outcomes  
The development of an innovative participatory IMG (Chapter 4) was aimed at eliciting 
knowledge from local farmers and farmers’ evaluation of different irrigation policy schemes 
at local scale. The findings indicate that there are feasibilities for some community-based 
rules and the underlying reasons why farmers reject particular drip irrigation system. I reflect 
on the use of RPG as a communication tool to share the differing perspectives of resource 
managers and users, and as a mediation tool to facilitate collective resource allocation 
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agreements, and ultimately create locally acceptable and feasible scenarios to improve 
irrigation efficiency which are also acceptable by the policy decision-makers in the region. 
My IMG included farmers, water agents, and academic experts, who offer various viewpoints, 
management goals, problems and incentives for collaboration for more deliberative 
discussions.  
In this self-designed IMG, the primary rules and understanding of the local system were 
drawn from information collected and the knowledge built from the conducted semi-
structured interviews and other complementary communication methods, including group 
discussions and in-depth interviews, to elicit farmers’ knowledge and a review of current 
irrigation schemes (see Chapter 4 and 6).  
Farmers cooperated as a team to map different resources in their irrigation system and to 
locate them as accurately as possible to their actual location on the field. In this regard, crop 
patterns, water canals, access road and tube-wells as well as the sketch map of the village was 
drawn by farmers themselves. It was observed that during this stage, farmers were excited, 
sometimes argumentative and they spent a relatively long time discussing in their local 
language to agree on how to locate different resources on the board.  At the start of the game 
session, as this was the first time such a participatory process has been conducted for them, 
they were unfamiliar with the roles and the process of the simulation. In their experience a 
similar attempt had been previously undertaken by officials to map their land holdings for a 
land integration scheme. Farmers indicated that officials took many hours to acquire 
information about their land and tube-wells locations and in the end there was no discussion 
or educational achievement for them. This experience led farmers initially to doubt the value 
of the IMG and contributing to the process, but during observation of the development of the 
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simple map of their field, they gained more interest in participating. In this IMG, farmers 
were actively engaged and cooperated within the communication and playing their assigned 
roles. They observed other farmers’ reactions and behavior through the session and listened to 
others’ viewpoints.  
At the end of the game, farmers indicated that this mapping and evaluation of different policy 
schemes was very useful and brought all their thoughts and opinions together. Farmers were 
interested in seeing more of the similar game design for the future and suggested that this 
could represent their actual water practices and irrigation problems, particularly regarding the 
difficulties that they faced in accepting new irrigation technologies. 
The findings from conducting the IMG (Chapter 4) are summarised under the following four 
headings, which I will explore in turn: 
I. Farmers’ knowledge and communication 
II. Incentives for collective action within behavioural analysis 
III. Formulation of scenarios  
IV. Reasons for rejecting drip irrigation system 
 
7.2.1. Farmers’ knowledge and communication 
Generally, natural resource games tend to represent a particular conceptual model with 
specific socio-ecological features, which triggers the imagination of game participants thereby 
facilitating discussion (Meadows, 2001). Farmers participated from the planning stage 
throughout the design and evaluation of the policies, within Role-play IMG exercise. The 
game design was realistic and thus could elicit different knowledge and a new behavioural 
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approach from farmers. As farmers had initially designed the game, they were aware of their 
irrigation functions and management, particularly as in the game they were assigned with 
their actual role. This greatly supported their involvement in different aspects of the 
simulation. They eventually reached common agreements and collectively decided which 
management approach is more sophisticated. The Irrigation Management Game (IMG) has 
greatly assisted me as researcher in collecting information to improve my understanding of 
the role of farmers in relation to other stakeholders. Here it was important to refer to the 
knowledge and understanding of the irrigation context which was provided through social 
research methods discussed in Chapter 6. This could also assist the researcher prior to the 
implementation of the IMG to identify the farmers’ main vulnerabilities in terms of existing 
challenges and difficulties. These are such as i. a significant reduction in groundwater levels 
which would increase the cost of pumping; ii. persistent drought; iii. increased cost of 
fertilizers and pesticides following removal of governmental subsidies, as well as the possible 
adaptation strategies available to farmers in response to a water crisis, and evaluating how 
farmers perceive sustainable agricultural practices in the future (see Chapter 6).  
As noted previously, in Iranian irrigation systems, water allocation is based on fixed time 
slots, which in most cases have been inherited by farmers (Chapter 3). In this system, local 
farmers manage water allocation and distribution rules through a process of negotiation and 
agreement, and in most cases it is not necessary to monitor farmers’ behaviour (Ostrom et al., 
1994). The irrigation and water allocation rules that were established for Qanat systems in the 
past also apply to motor-pump groundwater abstraction wells (see Chapter 3). Within the 
simulation which facilitated better visualisation to explain the irrigation rules, farmers further 
explained to the facilitator (researcher) that, based on the amount of water that can be 
abstracted from each tube-well, specific pieces of shared agricultural land are associated with 
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that well.  During the role-play simulation exercise, farmers in Ali-Abad village (2013) 
explained some of their rules as follows:  
“Based on each person’s water hour right, lands are divided between farmers.  Water right 
for each person was the main basis of assigning the lands to him ...Larger farms have more 
water rights allocated to them. A farmer, who in the past has paid more money to construct 
the Qanat, can get more water now”. 
 
Farmers indicated that after they changed their system from Qanat to motor-pump technology, 
the problems that arose in allocating water were eventually resolved through negotiation and 
by mutual agreement.  
As stated by one local farmer in Ali-Abad village in Kashan (2013):  
“The water right system in our tube-wells is the same as Qanat, each person receives his 
water turn based on 24 hours water allocation (we have sometimes slightly modified rules), 
but in Qanat the cost was lower...  
 
However, they emphasised that there was less conflict when they were largely using the Qanat 
system. It seemed that motor pump technology contributed to many difficulties in water 
allocation specifically relating to sharing the cost of repairing wells.  
They added that managing tube-wells created several difficulties for their daily management 
and practices: 
“Motor pumped tube-wells break frequently (it is collectively owned so we have to set some 
rules for its operation and maintenance), well chief should go after to fix the pump and after 
meeting with managerial panel and approval of the repairing cost (plus electricity bill) the 
cost is collected from all share owners (mainly in instalments)...”. 
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The farmers’ engagement in a social learning process has been improved throughout the 
simulation processes and the discussions. This is mainly occurred when farmers exchanged 
their knowledge and experiences and also listened to others. This provided higher quality 
discussion and understanding while Role-play simulation provided better opportunity to 
explain and reflect on different biophysical and social aspects of irrigation system context and 
farmers’ behaviour. This is consistent with the findings of (Von Korff et al., 2012; Muro and 
Jeffrey, 2012; Kuper et al., 2009), who indicated the generation of social learning through 
discussion process and during participant’s interactions by dialogues (see Chapter 2). In my 
case study, the social learning eventually developed when simulation was proceeding with 
more accurate and relevant information which was gathered from farmers’ perspectives. The 
visualization of farmers’ irrigation system and incorporating actual rules and responsibilities 
for the participants has assisted them in better explaining the rules and water allocation 
mechanism to the researcher, which was also educational and insightful for them (see more in 
section 7.2.2.). Also later social learning was generated among farmers when the outcomes of 
the modelled scenarios were discussed with them during the Companion modelling process 
(see section 7, 4). 
One farmer in Ali-Abad (2013) stated:  
“Describing these water and land management rules and farmers’ interactions in this system  
is a good reminder for us to realize that we have a strong bond and cooperation amongst 
ourselves; these small reciprocal acts and respecting rules by farmers have increased trust 
between us and have brought us closer for more collective action.” 
Some of the incentives that revealed the reasons for farmers’ collective action behaviours 
were further explored by conducting the role-play simulation, which I will reflect on in the 
following section. 
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 7.2.2. Farmers’ Incentives for collective action within behavioural analysis 
Some of the main incentives for farmers’ collective actions in irrigation system management 
have been reviewed within the worldwide literatures (see Chapter 2). Also some of the main 
influential factors for Iranian farmers’ participation in national or regional irrigation schemes 
and the existing obstacles (e.g. governance, economic, social and cultural issues) have been 
reviewed within the Iranian relevant literatures (see Chapter 3).   
One important outcome of the IMG was to reveal some of the main incentives in local 
communities for engaging in collective action. This outcome is consistent with the findings of 
several studies (Burton, 1989; Hagmann and Chuma, 2002; Bluemling et al., 2006), which 
have proven the role of simulation games as a powerful motive for farmers to join collective 
and participatory actions for their water resource management, and to elucidate their 
behavioural approaches. Some authors have developed particular tools and methods to design 
and implement simulation games to create close connection with participants and encourage 
them to collectively participate in the game. For example Lankford and Watson (2007) have 
used glass marbles in their River Basin Game, symbolising water to stimulate participants’ 
mind and make easier connection with them for better engagement. Incorporating farmers’ 
real roles and community-based rules can help replicate their behaviour successfully during 
the simulation, thus removing possible constraints on participant’s behaviour and their 
attitude to the game (Toth, 1988).  This was also the case when conducting IMG with farmers 
in Kashan, as they could express their actual behaviours and interactions with other farmers 
and also their conflicting attitudes regarding water allocation mechanism and fair distribution. 
During the game farmers showed awareness of the advantages of collective action as there is a 
long history of collective action in Iranian rural community management. Some of the 
existing incentives that have fostered collective action are outlined below. These include: 1. 
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fairness; the ability to create justice and adaptive rules; and the emergence of 2. social capital 
within traditional community rules and ethics. Farmers described and reflected on their 
traditional irrigation rules during the simulation, and used piped-water irrigation to explain 
how their water right system operates (indicating that the installation of the piped water 
system was exactly based on their water allocation time-slots- see more in this chapter). 3. 
economic motives also encourage farmers to make rational decisions and develop more 
efficient management strategies, in order to achieve higher profit for example by adopting 
pipe-line irrigation systems the water availability and thus production level will increase.  
In the following section, I elaborate further on the main incentives among Iranian farmers to 
participate in the collective irrigation management practices. This is one of the main outcomes 
of conducting an IMG with local farmers in Kashan villages. 
 
7.2.2.1. Fairness 
Inequalities in water allocation between large-scale and small-scale farmers in the region, 
have led to the inefficient use of groundwater as a common pool resource (see Chapter 6). 
This has led to conflicts between richer and poorer farmers that have reduced individual 
farmer’s incentives for collective action, which this is consistent with the findings of Ostrom 
et al. (1994). A wide range of local rules give clear guidelines for water allocation based on 
location, time, type of water user, and other factors, which are effective in resolving potential 
conflicts in water allocation in the case study area. In this study, the game simulation board 
provided an appropriate environment for farmers to describe and consider past conflicts, for 
example between head-end and tail-end farmers, who sought to cultivate land near tube-wells.  
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“A new scheme needs to include farmers’ agreement, because maybe one piece of their land 
is far away from wells or near wells, so their land should be divided into two pieces one close 
and one further from the wells. This is the main problem that farmers do not get to agreement 
for land integration and sub-surface pipelines, because they want lands near wells”. 
During the problem-solving process, farmers mutually negotiated the division and re-
distribution of land near the tube-well, such that they kept that part of their land close to the 
well and exchanged some of their land for farming further from the well. This ensured that 
other farmers also had land near the well and ensured fairness.  
A water rights system provides equity in accessing groundwater resources among farmers. 
Efficiency in water distribution systems is evaluated by comparing the water that has reached 
the final farmer with the water that is lost by seepage through the irrigation system (Roa-
Garcia, 2014). A farmer in Ali-Abad (2013) reflected on the new sub-surface piped irrigation 
scheme, while using the board game for explanation that: 
‘When a tail-end farmer had muddy canal, his water was wasting all the way, but when they 
installed sub-surface pipes, it is like the well is brought just nearby his land (it means no 
water wastage through the delivery canal), so it is much fairer and profitable”. 
This was noted by farmers as an educational point and has raised their knowledge about the 
advantages of this new irrigation scheme which can enhance their water availability that 
reaches their plots of lands. The simulation revealed that adoption of the sub-surface piped 
irrigation system can increase water use efficiency by providing farmers’ share of water right 
in a more equitable water distribution system. Kuper et al. (2012) suggests that this allows 
small-scale farmers to improve their agricultural income and livelihood which is consistent 
with our findings. 
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7.2.2.2. Social capital 
There has been much research on the potential impacts of social capital on collective action 
and the forging of sustainable institutions (Walters, 2002; Pretty and Ward, 2001). This 
suggests that where social networks are well-developed and an existing sense of community is 
strong, local groups with locally developed rules and sanctions are able to make better use of 
existing resources than individuals working alone or in competition. The simulations revealed 
some of the behavioural approaches and incentives for farmers to participate in collective 
action, consistent with existing theories on driving forces for collective action (Ostrom, 
1990). Farmers described how they will reach agreements within community-based rule 
setting. From this, it can be argued that informal local meetings could be more effective and 
productive in outcomes, rather than official institutions which enforce such meetings for 
farmers.  
For example, a farmer in Ali-Abad (2013) stated: 
“If farmers need to meet to discuss any issue, the Wells Manager organizes a meeting (e.g. to 
discuss installing pipelines). If we all do not reach an agreement we will not request pipes 
from the official agency”. 
This indicates the importance of collective decision for farmers which can be achieved in their 
local meetings and through negotiation and agreement to satisfy every farmer expectation. 
The researcher established a close relationship with local farmers in this case study area (see 
Chapter 4), as a result they were more comfortable in expressing their perspectives and 
feelings which they usually do not share with official bodies. When asked how they usually 
convince other farmers to engage in collective decision-making, one farmer in Ali-Abad 
village responded:  
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“We have almost become a big family after many years; most people in rural regions marry 
within the same village, so they must follow the community and the majority vote. They do not 
have any other options”. 
The farmers’ viewpoints on collective action and the powerful social capital that we observed 
between farmers in each community encourage mutual respect and respect for social norms, 
which are crucial factors in creating a successful institution.   
 
7.2.2.3. Economic motives 
Economic driving forces provide a key motivation in initiating locally-based collective action. 
Local farmers evaluate the cost and benefits of collective action based on economic, social or 
cultural issues. It has been observed that farmers make rational decisions based on their own 
economic position and thus farmers are persuaded to participate in collective action when they 
derive economic benefit (Olson, 1965), such as increasing their irrigation efficiency through a 
more appropriate water allocation systems. It is almost impossible for small scale farmers to 
achieve higher economic benefits from agricultural practices individually; hence collective 
action brings economic advantage. As a result of discussing the advantages that underground 
piped irrigation system can bring for farmers during IMG, some indicated that mainly due to 
the economic advantages that this system provides by increasing water availability and higher 
productivity, they will be willing to participate in installation of the pipes.   
As one farmer in Ali-Abad (2013) stated: 
“I had different (negative) views on this governmental new irrigation scheme, but today 
discussion on its economic benefits persuaded me to  replace my cement tube  canals with 
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more water efficient underground pipelines…it will save my time and effort to catch water 
and reduce the time taken for a farmer to receive water on his land.”   
The underlying factors that led farmers to reject modern irrigation scheme which is proposed 
under the top-down governance regime of Iran, were also explored during the game: 
One farmer stated that:  
“This is why we cannot accept drip irrigation system, because then we have to establish a 
shared water reservoir but each farmer wants to have his own authority on his 4-5 hours of 
water. The official Jahad Agriculture agency wants a farmer to manage his water in 
reservoir”. 
 
As part of the ‘Tooba’ scheme on installation of the drip irrigation system, farmers have to 
build small reservoirs on their lands. The establishment of a reservoir is followed by 
acceptance of a drip irrigation system, which requires farmers’ agreement to integrate their 
land and hence become eligible for a government loan. For small-scale farmers, construction 
of the reservoir also installation of drip systems and its maintenance is expensive, requiring 
collective ownership of the infrastructure to share their cost. And if farmers are to benefit 
from the application of a drip system, they need to consolidate their land holdings to obtain 
larger plots. The agreements for land integration to become eligible to receive loan from the 
government for installation of drip system requires extensive effort between farmers, which is 
not possible within a short period of time. 
Regarding the more affordable sub-surface pipe irrigation scheme and its economic 
advantages, one farmer in Ali-Abad village (2013) stated that:  
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“With pipelines the volume of water that reaches crops has increased and I can cultivate 
more. If government continues to give pipes for free we have enough lands to install them, it 
makes huge difference, I can irrigate with more available water and less costs”. 
 
Farmers indicated a preference for using piped irrigation systems over drip system, and in this 
case economic motives (for collective action) also encouraged farmers to make rational 
decisions and develop efficient irrigation management strategies. Otherwise if the scheme has 
higher economic return in the short-term and does not require massive financial investment, 
(e.g. piped-water technology) this could be feasible for small-scale and poorer farmers to 
accept the scheme.  
The land integration scheme which was pointed out particularly during the Role-play game, 
and the reasons for rejecting the scheme by farmers were explored, is one of the main barriers 
to improving economic returns for small-scale farmers. The main reason for rejecting, or 
reluctantly accepting, schemes such as land integration and changing crop pattern might be 
rooted in social and cultural aspects of a particular region (see next section). For example, 
historical water rights were adjusted to provide a fair distribution of water to small and 
scattered pieces of lands. Currently these small and scattered lands are economically 
disadvantageous for farmers, although farmers believe that this is a good scheme and are 
aware that integrated land can significantly reduce water wastage and facilitate the use of 
machinery, but land integration is hard for farmers to implement.  
In the IMG, farmers revealed that they find it hard to adopt land integration and thus are 
reluctant to adopt drip irrigation system for the following reasons: 
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1. Their cultivation patterns are different and are not matched in one plot, hence when 
they plant pistachio they cannot exchange it, 
2. The quality and size of their land are different, 
3. Each well-sharer must exchange land with each other and two farmers who have 
shares in two different wells cannot exchange their land because of the long distance 
to reach their tube-well, 
4. It is hard to reach agreement because land holdings are small and scattered,  
5. When water right owners are limited, land integration is more likely to be 
implemented (but in villages with more water right owners and with scattered land it is 
more difficult), 
6. Accessibility to water is the main issue to be agreed and resolved between farmers for 
land integration. 
 
If farmers are to benefit from the application of drip systems, they need to consolidate their 
land holdings to obtain larger plots. This requires considerable effort and agreement between 
them, which is not possible within a short period of time. The main motive for farmers to 
accept and implement the scheme is that by having larger plots of land, their income will 
increase and the scheme will provide more facilities for them.   
 
7.2.3. Formulation of Scenarios 
Farmers raised the issue of land integration and described how this scheme would increase 
their water use efficiency. This scenario was used for another round of the IMG by asking 
farmers to demonstrate how they thought land integration could reduce water wastage. The 
land integration project which is associated with the ‘Tooba irrigation scheme’ is considered 
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as a scenario in WEAP model to be tested. Farmers indicated that this scheme would only be 
possible if they agreed amongst themselves to consolidate their land holdings into one 
location, preferably closer to the well.  This would entail farmers with scattered land holdings, 
exchanging land with other farmers to retain a larger, single, plot of land (ghafis).  
As one local farmer in Ali-Abad village (2013) indicated: 
“Land integration has many advantages, when we did it the government supported us, my 
lands which is around 1 hectare were scattered in 5 to 7 different locations, but now they are 
all gathered into one piece. Pavement was also important, it’s now very comfortable to travel 
by cars between plots, we did not have it in the past and now it’s very good”. 
 
The farmers represented the process of land integration by attaching small pieces of green 
paper to their land to illustrate how it could function with water distribution canals. 
By proposing the land integration scheme as a new scenario, farmers expressed their 
perspectives. The tractor driver in particular, explained the difficulties and the advantages of 
land integration schemes. He demonstrated on the board game that scattered and small-size 
lands create difficulties for him to move between lands. Also, irrigators explained that farmers 
with scattered lands have difficulties to receive their water rights in time and need to travel 
between their scattered lands several times. 
A tractor driver in Ali-Abad (2013) reflected on a conflicting issue that occurs in their system, 
while using the board game to explain as below: 
“If two farmers have different time schedule for planting their crops, one might has already 
cultivated and the other just wants to start ploughing to prepare his land; under this 
condition, my work with the tractor damages the neighbor’s crops and this lead to conflicts. 
255 
 
The land integration which farmers need to cultivate the same crops in same plots can greatly 
resolve these conflicts.” 
The IMG has assisted tractor drivers to discuss and explain the main source and the reason for 
a conflict that occur between neighbor farmers. The debate around this issue was educational 
for participants as they discussed the advantage of land integration as the best resolution to 
reduce this conflict. 
An important result obtained from the game was the formulation of relevant scenarios (some 
of which were tested subsequently by a hydrologic model representing future trends in water 
availability) (Chapter 5).  
Specific scenarios that were obtained from farmers include: 
 Land integration to reduce water wastage through transmission canals; 
 Changing cultivation practices to increase the use of Pistachio (a drought resistant 
crop); 
 Using sub-surface piped-water to reduce water wastage and increase water availability 
for irrigation; and 
 Changing from agriculture to industrial development to increase farmers’ income. 
 
Based on the above mentioned scenarios that farmers agreed upon to be important, the WEAP 
model (Chapter 5) was used to model these scenarios. Some of the most relevant scenarios to 
farmers’ need (such as change in irrigation technology, under which specific amount of water 
usage is saved, land integration and estimated water saving provided by the governmental 
reports), was used in a form of storyline scenarios to be modelled and evaluated in WEAP 
(see Chapter 5) and further discussion will be presented in this chapter.  
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Ultimately, farmers produced their own evaluations of the various official irrigation schemes, 
and decisions on the best possible technical design and organization regarding their irrigation 
management. The game procedure is closely defined by the different steps of scenario-
analysis. Primarily scenarios and rules were designed to create a productive and familiar 
environment for farmers. The objectives were to simulate the realistic procedure of policy 
decisions and enable farmers to evaluate specific policies. The scenarios provided the initial 
basis for individual simulations. Thus, the well-known scenario describing the drip irrigation 
policy scheme was initially used as it is currently the farmers’ main challenge. According to 
Toth (1988), scenario development is an essential (and central) factor in policy evaluation 
exercises. Scenarios create a framework in which a variety of issues, including existing 
problems and particular policy alternatives, are tested during the interactive simulation 
process. Regarding simulation of new developed scenarios, some farmers argued that it was 
inefficient to install modern drip irrigation systems or piped water on scattered small fields. 
Farmers also concluded that without integrating their land, it would be difficult to cultivate 
pistachio as a large space between trees is required to establish water canals for irrigation.  
One educational aspect of discussing the scenario of land integration scheme that has led to 
social learning for farmers, was pointed out by a farmer in Ali-Abad (2013): 
“The debate on this board could better visualize for us some aspects that we need to carefully 
consider. For example we could imagine that if we want to plant pistachio with 7 metres 
distances between each, this requires land to be integrated to larger plots, otherwise 
changing crop patterns even under piped irrigation system, would not be profitable for us.” 
Farmers indicated that there were several conflicting issues when seeking to agree on land 
integration, and in some cases they could not reach an agreement as they had insufficient 
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evidence to accept the benefits of the exchange.  However, farmers observed the feasibility of 
this method and the way in which it might benefit them. Finally all farmers agreed that land 
integration and also installation of sub-surface piped irrigation system were the most 
appropriate strategies to increase their irrigation efficiency. 
 
7.2.4. Reasons for Rejection of Drip Irrigation Method 
From analysis of the conducted interviews with local farmers in Kashan, some of the 
underlying reasons why farmers might initially reject government irrigation management 
policy included: a) land use structure, b) unsuitability of introduced irrigation devices (which 
does not match their historical water allocation mechanism), c) economic problems and d) 
crop patterns. Particularly regarding drip irrigation method, other influential factors include: 
labour-intensive nature of maintenance, leakage, cost of repair, and concern about theft. 
During the IMG simulation exercise, farmers gave an insightful evaluation of the drip 
irrigation systems. Although farmers have struggled to maintain traditional water right 
systems, which could secure equity in access to groundwater resources, some government 
policies, such as drip irrigation systems, can disturb existing water right regimes that present 
particular difficulties for poorer farmers. Many farmers stated that this state-oriented policy 
disturbs their historical water allocation. They considered it to be neither suitable nor effective 
to apply drip irrigation system for their excising crop pattern and farmers could not be 
persuaded to accept this method.  
During the game, farmers, who had installed gravity-fed subsurface pipelines to transfer 
irrigation waters,  represented their tubes with wider blue lines linked to their farmland to 
demonstrate the higher water use efficiency of their irrigation network compared with the 
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other methods. Farmers used thin blue lines to indicate muddy canals with high seepage 
losses. Scattered farms, receiving less water, were represented by thinner blue lines. This 
issue stimulated further discussion, and was educational for other participants as it was argued 
that based on farmers’ experiences of using these tubes, it could significantly reduce water 
wastage from transmission canals. Farmers mentioned that due to the scattered distribution of 
their lands (Kardu), and the time taken for water to flow through the canal network, 
considerable time would elapse before water reached every piece of land.   
They also indicated preferences of using piped-line irrigation system over costly drip system, 
and in this case economic motives also encourage farmers to make rational decisions and 
develop efficient irrigation management strategies. Thus, attention to socio-political dynamics 
is essential to improve irrigation and land management, rather than enforced or compulsory 
imposition of technical options by government.   
The IMG enabled farmers to appreciate the complexity of their irrigation system. As 
discussed previously, farmers could explain how drip irrigation system for this particular 
landscape is inappropriate, particularly when due to their scattered lands it is not feasible to 
apply drip system for the pistachio trees.  
More importantly this system could not be adapted to their historical water allocation system. 
To install the pipe, which is the farmers’ responsibility, they put one gate as a water outlet in 
any one or two 24 hour periods of water right. Farmers explained that the water outlet from 
the sub-surface lined-pipes matches the time slots of their water allocation mechanism which 
could make this irrigation technology more acceptable. They also indicated that the recent 
pipe scheme does not make significant changes into their current system, but considerably 
improves water transition efficiency. This potential adaptability to the water right system can 
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facilitate acceptance of the use of pipes in the irrigation system. This finding is consistent 
with Kamash (2012) who considers that: “The factors that governed the acceptance of water 
technology include how people viewed water and how those technological choices were 
wrapped up in historical and social, as well as pragmatic, negotiations”. Also de Laet and 
Molle (2000) state that it is important: “to do technological things in the socially right way”, 
in the context of their study in a Zimbabwe bush pump. The installation of the modern 
technology of sub-surface piped system is adaptable for the specific characteristics of the arid 
Kashan region, and it is a preferred option by farmers regarding biophysical, social, economic 
and cultural suitability (see more in Chapter 6) within their traditional irrigation system.  
 
From analysing the debates occurred amongst farmers during IMG process, the game as a 
mediation tool could provide more insightful thoughts and deeper understanding for farmers 
regarding some of the advantage that governmental irrigation scheme can provide. The game 
board actively involved farmers in the management evaluation process by assigning real roles 
and rules, so that farmers could explain and understand different aspects of the proposed 
irrigation policies. Also understanding the conflicts and farmers’ expression of dissatisfaction 
with some of the governmental policies was provided through participatory modelling 
development. This is while conducting conventional social research methods or even 
governmental educational workshops does not produce as much effective outcomes as the 
participatory role-play simulation processes.  
One major source of conflict in farming communities arose from the government policy of 
compelling farmers to join official cooperatives and pay for government services. A well 
manager participating in the simulation game revealed that this has reduced farmers’ trust of 
260 
 
officials. This field observation is consistent with Ostrom’s (1990) experience that in many 
cases the use of government power has reduced the legitimacy of subsequent decisions, thus 
creating more problems in managing common resources. One example, raised by farmers in 
the discussion, indicates that weakness in defining government responsibilities could destroy 
farmers’ agreements and their ability to make collective decisions giving rise to conflicts 
among them.  For example, in our study, it is the local farmer’s responsibility to install pipes. 
In the village, the well manager is a farmer himself but has the skill to undertake the 
installation, and other farmers pay him for his services. In this case, even when farmers reach 
agreement and try to form a local cooperative, the government provide insufficient pipes for 
the well manager who consequently fails to fulfil his responsibilities, thereby also disrupting 
the farmers’ agreements.  
As government has the primary responsibility to restrict groundwater abstraction and charges 
farmers to monitor abstraction rates, it has reduced the farmers feeling of ownership, and 
responsibility to manage the resource thus ultimately jeopardising protection and maintenance 
of groundwater resources (see Chapter 6). This significantly highlights the crucial role of the 
government in supporting collective action behaviour among farmers. In the Kashan case 
study, it was revealed that in successful managing of groundwater resources not only 
community-based rules and collective participation in management is crucial but also the 
government can play an important role to encourage creation of cooperation among farmers. 
The government by providing sufficient funds for new irrigation schemes need to take more 
responsibility in making thoughtful decisions that could ensure farmers their collective 
actions will be completely supported and succeed to improve their income.  
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Considering the important role of interaction between local farmers and officials to manage 
groundwater irrigation practices, this study attempts by including a simulation game exercise 
and integrate it with the physical hydrologic model, foster more dialogues and improves 
communication between farmers and also farmers and policy makers. The following section 
reflects on the outcomes of this effort, which is experimented for the first time with local 
Iranian farmers in Kashan case study area. 
 
7.3. WEAP Co-modelling to Foster Dialogues  
As this study is an interdisciplinary effort, the use of IMG simulation was used to provide 
wider social dimensions to analyse farmers’ behavioural approaches within groundwater 
irrigation management. On the other hand, this research study steps further to integrate local 
knowledge with some physical factors using a hydrological model, to illustrate the future 
water trend and changes in the irrigation system. Using a hydrological model was to assist 
farmers to obtain better understanding of their invisible aquifer and to raise their awareness 
about the main parameters that can affect groundwater balance level, through discharge and 
recharge mechanism. The WEAP model has broadened farmers’ understanding about climate 
factors such as changes in precipitation and its impact on groundwater level in a simple 
representation of graphical results. This has produced more dialogue and tested farmers’ 
capability to engage into more complicated decision-making arrangements. Farmers also 
indicated on several occasions that integrating their local knowledge into the physical model 
can be influential as a tool engage them with policy makers, to enhance communication with 
them at regional level. This can be more educational and insightful for farmers as well as for 
authorities on how to improve water use efficiency using more adaptive management options.  
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7.3.1. Developing a Companion Modelling Process: The Insights  
In this study it was proved that physical and social integration enables a more effective 
decision-making process. It is stated that this provides a wider dimension and perspectives 
associated with particular water management problems that illustrate system complexity, in 
comparison to when models or social simulation are used alone (Robinson, 1991).  
 
For this purpose, the aim of this study was to select an appropriate modelling process 
approach which enables incorporating physical and social aspects of irrigation management. I 
will signify the outcomes of this intervention and the challenges as well as the opportunities 
that these participatory and integrative methods have created in order to move towards more 
successful participatory adaptive management for irrigation practices in the region. The 
discussion previously emphasised the need for more adaptive irrigation management 
strategies (see Chapter 6). This requires an adaptive modelling process by engaging and 
incorporating the local knowledge and their perspectives into policy development 
assumptions; which facilitates moving towards implementation of more adaptive solutions. 
According to the literature, the Companion Modelling (ComMod) approach has been 
developed with the aim of including different stakeholders’ perspectives within the 
continuously evolving adaptive management and social learning process (Bousquet et al., 
1999; Barreteau, 2003). Not all features of this approach could be integrated into the 
methodological process. For example instead of using multi-agent system models, it was 
decided to use a user-friendly hydrological model which enables to incorporate climate 
variables and add more complexity to the final outcomes (see Chapter 4). This hydrologic 
model is used as a mediation tool to give an integrated view to our thoughts and approach, as 
it links between physical and social dimensions to water management in an integrated 
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manner. The other objective of incorporating a particular hydrologic model is to create a 
suitable decision support tool, which can bring in-depth discussion and dialogue between 
participants and provide iterative simulations of key processes. In this study, the importance 
of incorporating officials’ concerns, whose management plans focus on protecting 
groundwater resources, has been actively considered in the modelling process (the secondary 
data used in the model was gathered from the local agencies and the main simulated scenario 
was based on the governmental irrigation scheme).  
The combination of IMG simulation with a hydrological model of WEAP was an 
experimental effort to integrate stakeholders’ perceptions, institutional management policies 
and hydrological variables to create a conceptual framework (Chapter 4, 5), through which 
different management options can be explored and discussed with the relevant agents. 
However, the modification and the use of a different physical model was done to adapt to a 
particular physical and socio-cultural circumstances in the case study area. The adoption of 
this model could broaden discussion and added enough complexity to the simulation 
modelling assumptions for deeper evaluation and to enhance local decision-making ability for 
irrigation management, while creating common-agreed sustainable agricultural water 
management strategies for future water management in the region. Within different stages of 
the methodology, the specific climatic, social and technical factors affecting water use were 
elicited as scenarios from the perspectives of Iranian farmers within the simulation. The 
hydrological model was run using some of these scenarios, some of the outcomes were 
presented and discussed with farmers to validate the model and to generate wider discussion.   
The participatory modelling process in general, resulted in educational achievements for 
farmers (as well as for the researcher) and has empowered social learning and collective 
decision-making in irrigation management practices in the case study area. Another 
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achievement was the investigation of the social concerns regarding groundwater use and 
irrigation practices and associated hydrological processes, to evaluate the impact of climate 
change on groundwater resources and eventually share the knowledge with local farmers. The 
outcomes of this modelling process may be interesting for authorities and can create a suitable 
linkage to improve the collaborations between local farmers and the local authorities.  
The main stakeholders involved in the modelling process included farmers, government 
agencies, local institutions and academics. The viewpoints of all these stakeholders have an 
important role in groundwater and irrigation management. The main findings from this study 
are: 
 Farmers denied parts of the modelling results which conflicted with their actual 
observations and belief.  
 Showing graphs can foster more in-depth dialogue and wider discussions among 
farmers, e.g. about different irrigation time schedule during seasons and duration of 
irrigation practices. 
 Showing statistical graphs was a new experience for the farmers. They expressed their 
knowledge more confidently about groundwater and its interaction with surface water 
and climate change parameters. Interestingly they could comment on and even 
criticized some aspects of the results and the input data. 
 It has improved their trust towards the researcher regarding existing concerns about 
their groundwater level status by officials. And observing the decline trend in 
groundwater level and storage capacity (which was agreed by farmers) could raise 
their awareness about the irreversible degradation of the groundwater resources. 
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 Farmers suggested that this modelling effort can also be useful in representing their 
actual water need to the officials, if their knowledge of real water use and crop water 
need is integrated into the model assumption. 
In the next section, different outcomes of this combination effort will be discussed in more 
depth.  Afterwards the challenges of adopting interdisciplinary methods and the difficulties of 
direct use of a hydrologic model with farmers as main stakeholders will be discussed.  
 
7.3.2. Farmers’ Interactions and Evaluation of the Hydrologic Modelling Results 
When discussing the WEAP model outcomes with farmers, they showed interest and 
understanding of the simpler modeling results which fostered more discussion among them, 
but when the facilitator tried to present more complex graphs, some farmers tried to change 
the topics to other issues. Discussion was still carried out among farmers on relevant subjects, 
but dialogues on the model results could not be continued. Also in the co-construction 
process, time is another major issue which has been considered, because the process is 
iterative and this depends on farmers’ ability to interact with the results or other participants 
(Voinov and Bousquet, 2010). 
One simple graph (Figure 29), regarding the trend in water demand in agriculture and 
domestic use, within the next 10 years also during different months, was discussed with 
farmers. 
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In contrast with what the graph illustrates, that water demand in the future is likely to 
increase, farmers disagreed. They indicated that water demand has not increased over the last 
30 years because there were restrictions on digging new deep tube-wells in the region, thus 
they believe the abstraction/discharge rate from groundwater has not significantly changed. 
They also stated that water discharge or delivery rates were the same as previously, and 
according to their historical water right. Because once farmers realised that their abstraction 
rate had fallen, they will try to get permission to deepen their existing wells and compensate 
the reduction. Farmers stated that this indicates the flexibility of groundwater resources, but 
surface-waters such as rivers are less resilient. In response to the significant reduction in 
groundwater levels, farmers agreed that there has been a significant drop in water table in the 
case study region. 
 One old farmer in Ali-Abad (2013) mentioned that: 
Figure 29 Water Demand for Agricultural and Domestic Sectors (agricultural water demand is 
under improved Irrigation efficiency) 
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“In our village in 50 years ago we could reach water in 2 meters depth, in 35 years ago was 
is 20 meters and now its 80 meters in depth”. 
They also reflected on the rainfall rate in the region, and showed awareness that the mean rate 
of rainfall in this region is less than in many other parts of the country: 
“If rainfall pattern changes the situation will be different, if God send us 250mm we will have 
less difficulties, but rainfall rate is currently 90mm or below 100mm, therefore the water level 
does not come up. Even during winter the rainfall is not significant”. 
In criticizing the graph when it is indicating that water demand will increase by 2020, 
however, groundwater levels will decrease. Some farmers explained this to others, they 
accepted that groundwater level will drop further in the future but they eventually disagreed 
that water demand in the region will increase, they emphasized that water demand will 
decrease because the number of farmers is reducing and when there is lack of water then 
demand cannot grow. 
As indicated by Olsson and Andersson (2007), stakeholders might reject scientific model 
results not only because of the model accuracy level, but due to different economic, political 
or social factors that influence public’s acceptance of the model’s outcomes. When farmers 
observe contradictory results from their personal interest or belief about system function, they 
criticise the model outcomes and doubt its validity (Cockerill et al., 2004). In our case a 
similar situation emerged when farmers did not want to accept the fact that their abstraction 
rate is increasing, which might be due to various social and political reasons. The facilitator 
explained to farmers that these graphs were produced from available regional data, gathered 
from different local water and irrigation agencies, which could increase farmers’ level of trust 
in the results. 
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When discussions continued it was realized that farmers know that water demand is currently 
high but they believe that it would not increase further, they think groundwater levels will 
decrease but their water consumption will remain steady or maybe even reduce. One farmer 
(Ali-Abad, 2013) stated:  
“Water demand might increase because of climate change (higher temperature) but they do 
not let us to dig more wells and increase current abstraction rate”. 
 
Discussing another graph with farmers, regarding the trend in groundwater levels after 
improving irrigation efficiency fostered discussion among farmers. On seeing a graph 
illustrating that groundwater decline might change after improving efficiency (by a certain 
percentage), they commented on the accuracy of the modelling results (Figure 30). The graph 
illustrates the monthly changes in groundwater level, therefore one farmer (Ali-Abad, 2013) 
stated that: “In our real system, during January and February water level is higher and in April 
it is reduced”. In this case, the model showed a contradictory result which farmers noticed. 
Farmers indicated that during January and February because it rains, the motor-pumps are off 
and water demand decreases, therefore water level should increase. In other months for 
example during March, April and May crops consume more water, so water demand should 
increase and groundwater levels will fall. It is stated that local stakeholders, particularly 
farmers who have deep knowledge and awareness about their environmental or resource 
changes, are more likely to criticise the model outcomes, when it does not properly represent 
the system (Olsson and Andersson, 2007). In our study, this situation has occurred, however 
the facilitator was prepared to give adequate information to increase transparency of the 
model outcome to farmers.   
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Showing graphs to farmers encouraged them to expand more details about irrigation schedule 
and justify their reasons for rejecting the model outcomes. They refer to the type of crops and 
crop water need during different seasons and different months.  Also they emphasised that 
their cropping pattern changes has made different water abstraction rate during different 
seasons.  
This has also brought another perspective into the discussion as one farmer stated that: 
“Currently with pistachio cultivation, we need water in all months, because pistachio uses 
even more water during winter for the first two years, so we need to do flood irrigation (20 
cm of irrigated water on top-soil) which this increase water consumption”. 
Discussing the graphs of results encouraged farmers to reflect deeper on their seasonal and 
duration of irrigation, as well as their irrigation schedules and crop water requirements during 
different seasons and for different crops.  
The other farmer in Ali-Abad (2013) added that:  
“Only during winter, when other crops do not need water, pistachio requires 2, 3 times 
irrigation. However, it is a very resilient tree and after these two years, even if farmers don’t 
irrigate it for 50 days it does not get dry, that is why it needs more water at the beginning to 
resist longer”. 
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Discussing the fall in groundwater levels revealed farmers’ perceptions and understanding of 
groundwater and the impacts of its reduction, also on recharge mechanism. As one farmer in 
Ali-Abad village (2013) stated: 
“The problem is that groundwater level has decreased and as a result land surface has lost its 
moisture and gets dry more severely. In the past the moisture was in 3 to 10 meters depth and 
it was penetrated to the top soil but now underneath the soil is dry and that is the reason we 
must use more water for irrigation”. 
Discussion around seasonal irrigation pattern, the crop types and the groundwater table 
decline, led the researcher to question whether farmers believe that by continuing flood 
irrigation method, the water recharge to groundwater will maintain or increase, they expressed 
different perspectives.  
Some of the farmers believed that flood irrigation method could increase groundwater 
recharge rates particularly in the past, before groundwater levels fell this deep, but today the 
recharge is not significant, because currently the water table is very deep and temperature is 
Figure 30 Unmet Water Demand, without improved efficiency and population growth 
by 2.1% 
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very high (see Chapter 6). Some others assume that because the abstraction rate is high and 
different layers of soil is dry and absorb moisture immediately, thus the aquifer does not 
replenish at all. This is consistent with the reports published by the local water and irrigation 
institutions in the region. They think when they were using Qanat system and rainfall was 
relatively higher, groundwater could recharge during winter but today this does not happen.  
One farmer (Ali-Abad, 2013) said:  
“Of course irrigated water penetrates into earth (when we use flood-irrigation) however, 
during summer days there is high evaporation, but during night, irrigation could recharge the 
groundwater”. 
The other farmer had an important perception as he believed that by night time irrigation in 
summer, they can irrigate larger pieces of lands and the runoff discharge to groundwater, 
however, drip irrigation systems do not function like this, because the irrigated water does not 
reach the deeper soil level. This is in accord with the scientific assumptions, and the new 
concept of efficiency gain introduced by Lankford (see Chapter 6). When discussing future 
water demand graphs, under extended climatic condition and unimproved irrigation 
efficiency, it was stated by the researcher that groundwater recharge rates were very slow and 
under these climatic conditions, might not occur, so there is a need for more control and 
monitoring of farmers’ abstraction rates. 
When discussing groundwater storage capacity, and future declines in level, farmers 
responded to the question as to whether they believed there is still abundant water stored 
underneath their farmlands. They responded positively and explained that: 
“If we face severe water shortage we will have to reduce our abstraction, but we have not got 
there yet, because when you do not have water then all people should cooperate and reduce 
their consumption”. 
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This indicates that farmers have their own measurements of water availability and assume that 
there is a considerable volume of water stored as groundwater in the region. Farmers’ 
perceptions about how their aquifer looks, is in similar to the shape of a bowl in which its 
boundaries are higher and storage is lower. They showed awareness about the recharge 
mechanism of their aquifer as stated that the melted snow from mountain regions recharge the 
aquifer in winter. One farmer stated what he learnt is that groundwater is a shared resource in 
which each farmer by having his deep tube-well is like putting a straw into the storage and 
abstracting from the same bowl. One farmer indicated that they learnt from one government 
engineer that within 100-150 years the aquifer gets dry. My impression is that this might have 
influenced farmers’ estimation of groundwater sustainability. 
Discussing different graphs with farmers has resulted in educational achievements for farmers 
and has empowered social learning process as farmers debated several irrigation-related 
experiences within irrigation management practices. When a graph was discussed with 
farmers, they mentioned that this was the first time that they had looked at graphs of their 
groundwater resources, because the official agencies never discuss any graphs with them.  In 
any participatory modelling, stakeholders can be engaged in various ways, such as extracting 
knowledge, selection of the suitable model and development, collecting data and integration, 
development of relevant scenarios, analysis and discussion around results, developing new 
policy or  management strategies (Voinov and Bousquet, 2010). In this modelling effort local 
participants were engaged in knowledge provision, developing model and scenario building as 
well as interpreting the results and suggesting collective-agreed management decisions. The 
final step in ComMod process is that different developed scenarios should be used to discuss 
and to define alternative resource management strategies with resource users. The results 
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could be used to inform water users about the future predictions of water availability or 
evaluation of the scenarios. 
In this study, local farmers participated in evaluation of the results of a scientific model which 
illustrated the groundwater declining trends, and its control is under governmental 
responsibilities. For eliciting farmers’ feedback on the participatory modelling process, the 
facilitator explained that the main scenarios were formulated from the previous IMG (in 
which they played a major role in designing and simulation of the game and articulation of 
scenarios). Enough time was given to the group discussions for the emergence of more 
dialogues among farmers. Finally, to obtain more accurate results within iterative process, this 
methodology can be improved by connecting with more usual technical simulations 
(indicators, biophysical dynamics, GIS, vulnerability assessment, databases, etc.). These 
technical supports are useful to assist the operational management of the simulation exercise. 
Farmers were more enthusiastic to see more related result towards their crop pattern and 
groundwater level condition in the future. 
Here, I reflect on the main challenges of conducting this methodology. Within ComMod 
process it is essential to identify two different contexts: the generation of knowledge emerged 
from complex system within systematic research approach and the use of this to support 
collective decision making process for resource management.  
In this study, the attempt was to use the same conceptual model for the IMG design and for 
the indicators used in the hydrologic model. However, the nature and outcomes of using these 
two different tools was varied. In our study, IMG and computerized model were used in turn 
and one after the other.  
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The IMG was used to create an interdisciplinary area to build a multi-perspective system 
platform, which included farmers’ perception of their actual irrigation system, their rules and 
factors affecting their water situation, and some elements of climate variables. In this stage 
the information and assumption were incorporated from different interviews and group 
discussions. However the main focus was to give farmers the priority to have a main role in 
designing the simulation process.  
In ComMod (companion modelling) process, validation is an essential step, which in fact it is 
different from the conventional model validation and does not exist in the same way as 
physical and mathematical models (Barreteau et al., 2001). This stage was completed during 
the Role-play simulation and revision of the main scenarios and the model assumptions.  
In the first phase in generating knowledge the challenge is to deliver and understand the 
interaction among resource users and managers and their evaluation of the existing problem. 
The challenge of this study was how to integrate different hydrologic variables with different 
stakeholders’ perceptions toward groundwater use and irrigation management, to create a 
shared-agreed conceptual model for all. In the second phase, the concrete knowledge and any 
technical decisions to support the deliberation of the participants’ concerns was employed to 
formulate a shared understanding of the problems and to identify shared solutions for 
collective action and management. 
The modelling approach is not to produce a practical application for improving irrigation 
efficiency but it is step forward to facilitate collective decision making process and eliciting 
knowledge from wider range of stakeholders. The modelling and IMG are tools to capture 
part of the complex system, which relates to climate variables and water use strategies in 
irrigation. This study provides an innovative method to identify the effectiveness of this 
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approach in decision-making processes and facilitating negotiation. The effectiveness of a 
participatory approach has been proven, as it produced a shared perspective, more critical 
analysis of the system and more in depth discussions. The model could provide relatively easy 
outlook of results, raise farmers’ awareness about their groundwater level trend, and foster 
more dialogues regarding climate variables and how these factors affect the aquifer in general. 
Although farmers’ interaction with the model result for the first time attempt was successful, 
there is still a need to find methods and interactive ways to represent more transparent 
outcomes to farmers. It can be suggested that training farmers in a workshop to enable them to 
directly use the model and observe their own inputs in construction of the modelling 
assumption, can build more trust in the model’s outcome. 
According to my findings, local farmers in Kashan have the capacity and interest to 
participate in a more cooperative management process. This requires the existence of effective 
local institutions to promote collective action and strengthen social capital among farmers’ 
communities (see Chapter 2). The powerful local institution also develops a higher level of 
trust for farmers and affects their behaviours in adopting governmental schemes and being 
actively involved in more collaborative resource management with the governmental 
agencies. In the next section, I briefly reflect on the role of this important factor. Then I will 
argue that according to my empirical findings and the potential for promoting participatory 
management for irrigation practices in the region, moving towards adaptive management 
purposes is necessary. I will discuss the possibilities and the values of developing adaptive 
management process, and suggest the use of innovative methodologies under informal and 
reflective local institutions to improve irrigation management for Kashan.  
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7.4. Building Adaptive, Flexible and Reflective Institutions for Irrigation Practices 
From this study it could be concluded that solely community-based management over 
groundwater irrigation in Iran cannot be possible, although community-based management 
gives stronger legitimacy to the users’ rights in comparison with other governance regimes 
such as co-management. Co-management or joint management is when government continues 
with the majority of its roles in conjunction with local users and has transferred some 
management responsibilities. In participatory (community-based) irrigation management local 
users are encouraged to increase their engagement in the management process and to 
complement the role of government (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999). In my case study, 
poorer farmers still require governmental support for managing their irrigation infrastructures 
and to provide a suitable market for their products (see Chapter 6).  Indeed, a lack of 
governmental support in most cases has discouraged many farmers from continuing their 
practices and they migrated to urban areas (Katouzian, 1978). Thus, there is a need for 
capacity building to empower local farmers and local institutions to improve management 
decisions, before transferring the responsibilities to farmer communities.  
 
In promoting an adaptive management process, the existence of strong local institutions is 
important. The knowledge linkage with institutions represents long-term adaptation of socio-
ecological system to dynamic changes (Berkes and Folke, 2002). To bring local users into 
effective management of resources and not just as a topic, governments need to transfer power 
to local institutions or local communities for more engaging decision-making processes 
(Ribot, 2002). 
As noted by Neef (2009) many participatory approaches in developing countries are still 
restricted to pilot studies, e.g. study on polycentric river basin management or transferring 
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irrigation management to local water users (see Ostrom, 1990). It is observed by Neef (2009) 
that in the participatory management of water resources, officials lack trust in local 
communities’ capability, and do not believe that farmers can have such significant influence 
and input into governance and management of resources, which is particularly widespread in 
managing scarce water resources in developing countries (Neef, 2009). It is usually argued 
that unsustainable use of water resources by local communities is evidence of their inability to 
regulate and establish rules to increase efficiency use of water resources, and this argument 
has been used to increase the state control over water usage in local communities (see Chapter 
2). This is in contrast with the findings which indicate the capability of local users in 
developing common rules and valuing system for water rights and distribution which provides 
equal access to water for all members and follows the established rules of water management 
(Neef, 2009; Ostrom, 1992). This is an actual issue as some scholars challenged the fact that 
governance of common resources will be successful only if the rules are established based on 
interests of users (Dietz et al., 2003; Allen et al., 2010). Generally adaptive management 
approach requires flexibility and openness which the state-led governance usually lacks. This 
approach normally faces many limitations because of the certainty of regulations and 
strictness of the organisations (Garmestani et al., 2009). My study confirms that participatory 
research must be flexible in order to be adaptive and lead to democratic management 
decisions. It is an argument that informal participatory efforts are more likely to develop 
towards adaptive management compared with formal processes which are organised by 
official regulatory mechanisms (Gunderson et al. 2006, Olsson et al. 2004). Sustaining 
flexibility of stakeholders’ views is the condition that needs to be met.   
One of the main problems in the agricultural water management sector in Iran is that there has 
been much less attention to the sustainability of governmental development projects and lack 
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of effective educational system in this regard (Balali, 2009). In the study by Karbasioun 
(2007) in Esfahan, he argued that the “uncontrolled influence of political visions on decision 
making in the agricultural sector is one of the crucial problems of agricultural development in 
Iran”. An individual’s behavior is influenced by the institutions and environmental context 
which has surrounded him (Rier and Foster, 2003). Thus although farmers are concerned 
about water resources’ declining level, the social, ecological and economic circumstances 
counterbalance their behavior in over-using resources (Folke et al., 2002). Reshaping 
water/irrigation management institutions or policy frameworks to adjust to changing social-
environmental interactions which promote more sustainable water management has still not 
been completely achieved (Dietz et al., 2003; Folke et al., 2002). Any changes in local level 
require administrative and legislative changes at a higher political level, and within 
organisational boundaries. Under an appropriate framework approved and encouraged by 
political will and communities’ capabilities for engaging in management decisions, the 
implementation of wider participatory research would be possible. 
 
7.5. Social Learning, Empowering local farmers and Capacity Building for Adaptive 
Management 
The need for a more integrated water management approach is the recent focus in many water 
policies and plans in developing countries (see Chapter 2). The gap still exists for developing 
more democratic and participatory research to address the limitations and advantages of this 
process for natural resources governance (Stringer et al., 2006) but also “to critically reflect 
on the links between communities, science, institutions, knowledge, and power” (Stringer et 
al., 2006). 
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It was discussed that to avoid failure in management of complex system as a result of 
incomplete understanding (Gunderson, 2003), there is a need for improving social capacity by 
learning about the systems dynamics to protect the system management (Olsson et al., 2004). 
Learning through management is the main emphasis of adaptive management which follows 
the philosophy that our knowledge is incomplete or even wrong, the uncertainty in natural 
resources management is high, however policy makers must act and make decisions (Walters, 
1986). As indicated earlier, adoption of optimal models which rely on predicted future 
outcomes cannot be the most suitable outlook for environmental management (Holman and 
Trawick, 2011). The use of models to generate social learning requires understanding the 
ways in which knowledge is gathered, integrated and validated (Berkes 1999, Berkes and 
Folke 2002). In this case study different methods of participation including interviews, 
discussion, and farmers’ engagement into mutual dialogues have been adopted in order to 
obtain deeper understanding and collective information of the local system. This process has 
transferred the role of farmers from participant to active players in decision-making, in which 
they selected particular irrigation technology and suitable management approach, when 
evaluating policies.  
 
This study allowed farmers to incorporate themselves into the simulation process in different 
stages, and eventually within the process they could change the way of their participation in 
the process to playing a more dominant role by teaching others about the model and by 
initiating some new scenarios. Thus within IMG, as knowledge was formed during different 
stages, the role of farmers has evolved from ‘target population’ to ‘active participant’ and 
‘decision-makers’. In this study, farmers gradually offered their own criteria and priorities for 
selecting particular irrigation systems and more adaptable options for the future.  
280 
 
In this study, it was also found that the integrated methodological effort has greatly resulted in 
better understanding of the context and irrigation practices of this particular case study area. 
This is consistent with the findings by Revene (2011), who also found that integrated 
methodological effort enhanced their understanding of semiarid region livelihood and the 
factors affecting their vulnerabilities (Knutsson and Ostwald 2006). My study showed that 
combining qualitative knowledge from stakeholders with a quantitative model has created 
more discussion and improved participatory outcomes by providing higher valued information 
for local usage. Enhancing participatory research approaches in different or similar contexts 
will empower local capacity and bring insights for researchers, policy makers and local users 
to improve management approaches.  
The methodology used in this study facilitated social learning, which also assists in 
maximizing democratic approach and in flow of information. Social learning plays a crucial 
role in smoothing stakeholders’ participation in the adaptive management approach and 
assisting in building trust and increasing local capacity (Pahl-Wostl 2006; Muro and Jeffrey, 
2008; Collins and Ison, 2009). As stated by Stringer et al. (2006) the key factor is flexibility 
in participation under which adaptive management can be achieved, because this can provide 
means to facilitate more dialogue and social learning. Within group discussions farmers 
showed care and awareness about climate change and expressed their evaluation in terms of 
observation of increased temperature and changes in rainfall pattern that affected every 
individual’s livelihood. The model proved that it can function as a suitable tool for 
educational purposes.  
From this study, it can be argued that the role-play simulation can generate more discussions 
and dialogues among farmers that can enhance the social learning process. The frequent 
occurrence of social learning increases social capital among farmers and thus improves 
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farmers’ capacity to respond to harsh and unexpected natural phenomena. This is expressed as 
one key factor to transition towards adaptive management procedure (Pahl-Wostl, 2007). In 
local farming regions of Iran, implementation of such participatory management exercises can 
lead to facilitation of formulating more adaptive management solutions. Local solutions 
empowered and supported by strong local institutions will lead to more effective management 
procedures. The effective collaborations and social learning between farmers and local 
agencies can help broaden perspectives and management options and has provided some 
kinds of horizontal learning (between farmers) and vertical learning (feedback to officials) as 
indicated in the studies of Olsson et al. (2004). 
 
As Berkes and Folke (1998) stated, for successful adaptive management it is necessary to 1. 
Understand the system, resources and dynamics; 2. Initiate practices that respond to system 
mechanism; 3. Encourage reflective and flexible institutions to promote adaptive 
management. When these conditions are provided, the system can move towards a more 
collaborative form of adaptive management or cooperative management. There is an emphasis 
in conducting a participatory process that it should be related to policy issues in which the 
findings can be employed in policy decision-making and thus be practical (Rowe and Fewer 
2004; Creighton 2005). It is indicated that the communication between local stakeholders and 
policy-makers needs to continue to lead to more informed decisions for groundwater 
management in the future and under this condition adaptive management could be promoted. 
In this study, I argue that complex and adaptive systems such as irrigation require flexible and 
adaptable management system. Groundwater resources face significant uncertainty in future 
climate change impacts, thus there is a need for a more bottom-up and community-based 
approach in developing adaptive management and improving local capacity to deal with 
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changes. My study has implications for designing successful adaptive and participatory 
management protocols. These include: structure, careful formulation of objectives and setting 
up alternative management scenarios, collection of data and assessment and monitoring the 
outcome within an iterative process with participants. Different constituents of adaptive 
management processes are defined by Williams (2011) including “stakeholder involvement, 
objectives, management alternatives, models and monitoring protocols”.  These factors are the 
main elements in the iterative process of learning about complexity of the system and 
improved management decisions based on the learning. In my case study these different 
phases were achieved through conducting social research methods and IMG simulation which 
will be examined as follows. 
7.5.1. Stakeholder Involvement 
Participatory approaches require continuous collaboration between stakeholders, scientists 
and policy makers. In this participatory modeling study, I have engaged stakeholders and the 
perspectives of policy makers into a conceptual framework to support the decision-making 
process in a complex irrigation system (Chapter 4). The modeling attempt has assisted 
participants to better understand the system interactions and farmers’ behavioral approaches 
towards particular schemes or technologies. This was an attempt towards more open and 
integrated modeling effort, which has revealed the main causes of conflicts or misbehavior as 
well as underlying factors for mutual cooperation, collective action, local knowledge and 
values in local farmers’ communities. The selection of a participatory approach is well suited 
with the concept of integrated water resources management which tries to improve 
management by considering social and economic aspects at local level (Voinov and Gaddis, 
2008). 
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7.5.2. Objectives  
It is important to have agreed upon the main objectives as they will play an important role in 
assessing performance, reducing uncertainties and enhancing management decisions. In this 
study, I could eventually articulate clearer, common agreed and measurable objectives to 
evaluate the improved management decisions (see Chapter 4). The validation of objectives 
had been undertaken several times prior to design the simulation modelling process through 
redefining study objectives based on updated modelling assumptions during the field-work. 
7.5.3. Management actions 
Different management strategies which were introduced by the government and were 
completely or partly adopted by local farmers have formed the iterative decision-making 
process for farmers. Different scenarios that were formulated by farmers have been discussed 
and some were tested to illustrate the future changes in their irrigation system. The most 
appropriate set of management actions and alternatives should be identified by resource 
managers in order to constitute adaptive management (Williams, 2011). It is indicated that if 
potential management activities fail to be identified, it will be unlikely to produce effective 
and useful strategies (Williams, 2011). 
7.5.4. Models 
The use of a hydrological model in this study, helped to compare different management 
alternatives and evaluate their cost and benefits from the local farmers’ perspectives in the 
case study area. Various scenarios in terms of management options have been used in the 
WEAP model in order to predict their possible future impacts and changes. The use of a 
hydrological model could represent the dynamics of the resource and its complexity and 
provide the opportunity to compare the different outcomes under different scenarios. The role-
play simulation has also captured the social dynamics in this specific irrigation context of 
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Kashan. As the adaptive management approach is a learning-based process, using different 
participatory tools can lead to educational achievements in different ways. In this study, the 
main method is the development of scenarios of future changes, for each scenario a 
management option is identified and being tested through adaptive decision-making process 
and these scenarios were evaluated by resource users, regarding the most suitable one 
(Williams, 2011). 
One of the main challenges of using models is that if models fail to integrate meaningful 
assumptions or scenarios, the adaptive approach may not produce or suggest effective 
management strategies. This study stimulated a social learning by linking local knowledge 
within different farmers’ perspectives of different villages and integrated the knowledge with 
researcher and policy schemes to create varied and sometimes innovative management 
options. The participatory research was designed locally but the process was inspired by 
scientific literature, which provides more insightful results rather than scientific and local 
knowledge alone. 
7.5.5. Monitoring Plans 
The learning outcome of adaptive management emerges from the comparison of the model 
outcomes and the observations. In this way having learned about the irrigation system and its 
dynamic, the most appropriate management or strategy can be articulated and this can be the 
best response to the management alternatives. The monitoring phases mainly conducted 
through role-play simulation to validate the WEAP model assumptions, can facilitate 
evaluation of the process and learning about the system dynamics. Monitoring system and 
management options are to produce information and assess different strategies, update 
measures and prioritise alternative options. In this study, these management priorities were 
formulated by local farmers and incorporated as different scenarios into the WEAP model for 
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evaluation. The outcomes of such an adaptive management process can be integrated into the 
decision making procedure, assessment performance and learning, moving towards more local 
adaptive solutions.  
 
7.5.6. Feedback 
The evaluation and feedback by adopting particular management strategies and assessment of 
the project is one essential element in an adaptive management process (Williams, 2011). In 
this study engaging the main stakeholders in the management processes improved the 
understanding of the irrigation system. Through discussing and farmers’ evaluation of the 
main irrigation management policies in the region, the farmers’ decision making influenced 
and improved. This is a continuous process, thus within an iterative adaptive management 
process, both management and system understanding will be improved further. 
This study showed the successful application of participatory modelling for adaptive 
management solutions at local scale of Kashan. The application of adaptive management has 
been successful in various localised scales (Williams et al., 2007). The potential of an 
adaptive management approach at local scales has been recognized not only because of the 
majority of problems that exist at local scale but also because structuring of the problems is 
easier, also the identification of uncertainties as well as stakeholders involvement in 
management process can be facilitated with less effort (McConnaha and Paquet, 1996). 
7.6. Conclusion 
In this study, the simulation game is used to present farmers’ interests and knowledge by 
generating discussion on different technical, socio-economic and managerial issues and the 
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decision-making process. The debates enabled farmers to evaluate different government 
irrigation policies in Kashan, Iran. In this chapter, the important role of local communities’ 
knowledge is emphasised, the main attempt is to establish a participatory tool for local 
irrigation management, which is built upon existing knowledge provided by local farmers, 
which could empower local capabilities and foster collective action.  In this case because the 
novel participatory process was developed, conducted and improved by local water users, it 
can be applied in similar contexts and in similar climatic and socio-economic circumstances. 
The participants in this process were also the users of the results that were generated.  Based 
on their inputs, their evaluation of the policies were practical and empowering and knowledge 
flow between technical aspects of the irrigation systems and local knowledge of farmers could 
further support farmers’ participation and result in social learning. Regarding policy 
evaluation outcomes, the game process provided opportunity for local stakeholders to 
evaluate the current policies regarding groundwater and irrigation management and their 
viewpoints and suggestions were taken into account.  
During the debriefing session, farmers suggested how the design and the game process should 
be improved in the future, for example they emphasized that a larger board game, which 
represents locations more accurately with more land holdings or irrigation canals would offer 
better visualization. Farmers thought that this kind of participatory action could be undertaken 
in future for new subjects such as land integration, in which a comprehensive redesign of their 
farmlands, could encourage collective agreement and action between farmers, particularly 
those ones who were unwilling to adopt the scheme. To improve the governance system one 
farmer suggested that a local-based solution which is adaptable for farmers (in terms of costs 
and efficiency) and is deeply analyzed can be the most appropriate.  
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The main effort to be made in a participatory process is to direct management towards 
development of shared understanding of the existing problem by exploring shared 
perspectives which link different knowledge together, (e.g. improving efficiency is a goal for 
both farmers and agencies). This requires conceptualisation of the process and not simply 
enforcing particular methods assuming that they will be accepted by stakeholders. Externally 
imposed rules or technologies have consequent social, institutional and political outcomes 
which can have a significant impact on every farmer’s life and on agriculture generally. Thus, 
management decisions have a major impact on the agricultural system and production in 
general and on farmers’ livelihood. Introducing technologies or the governmental intervention 
schemes, does not address farmers’ needs and they are not adaptable to the local social-
cultural circumstances to be implemented by traditional farmers. They expressed 
dissatisfaction and anxiety with the Iranian Government’s adoption of this rule.  These factors 
have been better understood through conducting an IMG. As my findings indicate the 
evaluation of technology by farmers has crucial role in its adoption and improving 
performance of irrigation practices. For instance, piped-water systems were better accepted in 
Kashan villages by farmers over a drip irrigation method. Another important outcome was 
that the boundaries of knowledge between experts and locals reduced as the knowledges were 
integrated. The new knowledge and collective understanding of the underlying reasons for 
farmers’ rejection of particular system resulted from capturing different interests, values and 
criteria which leads to more comprehensive decision making. An Irrigation Management 
Game (IMG) helps farmers appreciate the value of cooperation with each other which enables 
efficient operation and maintenance of their irrigation facilities. However, further 
improvement of the game is possible, for example, organized workshops could be introduced 
to design the game; evaluate the success of the game design; and determine the added value to 
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farmers (and researchers) in understanding complex groundwater-irrigated systems in arid 
regions. 
Regarding the companion modeling effort, the whole participatory modeling process has led 
to social learning for farmers and insights for the researcher; also it provided a platform to test 
scenarios and understand farmers’ behaviors in more depth. It is important that participants do 
not assume any of the outputs from the hydrologic model or simulation as a final solution, but 
they are just for representing part of the complex system. The incorporation of farmers into 
designing, planning and acting within the simulation created a sense of ownership and trust in 
the outcomes, however there is a need for more interactive methods to familiarise farmers 
with the final results and the future consequences of their decisions. For future development 
of this process, I would also suggest to engage a greater diversity of stakeholders, and some 
official bodies into the entire modelling process. Conducting educational workshops to 
introduce the model and different processes would be useful and more engaging for farmers. 
In that case, the IMG should also be designed for surface water resources, and transferred into 
the WEAP model background screen.  The modeling process is a time and budget consuming 
task, so it is more advantageous if the researcher lives nearby or does not have to travel to 
conduct the workshops. In that case, the repetition of the entire process would be more 
affordable and efficient. However, this could not be possible in this study due to distance and 
cost of travel to the case study region.  
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CHAPTER 8 
                                   Conclusion 
 
Introduction and Contribution of Thesis 
This interdisciplinary study set out to develop participatory irrigation management processes 
with local farmers in Iran. The study investigated the role of participatory modeling for 
adaptive irrigation management in an arid case study region (Kashan) in central Iran. It has 
also drawn attention to the crucial importance of groundwater resources as the major water 
supplier for agriculture, economy and social welfare, and their sustainable use in arid parts of 
the world. The research has highlighted the need for the development of more adaptive and 
innovative strategies to improve the management and efficiency of irrigation systems as a 
common-pool resource. One of the main contributions of the thesis is in establishing the 
principals and techniques for involving farmers in the development of the research methods. 
The research was therefore able to elicit farmers’ deep knowledge and perspectives on water 
management and their responses to certain irrigation policies. The study involved 
stakeholders’ engagement at the early stages of the research design and throughout the 
research process. This addresses a lack of such studies within Iranian literatures on 
participatory groundwater management at a local level. The second important contribution of 
this thesis is that it is the first study to develop and use a role-play Irrigation Management 
Game (IMG), which is designed and developed mainly by the local irrigators in the Kashan 
case study area. The thesis demonstrates how the innovative use of this participatory game has 
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facilitated social learning (see Chapter 4, 7). The development of an interdisciplinary platform 
including physical and social dimensions was undertaken to understand and strengthen the 
collective decision-making process for irrigation management within the local farming system 
of Iran. The study particularly sought to answer two main questions: 
1. What is the potential role of participatory modeling in adaptive groundwater irrigation 
management in Iran? 
2. Can the use of a participatory simulation exercise with local farmers be successful in 
achieving collective decision-making and improved irrigation efficiency in Iran? 
 
As discussed in the introduction and literature review, irrigated agriculture is the predominant 
abstractor of groundwater resources worldwide. It is the largest water consumer sector 
globally, which plays a major role in water and food security around the world (see Chapter 
1). Groundwater resources are the most important water sources in Iran. However due to over-
exploitation and prolonged droughts, their sustainability and maintenance has become under 
threat within recent decades. The thesis has outlined how in most arid and semi-arid regions 
of the world, the management of groundwater resources and their sustainability is a major 
challenge for the maintenance of agricultural production and aquifers. The uncontrolled 
abstraction of groundwater resources and a lack of effective governance systems has caused 
major damage to the environment and has resulted in significant depletion of groundwater 
resources in arid regions worldwide (Molle et al., 2003) including in Iran (see Chapter 2). The 
sustainable use of groundwater resources, irrigation practices and efficiency are interlinked 
and require better collective management by farmers. Therefore policies and management 
approaches need to be integrated and collaborative in order to create cross-sector dialogues 
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for improving management decisions (Mitchel et al., 2012). The participatory methods 
developed in this thesis set out to meet this urgent demand. 
In consideration of a lack of analytical studies on the role of farmers’ behaviour in managing 
groundwater resources in Iran, and the specific characteristics of groundwater resources as an 
invisible common-pool resource, this study has paid particular attention to groundwater 
irrigation management, farmers’ behaviour and decision-making processes in irrigation 
management for local farming.  
Within the Iranian governance system, farmers have been largely neglected and their 
perspectives undervalued within irrigation management decision-making processes. 
Considering these shortcomings in both water governance itself and within the Iranian 
academic literature, this study has highlighted the need to recognize the role of social research 
studies of groundwater irrigation management within a participatory modelling approach. A 
social research approach has enabled the thesis to investigate and identify the role of farmers 
in successful management of common-pool resources, the main problems, challenges and 
appropriate management strategies at a local level. This has been achieved by conducting a 
community-based study. The participatory management approach produced shared 
perspectives, more critical analysis of the irrigation system and more in depth discussions by 
farmers. The application of a participatory modelling approach in this study is recognized to 
be an effective community-based research method, as it combines physical and social factors. 
Different viewpoints from farmers and the local agencies were integrated and discussed 
within a participatory research method development, which created a more legitimate 
management options for participants (see Chapter 7). As the evidence from the empirical 
findings present, the application of a participatory modelling approach facilitated better 
understanding of the main drivers for farmers’ collective action, and also improved collective 
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decision-making for more efficient groundwater irrigation practices in Kashan (see Chapters 
6, 7). This study recommends an adaptive management approach to the governance of natural 
resources that is driven from a community level which incorporates resource users’ 
perspectives into the development of more informed and higher quality management decisions 
(see Chapter 2, 7). A participatory approach to groundwater resource management has proven 
to be a more effective strategy than top-down governance imposed from beyond the local 
area. Participatory approaches can engage different viewpoints and interests in the 
management procedure to create a deliberative platform for more legitimate and informed 
decision-making at a local scale. Within this approach, a specific simulation and role playing 
gaming method were used to facilitate the flow of information and to foster discussion. This 
study has particularly provided a critical evaluation of government irrigation efficiency and 
management schemes (e.g. Tooba) regarding the adaptability of technologies in the region. 
For example, policy evaluation by farmers regarding the reduction of water rights to one-third 
of current amount under this scheme, revealed that the initial estimation of groundwater 
abstraction rate needs to be re-evaluated because it’s not compatible with current need (see 
Chapter 6).  
The study has engaged local farmers in the discussions around sustainability of groundwater 
resources through a participatory method which specifically incorporates a hydrological 
model in the process to foster dialogue, improve social learning and predict future trends in 
the state of the aquifer in the local farming system of Kashan (see Chapters 4, 7). The 
participatory physical model could provide a relatively easy outlook of results, raised farmers’ 
awareness of groundwater drop level, and fostered more dialogue regarding climatic variables 
and how these affect aquifer in general (Chapter 7). 
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8.1. Summary of Findings 
In this section, the findings are synthesized to answer the two above research questions. To 
understand the potential role of participatory modeling in achieving adaptive management, a 
methodology was designed to develop a participatory and innovative irrigation efficiency 
management exercise. The first stage of building a successful model is to understand the 
dynamics and context of the particular irrigation system. Different social research methods 
were undertaken to obtain sufficient and rich knowledge from the local irrigator farmers as 
the main stakeholders. In my study, interviewing different stakeholders such as agencies and 
local farmers revealed that working and understanding different groups is a challenging task. 
However, being an Iranian researcher and sharing a similar language and culture was helpful 
in engaging with farmers effectively (see Chapter 4). My study on local groundwater irrigated 
agriculture in Kashan has demonstrated that water and particularly groundwater resources are 
under ever-increasing demands from various stakeholders and interests. The high uncertainty 
and low controllability of groundwater as a ‘common-pool resource’ requires more adaptive 
strategies which incorporate local resource users’ knowledge and future predictions into 
management decisions (see Chapter 2). 
I developed an innovative IMG as a participatory modelling tool to provide detailed analysis 
of how to achieve agreement and reach collective decisions for groundwater irrigation 
systems management in a way that is sensitive to the local biophysical and social geography. 
The methodology was carefully developed through step by step incorporation of local 
knowledge and farmers’ feedback into the process. Therefore, the process has led to the 
establishment of a novel and context-specific participatory modelling technique for 
groundwater irrigation practices in Kashan, Iran. It has also provided opportunities to broaden 
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perspectives and elicit local knowledge to improve the decision-making process, which 
mainly benefited farmers. 
Integrating different forms of knowledge including farmers’ perspectives and interest, expert 
knowledge, values and physical criteria provided collective understanding that reduced the 
boundaries of knowledge among stakeholders and improved the decision-making process. For 
example, IMG revealed that one of the reasons for rejecting or reluctantly accepting schemes 
such as land integration and changing crop pattern might be rooted in social and cultural 
aspects of a particular region. For example, historical water rights were adjusted to provide a 
fair distribution of water to small and scattered pieces of lands and now this has become 
problematic and land consolidation is a difficult task. 
Farmers collectively decided and agreed that sub-surface piped irrigation system and also land 
integration scheme are some of the most appropriate irrigation management solutions to 
increase their water use efficiency and to ensure future sustainability of groundwater 
resources in the region (see Chapter 7). The game facilitated the explanation of the real rules 
underlying farmers’ attitudes and behaviours regarding preferences for adopting new 
irrigation technologies and barriers to change. The IMG was particularly designed as a shared 
platform to evaluate different irrigation policy schemes (such as drip irrigation and sub-
surface piped irrigation system) by local users. It was also to uncover the main reasons why 
farmers in Kashan are reluctant to accept a drip irrigation system for improving their 
irrigation efficiency.   
From the IMG it was concluded that a particular irrigation technology such as a drip irrigation 
system must be matched to the existing water allocation system and traditional water rights 
and distribution mechanism. Farmers found the government proposed sub-surface piped 
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irrigation system more adaptable to their water allocation mechanisms and more affordable, 
thus increasing the efficiency of water use. My research interviews showed that the efficiency 
measure by local users is defined as an increase in the volume of water that reaches each plot 
of their lands. This is particularly achievable for farmers through the adoption of sub-surface 
piped irrigation system that is funded by the government rather than installation of an 
expensive drip irrigation method (see Chapter 6, 7).  
The IMG process has expanded discussions among farmers and has revealed the main causes 
for conflicts, further reasons for rejecting governmental irrigation schemes, and the incentives 
for farmers’ collective action and decision-making behaviors in irrigation practices. The main 
motives for farmers to participate in collective action for irrigation efficiency and 
performance were found to be: fairness in access to water, social capital and ethics within 
farming society as well as economic incentives for poorer farmers to make rational decisions 
for their irrigation management. The challenges that were identified through the research 
interviews included the differences in definition of irrigation efficiency between officials and 
the local farmers, the difficulties that followed changes in governance regime, such as shifting 
costs on farmers, promotion of technological solutions without considering the local 
biophysical and socio-cultural conditions of the irrigation systems. The lack of trust and 
mutual understanding between farmers and officials seems to be one of the main barriers to 
improving cooperation (see Chapter 6).  
A participatory approach is well suited to the concept of integrated water resource 
management (IWRM) (see Chapter 2). It is aimed at improving management through 
effectively engaging stakeholders with different interests into a management process and 
considering social, economic and technical aspects of management particularly at local level 
(Voinov and Gaddis, 2008). The interdisciplinary and participatory modeling carried out in 
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this research was able to engage participants in planning, designing and running a simulation 
exercise for their actual local irrigation practice, providing a rich and valid platform for 
farmers to join the process. This study has also contributed to my innovative research method 
of integrating social simulation with a physical model to achieve collective decision-making. 
The participatory modelling procedure including hydrological modelling gave more 
complexity to the process and fostered wider discussion around the future sustainability of 
Kashan’s aquifer. The integrated methodology empowered local farmers to reflect on the 
advantages and disadvantages of their suggested solutions as different scenarios (see Chapters 
4, 7). However, it was argued that one of the main challenges of using physical models is that 
if a model fails to integrate meaningful assumptions or scenarios, the participatory 
management process may not produce effective management strategies. Thus, my research 
involved knowledgeable farmers as the main resource users, managers and academic 
viewpoints to collaborate in the deliberative creation of the model assumptions and also to 
formulate the most relevant scenarios by local farmers for evaluation and test by the 
hydrological model at local level. It is important that participants do not assume any of the 
outputs from the hydrological model or simulation game as a final solution. Instead this 
process provides collective agreed management options that consider social aspects of 
governmental policy recommendations. Although there is still a need for more interactive 
methods to familiarise farmers with the final results of the hydrological model and the future 
consequences of their short-term decisions, the incorporation of a physical model within 
social studies was recognized by farmers as a potential and effective method to facilitate the 
interactions between authorities’ and farmers’ perspectives and enhance the flow of 
information from local scale to the managerial level (see Chapter 7). 
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The second research question is whether the interdisciplinary and participatory methodology 
approach could lead to improved collective decision-making ability and improved 
groundwater management and sustainability at a local level. To address this question, I 
reviewed the major obstacles as well as driving forces for engaging stakeholders in the 
management process (Chapters 3, 7). Water management in Iran is chiefly under government 
control and management, thus not much space is left for a more democratic approach and 
collaborative management. However, the improvement of management decisions at a local 
level is still possible. My research recommends the introduction of a participatory approach as 
the main principle of ‘good governance’ in order to achieve sustainable water management in 
the future. Building upon theories of common-pool resource management, the use of games in  
collective resources management and the empirical findings in chapter 4, 6 and 7, I have 
evaluated how implementing a more participatory and adaptive management procedure in Iran 
(e.g. developing role-play irrigation game) could be promoted and be effective. Shifting 
towards adaptive and integrative water management has been encouraged widely as a means 
for achieving efficient water use (Stakhiv, 2003). This study has the following implications 
for designing successful adaptive and participatory management protocols. These include: 
structure, careful formulation of objectives and setting up alternative management scenarios, 
collection of data and assessment and monitoring the outcome within an iterative process with 
participants. This study showed that implementation of participatory irrigation management 
for groundwater resources at a local scale in Iran is possible and introducing an innovative 
participatory tool revealed the potential in local water users to evaluate the irrigation 
management policies (see Chapter 7). The challenge of this study was how to integrate 
different hydrological variables with different stakeholders’ perceptions toward groundwater 
use and irrigation management, to create a shared-agreed conceptual model for all. In this 
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modelling effort local participants were engaged in knowledge provision, developing model 
and scenario building as well as interpreting the results and suggesting collective-agreed 
management decisions. The study provided evidence of how participatory research effort 
could lead to more adaptive and acceptable choices, for example selection of sub-surface 
piped irrigation method over drip irrigation system in the Kashan region (see Chapters 6, 7), 
thereby improving water use efficiency, future sustainability of groundwater resources and 
agricultural productivity for local farmers.  
The following improvements in water governance were identified by this research. Firstly, 
from a managerial perspective, the adoption of a new scheme or project requires that farmers 
and governmental bodies reach common agreements around alternative solutions that include 
benefits and profitability for farmers as well as groundwater sustainability. More effective 
management decisions can be achieved when projects are first designed and introduced at a 
local level and within a participatory process that includes different farmers’ viewpoints, 
conflicts and motives for collective action. The introduction, implementation and the 
government financial support mechanism of a new irrigation scheme or system is key and has 
a crucial impact on farmers’ decision-making behaviours regarding whether to adopt or reject 
the project, as the findings discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Secondly, a lack of critical evaluation of management projects and governance systems in 
Iran has resulted in ineffective management strategies and outcomes which are designed in a 
top-down manner. For example the authoritative approach towards reducing water rights to 
one-third, without enough investigation and comprehensive evaluation of the local conditions 
has caused anxiety and dissatisfaction among farmers’ communities in Iran specifically in 
drier parts such as in Kashan. This study tried to address the farmers’ problem by empowering 
their decision-making ability and by ensuring them that their collective action and agreement, 
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when choosing a suitable irrigation scheme, can influence policy decision-makers to impose 
the most appropriate management option (see Chapter 6).  
Thirdly, a lack of integrated approaches in irrigation management decisions and no 
discernable improvement in agricultural productivity in Iran has led to further 
disappointments and distrust among farmers towards the effectiveness of governmental 
projects and even higher economic burden for poorer farmers as a result of reducing their 
agricultural revenue (see Chapter 6).  The lack of trust and mutual understanding between 
farmers and officials seems to be one of the main barriers for improving cooperation, for 
example as farmers assume the proposed solutions are brought from abroad. However this 
study suggested that the inclusion of farmers in the design, planning and action within the 
participatory modelling process created a sense of ownership and trust in the outcomes and in 
the final management solutions. Observing the declining trend in groundwater level and 
storage capacity (which was agreed by farmers) could raise their awareness about the 
irreversible degradation of the groundwater resources (see Chapter 7). For example discussing 
the hydrological modeling results with farmers, evaluated their own scenarios, fostered more 
in-depth discussion and gave educational advantages for farmers. Viewing statistical graphs 
was a new experience for the farmers. They expressed their knowledge more confidently 
about declining groundwater and its interaction with surface water and climate change 
parameters. 
This study in brief, aimed to improve local capacity and collective decision-making amongst 
farmers to move towards adaptive management solutions in the future. Through the interviews, 
IMG and associated discussions, participants began to see the 'whole picture' emerging from 
interactions between technical, socio-economic and political issues affecting irrigation 
management (Dionnet et al., 2008). It can therefore be concluded that introducing new 
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irrigation technologies to improve efficiency needs to match with farmers’ own needs, 
definitions and expectations of efficiency. These needs include; to increase the accessibility of 
available water to their lands, and to maintain their production level, particularly for small-
scale farmers. As part of an analysis of farmers’ behavior and the factors affecting their 
decision-making process, this study has further explored some of the specific factors and 
reasons for such behaviors. The main reason for farmers’ lack of interest to join government 
projects and thus improve adaptive management in the region is a lack of adaptability of the 
irrigation management solution offered. These governmental solutions do not take sufficient 
account of the biophysical, economic, social and cultural aspects of the local irrigation 
context.  Externally imposed rules have consequent social, institutional and political outcomes 
which can have a significant impact on every farmer’s life and on the agricultural industry. 
Thus the irrigation management game demonstrated the major impact that management 
decisions relating to the agricultural system can have on farmers’ livelihood and agricultural 
production in general. On the other hand, engaging groundwater users’ perspectives and 
considering their main challenges and difficulties in irrigation management can facilitate 
introducing a more suitable irrigation technology and improve collective agreement for 
adoption of governmental policy schemes. 
There is also a lack of capacity building programmes to improve farmers’ decision-making 
abilities. In the long-term, this has led to social and financial constraints in terms of economic 
difficulties for poor farmers to sustain their livelihood.  The study emphasised the crucial role 
of local informal meetings as the main support for integrating locals’ knowledge and 
perspectives into management decisions. Such local institutions which can be established 
through farmers’ meetings at local level (e.g. at a local mosque, where interviews were 
conducted) promote social capital and empower farmers’ decision-making abilities within 
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participatory irrigation management. The research recommends that the participatory 
modelling process could have further value if farmers’ viewpoints or experience can influence 
the management decisions of local agencies. It could assist officials to introduce technologies 
or a particular management scheme more adaptable to the local need. The use of game in this 
study proved to have some insightful outcomes in comparison with conventional participatory 
methods, as it triggers imagination of game participants thereby, facilitating discussion and 
revealing farmers’ underlying behaviours and attitudes. The study argues that participatory 
management methods which produce more adaptive management options under uncertainties 
of complex groundwater resources and irrigation system have the potential to improve 
governance and management approaches of groundwater irrigation systems. A game can 
create an experiential learning platform for farmers on their irrigation system and imposing 
future management scenarios to be evaluated. The IMG visualised irrigation system dynamics 
and social interactions by giving farmers their actual roles in a game and real rules which 
added complexity to a simplified board game model, this facilitated farmers interactions, 
revealed their underlying behaviors and flow of information, which is not achievable in usual 
interviewing methods. Using an interdisciplinary method and a participatory and bottom-up 
approach could bring local farmers and their rich knowledge into governmental policy 
management and plans. This will assist policy makers as well as researchers to better 
understand farmers’ perspectives, their driving forces, obstacles to change, the main motives 
for policy scheme adoption and also their main challenges at local farming system (discussed 
in Chapters 6 and 7). This study also recommends that while participatory modeling in natural 
resource management is widespread globally, there has been limited effort to pursue 
interdisciplinary methods which combine physical and social science data in order to engage 
local users into the plan, design and implementation of the project.  
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To cope with future droughts under increased water demand, there is a need for more 
innovative and participatory management methods including models of future water use and 
decline trends. The use of IMG as a novel methodological process under the authoritative 
governance regime of Iran was a valuable experience that also proved the existence of 
potential, deep knowledge of farmers and their capacities and motives for evaluating 
management decisions and to reach well-informed management strategies. It is important that 
locally-based solutions are integrated and valued in decision-making and irrigation 
management policies and those are tailored to the local hydro-ecological irrigation context in 
order that they can eventually improve agricultural water use efficiency and productivity. The 
common-agreed policies and management options should be developed under suitable 
institutional settings which empower farmers by engaging them in management processes as 
key stakeholders. 
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Appendix 1 
                   
                  Interview Guide: Local Farmers in Kashan and associated Villages 
 
Personal Information:  
Serial no: 
Sector: 
Rural: 
Date of Interview:  
Interviewee:   Gender:  Age:   Mobile Number: 
Name of Farm: 
Location of Farm: 
Farm establishment date: 
General Questions on Occupations, Ownership Status, Cultivation Pattern, Irrigation 
Methods: 
Is agriculture your main job? How many years you are doing agriculture? Do you have any 
other occupation? 
What are your responsibilities/roles in agricultural activities? 
Are you satisfied with your income from agriculture? 
Are you the main land owner? How large is your farmland area? 
If you are sharing your land how many farmers you are working with? 
What is your cultivation pattern in different seasons? 
What is your irrigation method?  
 
Questions from local Farmers on Water Value and Traditional Irrigation Practices: 
How local people value their natural systems? (Their worldview or understanding) 
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How they value water resources? 
How much people believe in ethics and Islamic ethics? 
How much they are relied or motivated about considering Islamic ethics in their water 
consumption behaviour? 
How modern allocation schemes affected farmers’ traditional perspectives and behaviours 
towards agricultural water consumption? 
How inappropriate governance in the past affected farmers attitudes towards new 
governmental water scheme projects? 
What are farmer’s perspectives towards reducing agricultural water consumption? 
Which factors affected farmers’ behaviours and attitudes towards reducing agricultural water 
consumption? 
What are the most important physical and social factors which will lead drip irrigation method 
to reduce water abstraction rate? 
To what extent increased water use efficiency will improve trust between farmers towards 
sustainable water management schemes? 
How to build trust and effective collaboration between farmers and water stakeholder 
agencies? 
How different governance structures affect individuals' incentives and capabilities to cope 
with collective-action problems involved in system operation and maintenance?  
How diverse combinations of institutions and engineering infrastructures affect irrigation 
governance, management, and performance? 
Compare Agency-managed Irrigation system with Farmers-managed irrigation system with 
reference to how they affect the intensive structures faced by irrigation officials and farmers 
on the system? 
How incentives affect actions and interactions of officials and farmers that in turn affect 
irrigation performance.
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Social and Cultural Questions: Kashan  
 
What is your current agricultural water condition? Do you see any reasons to reduce/increase 
your water abstraction? 
Do you cooperate/negotiate with any water institutions or water experts? What are their 
responsibilities? Do you trust them? 
What are the most common problems/concerns for farmers in this region? 
If in the worst situation your well dry up, which organization you ask for support? 
What is your prediction for future agricultural water status for you area? 
Will you cooperate in participatory irrigation management for your farmland in the future? 
When is the best time for you to take part in the meeting? Where? 
Have you ever participated in any cooperative or participatory activities for agriculture or 
irrigation management? If yes, what is your experience? 
Would you accept new ideas or methods in agricultural or irrigation practices? Do you use 
any innovative method for irrigation? 
How traditional ethics influenced farmers’ preferences about modern system of water 
allocation? 
How modern system of water allocation has affected your agricultural activities and your 
income? 
Are you interested to increase your knowledge about new irrigation systems? Why this is 
important for you? 
What is your preferred ways/organization to receive new information about irrigation 
management? 
Governmental or public sector 
Private sector/water experts 
Water association 
Farmers 
What is the main factor for rejecting new irrigation scheme?  
Lack of the participatory rules and legislations 
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Negative previous experiences 
Lack of knowledge and awareness 
Technical and planning weaknesses 
All cases 
Which factors would increase/affect your trust in agricultural water schemes? 
 
Irrigation and agricultural Issues: 
Would you emphasize on using traditional irrigation systems? To what extend those systems 
are in use? 
What are the advantages or disadvantages of using your irrigation method? 
Do you know about using intelligent water meter scheme to control water abstraction rate? 
What do you think about this scheme? 
Would you apply Tooba scheme for your farmland? Which factors affect your decision to 
accept or reject it? 
Do you know farmers who have applied Tooba schemes for their garden? How would they 
evaluate it? 
Have you ever had a successful cultivation? What were the main factors/reasons of this 
success? 
Do you think of changing your cultivation pattern to halophyte crops? (Less water 
consumption plants?) What do you think about this method? 
 
The most important factor on farmers’ participation: 
These factors are essential in communities and farmers’ cooperation in participatory 
management, and can assist to motivate farmers’ Participation: 
 
Individual/personal factors 
The level of knowledge, and accepting risk by farmers (What is the level of your literature? 
To what extent you would accept risks?  
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Responsibilities and farmers’ capability (What are your responsibilities and your roles in 
agriculture?) 
Individual benefits (How do you benefit from agriculture?) 
Ages (What is your age?) 
Farmers’ land owner status (Do you have your own property right? What is your land 
ownership status?) 
Income (Are you satisfied with your income from agricultural products?) 
Work Experience (How many years you are doing agriculture? Do you have any other 
occupations? 
Economic factors 
The economic status of farmers and their incomes (What is your economic status/ What is 
your average income?) 
The cost of irrigation and drainage canals (How much irrigation canals or water schemes 
costs?) 
The occupation status and job security in area (What is your job status and security?) 
 
Land Use and Ownership status 
1-What is the history of farming in this region and what's the history of this particular farm? 
What is the farmland size and water provision? Did the farm exist before the modern era of 
deeper wells and motor pumps? 
2-Was the land sub-divided as inheritance? Were the water rights also subdivided in exactly 
the same way, or were they reallocated or sold in a different way? 
3-What's the future of farming in this area?  What do you see as the biggest problems or 
opportunities in the future? 
4-How many years have you been living and working in this region? 
5-How did you gain your land ownership? Devoted□      Heritage□          Buying□        
Rented□        Devoted-heritage□           Heritage-buying □        Rented-devoted□   Heritage-
rented□         Devoted-buying□        other ways of obtaining land/water ownership? .... 
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6-What is your current land ownership status?........ What is the size of your farmland and how 
many pieces you have? 
5-What is your cultivation pattern this year? and what is the size of under cultivation for each 
crop? 
6-How much water do you use? How many hours is your water right? 
7-In how many motor pumps (well) you have a share? 
8-If you are a Qanat shared user, what is your water right status? 
9-Do you have any other occupation apart from agriculture? Is agriculture your main source 
of income? 
To measure the level of farmers’ willingness for investment in Agriculture in the future: 
10-Have you ever invested in agricultural field? Yes□     No□        Gardening□     type of 
garden........  Size of garden.........          Water store (pool)  □         House inside the farm□      
Land surfacing□      pipeline□       Machinery□   which types.....  Pressure Irrigation□   
Canalization□          other investments....... 
10-1-How did you fund these investments? 
Farm income□               Bank loans□          Both□         other sources............ 
10-2-Have you invested by yourself or in share? Alone□           Shared□           how many 
people.... 
11-Have you ever invested in Husbandry? No□             Yes□      Number of 
domestics...........         Establishing stable□ 
11-1-How did you fund it? Was it shared or an individual investment? 
Farm income□               Bank loan□         Both□           other............ 
12-If one day you pass away how would you predict the future of your land in heritage 
process? (For example all your kids will sell the land, or one of them buys it from the rest or 
rent it, etc....) 
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13-Do you want your children to continue your job? If your answer is no, why? 
Very much□      Very□        to some extend□      not very□    too little□ 
13-1-How much your children would like to continue your job? 
Very much□    very□  to some extend□   not very□         too little□ 
14-If you gain any fund, what would be your first option to invest or spend the money for 
yourself or your children for a better future? 
15-What are the agricultural activities that require investments? 
15-1-What are the investment can be done by the government to solve your water problems? 
16-Do you think for solving agricultural water problem such as reduction in water well, 
manure provision or marketing for a specific crop, what are the best strategies to be used? 
17-Is any of the following problem has occurred for your pump or your well? 
Decrease water level Yes□   No□ Make the well deeper Yes□     No□      Transferring 
wells’ location   yes□   No□  Changing pipes and motor pumps       Yes□     No□ 
17-1-How did you cope with your particular water related problem? 
Hydro-ecological characteristics of the region 
18-How rainfall pattern has been changed within recent decades in your region? 
19-Do you have a soil salinity problem? Yes□ No□ 
19-1-If yes, to what extend it has affected your cultivation? 
Very much□    very□  to some extend□   not very□         too little□ 
19-2-How would you combat soil salinity? Which methods are you using to remove salinity 
from your lands? Or which kind of crops are you cultivating that are tolerance to salinity? 
 
Questions relate to access to groundwater and social inequity 
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1. Are there any informal arrangements organised by small-scale farmers for accessing to 
groundwater? Why do they need this, and what is their approach? 
2. Do you think access to groundwater is equal between small-scale and large-scale farmers? 
How land integration can improve farmers’ access to water and improve irrigation efficiency? 
2.1. If there is an unequal access to groundwater, how has this affected small-scale farmer? 
How farmers overcame this differentiation? 
2.2. Which factors do you believe influenced farmers’ access to groundwater? Do farmers 
think that access to groundwater is related to financial capabilities?  
2.3. How much land ownership status (small or large scale, assignees or tenant) has affected 
social inequity in terms of accessing groundwater and irrigation distribution systems? 
2.4. How farmers have secured their access to water resources? Which obstacles exist against 
their water security? 
3. How forestation (plantation) scheme by natural resources department, has affected 
groundwater level and soil condition in your region? 
4.1. Are there any ethical (religion) or traditional norms that affected farmers’ preferences in 
adapting or rejecting the new water restrictions? (and changes in water right system?) 
5. Do farmers have a sense of ownership over aquifers? To whom they believe groundwater 
belongs? 
5.1. What are farmers’ main reasons for rejecting groundwater restrictions, if they believe that 
groundwater control is the government responsibility? 
6. Is there any (higher) fee charge for large-scale farmers for over-abstraction? 
7. What is the mechanism of the (public) lands property rights, operated by assignees or 
tenants? Who are assignees and tenants and why they rent their lands? 
7.1. Are the lands public? Does any new arrival (non-farmers) can buy or rent a land here and 
obtain water right? 
8. Howdid you obtain your land ownership? 
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(Devoted□       Heritage□         Buy□         Rent□        Devoted-heritage□    Heritage-buying□      
Rented-devoted□     Heritage-rented□      Devoted-buying□) 
 
Questions related to incentives for collective action 
9. What is the subsidization mechanism in the region? 
10. Why do you think the government has removed electricity subsidize from pumps? Did it 
make conflict between farmers and officials? 
11. How much external event such as drought has incentivized collective action among 
farmers and on their cooperation? 
 
Understanding farmers strategies toward groundwater use 
12. How much farmers believe that surface irrigation (flood irrigation) systems will lead to 
increase groundwater recharge rate? 
12.1. How do you think water inflows and outflows into the groundwater in this basin? 
13. Are farmers willing to increase their production level or they want to maintain the same 
production level? How it differs about large-scale farmers? 
13.1. How groundwater development resulted in your socioeconomic transition? How much 
pump technology brought economic and social welfare for you? 
14. What are the short-term strategies to cope with scarcity and salinity? What are the long-
term policies to cope with this problem? What are the conflicting issues? 
15. Do you concern about the volume of water you use for farming? How much protection of 
groundwater is important for you? Which organisation or body should be responsible or make 
decisions about this?  
(Islamic Form□      Each farmer□A society of all motor pump owners□ Old and 
reliableleader□A governmental organisation such as Irrigation management agency□) 
16. Which activities are overtaken by the government to cope or assist farmers with water 
crisis situation? What is their support for farmers in uneven climatic situation?(e.g. hailstone) 
17. Have you ever requested to obtain insurance through your cooperatives? 
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Appendix 2 
                Interview Guide: Governmental Organizations in Kashan 
Personal Information Name, Age, Occupation, Size of land, Land and water ownership status, 
Type of irrigation infrastructures,   
General Questions: Water and Climate Changes in the Region 
Which organizations are involved in addressing key issues and problems related to impacts of 
Climate change/ water resources problems? 
What are the policy or strategy documents to guide their work? 
What are the activities related to adaptation? 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the institutions? 
How people have access to information on current and future water problems? 
What livelihood or economic sectors are the most vulnerable to climate change impacts (water 
shortage problems?) 
Local water organizations: 
How water is used? In which economic sectors? 
Who is entitled to it? 
How it is managed? 
The size and technology of new projects? 
The role of the public in water management? The role of the equity in water treatments and 
distribution? 
Questions related to incentives for collective action 
9. What is the subsidization mechanism in the region? 
9.1. Does government pay compensation for reducing water entitlements? Is an entitlement 
reduction has be adjusted in favour of irrigators who are active users and non-active users? 
10. Why do you think the government has removed electricity subsidize from pumps? Did it 
make conflict between farmers and officials? 
11. How much external event such as drought has incentivized collective action among 
farmers and on their cooperation? 
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Appendix 3 
Two General Types of Farmers in Local Farming Villages of Kashan District 
(Iran) 
 Source: Author, 2014 (Adapted idea from Bekkar et al., 2009) 
 
 
Large-scale Farmers Small-scale Farmers 
-Private pumps owners 
-Integrated lands/Individual land 
properties 
-Drip Irrigation  
-Capital (to bring more water into their 
farms) 
-High valued crops  
(for national market) 
-Interested in more investment for the 
higher productivity / expanding cultivation 
areas 
-Higher income 
                                 
Offensive/Chasing Strategies: 
 
-Individual Access to groundwater 
-Water-intensive farming 
-Less responsible towards sustainable 
management (do not adapt their water use 
to groundwater stress level) 
-Less cooperative in collective actions 
-Applying Less adaptive strategies 
(drilling deeper wells, renting land with 
more available water, organizing 
partnership with farmers who own wells) 
-Well-connected to Gov. officials 
-Access to loans and Gov. equipment 
-Better accessed to water resources, 
through purchasing more lands and their 
entitled water rights 
-Collective pumps owners 
-Collective/Shared  lands 
Canal or flood irrigation methods 
-Limited capital 
-Less valued crops and seasonal (short-
duration) crops (to maintain livelihood) 
-Interested in water-saving mechanisms 
and maintaining current production level 
-Low income 
 
 
 
 
Defensive/Adaptive Strategies: 
 
-Collective access to groundwater 
-More responsible towards sustainable 
management (adapt their water use to 
groundwater status) 
-Highly co-operative in collective activities 
-More adaptive strategies 
(adapting farming to available water, 
cultivating less water demand crops, 
change sowing dates, land preparation, 
improving irrigation distribution systems) 
-Weak connections to Gov. agencies 
-Very difficult access to Governmental 
loans  
-More restricted access to groundwater, as 
it takes long time to negotiate on costs and 
drill deeper well due to financial 
difficulties 
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Appendix 4 
              Farmers' Classification Based on Statistic Centre of Iran (1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capitalist Farmers: individuals or institutions who own the farm. They produce 
crops for national and international markets. To reduce labour and other farming 
costs they produce high valued crops and use intensive cultivation (e.g. pistachio, 
cotton, sugar beet) and they usually pay wages to the work-force labours. This 
group of farmers are previous landlords during feudalism and before land reform 
in Iran. 
Independent farmers (peasant): this group owns the land, water and farming 
tools. They rely on family members as labour, but production is not merely for 
their own consumption (livelihoods), they offer part of their cultivation to the 
local market (bazaar). Due to land heritage and consequently fragmentation of 
their lands they are under economic pressures. These groups of farmers are 
classified under three levels: low class, intermediate and upper classes. The 
medium and low classes are faced with scattered and small-scale lands problems. 
(This group were workers during feudalism system, and they were working for 
the rural landlords on the large pieces of lands) 
Landowners: Generally are residents in cities, based on the size of their lands 
are divided into three groups of small-scale, medium-scale and large-scale. 
Farming is their second job and their aim of farming is to improve their 
economic status. 
Tenants: those who have the authority of land and water by paying a fixed 
amount of rent. 
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Appendix 5 
Kashan Aquifer Water Balance 
 
Source: Regional Water Resources Management of Kashan (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
                
 
 
 
Recharge Factors Million 
Cubic 
Metres  
Discharge Factors Million Cubic 
Metre 
Infiltration of Rainfall in Plain 22 Groundwater Abstraction 283 
Infiltration of streams, and runoffs 35 Qanat and Spring 
Extraction 
9 
Infiltration from Irrigation 73   
Infiltration from swage 27   
Groundwater Inflow rate? 139 
Total 157 Total 292 
Changes in groundwater storage -135 
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Appendix 6 
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